The Belgravia Dispatch: Train and Equip

March 02, 2006

Train and Equip

Greg Dussaq E-mails in, re: Iraq:

Greg, correct me if I am wrong, but as far as I know the Iraq army and police are primarily composed of Shiites and Kurds. This fact alone does absolutely nothing to appease the Sunnis who live in permanent fear of retribution from both these groups. While I don't think the US should shy away from building these forces, I am a little hesitant as to the degree of priority we place them in. I am a little worried that in transferring control over sooner than later we are allowing these separate factions to muscle a lot of their differences onto the negotiating table. The hearts and minds will be won by directly influencing the quality of life of the population at large via infrastructure improvements and crisis control, not through the build up of security forces that have been know to commit atrocities of their own against the same people they are supposed to protect.

Are we emphasizing T&E too much, and paying too little attention to infrastructure protection and the like? Maybe, but what's certain is that a multi-ethnic, cohesive Iraqi Army (and police forces) are desparately needed--if we mean to have any hope of Iraq being a viable, unitary state with democratic governance structures. We've made a lot of progress on T&E, but I'd bet you if US troops went down below, say, 80,000-100,000 anytime soon well, we'd see that Army splinter into militias might quick.

Posted by Gregory at March 2, 2006 11:35 PM | TrackBack (0)

Comments

Iraq is not nearly self-supporting in food. The population survives by wheat shipped in through Basra.

It follows that anybody who can stop the distribution of food from Basra north to any particular area, could severely inconvenience the people of that area. All it takes for mass starvation is that key bureaucrats make that choice.

Posted by: J Thomas at March 3, 2006 02:02 AM | Permalink to this comment

The latest Big Idea in Foreign Affairs ("Iraqization," in particular, is likely to make matters worse, not better.) argues a similar point as this email. We are not even quite sure what the ethnic/religious composition of the Iraqi forces actually is. That shows a great lacking in situational awareness.

It also seems, based on some blogging and published reports, that the Sectarianization of the armed forces has happened whether our troops are in Iraq. What caused/continues to cause this? Perhaps an too much focus on getting men in uniform.

The deep, dark secret (that should be none of those adjectives nor a secret) is that we are going to have to stay in Iraq in force for a very long time in order to keep the entire situation from collapsing -- more than it has collapsed already. Bush won't admit it, and that is undermining the chance of success as the American people (and the Iraqis) want out. What has been necessary since 2004 is Bush to apologize for misreading the geopolitical situation in Iraq and throwing tremendous money and lives into a Grand Idea. It's failed. That so much is clear. The world is not safer, nor is it better. We are in a terrible bind, yet Bush is either unaware or does not want to admit this.

Imagine it is 2010. What does it look like to you? Which is more likely: America has withdrawn and Iraq is in chaos or ruled (in part) by theocracy, or we're still rebuilding at about -- or close to -- the present commitment level?

Posted by: Chris at March 3, 2006 04:13 PM | Permalink to this comment

When you post multiple posts like this I'm conflicted as to where to place my comment. In the last week we've had Fukiyama, Buckley and Will endorse defining victory down and getting out. You rightly point out that the Sunni's have been, at best, sullen passive fencesitters who are now waking up to the consequenses of their passivity. In the past two years we have been cajoling them to get on the bus, we've insisted that the Defense Minister be a Sunni, etc. I think we've done everything that could be done on this narrow issue, definitely more than the Sunni community, in aggregate, deserve. I know we will be in country until 2009, but I do not agree that aid and comfort for the Sunni's should be at the top of our priority list.

Posted by: wks at March 3, 2006 07:04 PM | Permalink to this comment

Greg, since you only quoted from your e-mailer I have to ask whether he mentioned what Iraq's Sunni Arabs had to be "permanently afraid" of. For what might non-Sunni Arabs seek retribution?

Surely the absurdity of talk about infrastructure and crisis control ought to be self-evident by this point. The insurgency in Iraq has created its own dynamic; the reaction it has sparked won't diminish as long as the insurgency continues.

Posted by: Zathras at March 3, 2006 07:11 PM | Permalink to this comment

It looks far more likely to me that we'll be out by then.

The consensus for staying the course is weakening fast. Can it last 4 more years? Not likely.

Bush has committed to a troop reduction before the November 2006 elections. Our military needs that. Republican incumbents need that. But what's the chance things fail to get dramatically worse before we send the extra troops back to iraq? It's the perfect time to do more attacks on US forces. Say we got a couple of marines-in-lebanon attacks, 300 casualties one time, 500 another, we'd start looking whether we really want to raise enough troops to raise the level again. Alternatively, we could hunker down and be pretty much useless, and get the reports of what iraqis do to each other when we don't interfere. Or we could do a bunch of big airstrikes....

So then if we're still hanging in there in 2008 we'll need another drawdown to persuade voters that this time we're winning. Same thing all over. And by that time we won't be able to hide how mant casualties the iraqis are taking.

And if we're still staying the course in 2010, we'll need yet another drawdown to show the voters we aren't losing.

There are too many ways to fail before 2010. To hang in there that long we need to avoid all of them. Unlikely.

Posted by: J Thomas at March 3, 2006 09:01 PM | Permalink to this comment

	« Iran and the Shrine \| Main \| Re: The Execrable David Irving » March 02, 2006 Train and Equip Greg Dussaq E-mails in, re: Iraq: Greg, correct me if I am wrong, but as far as I know the Iraq army and police are primarily composed of Shiites and Kurds. This fact alone does absolutely nothing to appease the Sunnis who live in permanent fear of retribution from both these groups. While I don't think the US should shy away from building these forces, I am a little hesitant as to the degree of priority we place them in. I am a little worried that in transferring control over sooner than later we are allowing these separate factions to muscle a lot of their differences onto the negotiating table. The hearts and minds will be won by directly influencing the quality of life of the population at large via infrastructure improvements and crisis control, not through the build up of security forces that have been know to commit atrocities of their own against the same people they are supposed to protect. Are we emphasizing T&E too much, and paying too little attention to infrastructure protection and the like? Maybe, but what's certain is that a multi-ethnic, cohesive Iraqi Army (and police forces) are desparately needed--if we mean to have any hope of Iraq being a viable, unitary state with democratic governance structures. We've made a lot of progress on T&E, but I'd bet you if US troops went down below, say, 80,000-100,000 anytime soon well, we'd see that Army splinter into militias might quick. Posted by Gregory at March 2, 2006 11:35 PM \| TrackBack (0) Comments Iraq is not nearly self-supporting in food. The population survives by wheat shipped in through Basra. It follows that anybody who can stop the distribution of food from Basra north to any particular area, could severely inconvenience the people of that area. All it takes for mass starvation is that key bureaucrats make that choice. Posted by: J Thomas at March 3, 2006 02:02 AM \| Permalink to this comment The latest Big Idea in Foreign Affairs ("Iraqization," in particular, is likely to make matters worse, not better.) argues a similar point as this email. We are not even quite sure what the ethnic/religious composition of the Iraqi forces actually is. That shows a great lacking in situational awareness. It also seems, based on some blogging and published reports, that the Sectarianization of the armed forces has happened whether our troops are in Iraq. What caused/continues to cause this? Perhaps an too much focus on getting men in uniform. The deep, dark secret (that should be none of those adjectives nor a secret) is that we are going to have to stay in Iraq in force for a very long time in order to keep the entire situation from collapsing -- more than it has collapsed already. Bush won't admit it, and that is undermining the chance of success as the American people (and the Iraqis) want out. What has been necessary since 2004 is Bush to apologize for misreading the geopolitical situation in Iraq and throwing tremendous money and lives into a Grand Idea. It's failed. That so much is clear. The world is not safer, nor is it better. We are in a terrible bind, yet Bush is either unaware or does not want to admit this. Imagine it is 2010. What does it look like to you? Which is more likely: America has withdrawn and Iraq is in chaos or ruled (in part) by theocracy, or we're still rebuilding at about -- or close to -- the present commitment level? Posted by: Chris at March 3, 2006 04:13 PM \| Permalink to this comment When you post multiple posts like this I'm conflicted as to where to place my comment. In the last week we've had Fukiyama, Buckley and Will endorse defining victory down and getting out. You rightly point out that the Sunni's have been, at best, sullen passive fencesitters who are now waking up to the consequenses of their passivity. In the past two years we have been cajoling them to get on the bus, we've insisted that the Defense Minister be a Sunni, etc. I think we've done everything that could be done on this narrow issue, definitely more than the Sunni community, in aggregate, deserve. I know we will be in country until 2009, but I do not agree that aid and comfort for the Sunni's should be at the top of our priority list. Posted by: wks at March 3, 2006 07:04 PM \| Permalink to this comment Greg, since you only quoted from your e-mailer I have to ask whether he mentioned what Iraq's Sunni Arabs had to be "permanently afraid" of. For what might non-Sunni Arabs seek retribution? Surely the absurdity of talk about infrastructure and crisis control ought to be self-evident by this point. The insurgency in Iraq has created its own dynamic; the reaction it has sparked won't diminish as long as the insurgency continues. Posted by: Zathras at March 3, 2006 07:11 PM \| Permalink to this comment It looks far more likely to me that we'll be out by then. The consensus for staying the course is weakening fast. Can it last 4 more years? Not likely. Bush has committed to a troop reduction before the November 2006 elections. Our military needs that. Republican incumbents need that. But what's the chance things fail to get dramatically worse before we send the extra troops back to iraq? It's the perfect time to do more attacks on US forces. Say we got a couple of marines-in-lebanon attacks, 300 casualties one time, 500 another, we'd start looking whether we really want to raise enough troops to raise the level again. Alternatively, we could hunker down and be pretty much useless, and get the reports of what iraqis do to each other when we don't interfere. Or we could do a bunch of big airstrikes.... So then if we're still hanging in there in 2008 we'll need another drawdown to persuade voters that this time we're winning. Same thing all over. And by that time we won't be able to hide how mant casualties the iraqis are taking. And if we're still staying the course in 2010, we'll need yet another drawdown to show the voters we aren't losing. There are too many ways to fail before 2010. To hang in there that long we need to avoid all of them. Unlikely. Posted by: J Thomas at March 3, 2006 09:01 PM \| Permalink to this comment		Reviews of Belgravia Dispatch "Awake" --New York Times "Always-Worth Reading" --Andrew Sullivan Recent Entries A Brief (and Belated) Word on Chas Freeman What Would Real--Rather Than Rhetorical--Change in U.S. Foreign Policy Look Like? Of War, and Tent Hospitals The Obama Imperative Some Addt'l Thoughts Re: Georgia McCain: Let's Compound the Blunder! Georgia On My Mind Should We De-Emphasize The Terror Threat in U.S. Foreign Policy? 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