July 20, 2006

Cordesman Weighs In...

Anthony Cordesman:

Israel may or may not have played into the hands of Hamas, Hizbollah, Iran and Syria. The scale of its escalation showed it could not be trapped into massive prisoner swaps, but it has also almost certainly radicalised many more young Palestinians and Arabs. Even if Palestinians and/or Hizbollah are intimidated into a ceasefire, the radicals are likely to benefit from Israel’s actions. It is also clear that rockets, second fronts, tunnels and other measures can at least partially defeat Israel’s security barriers, and new attacks can begin at any time.

Both sides can escalate the war process. The problem is that neither Israel nor the Palestinians can really win; their values and goals are steadily diverging, and any final settlement is less and less likely. The Israeli-Palestinian war of attrition since September 2000 will continue to escalate to nowhere; outside diplomacy will accomplish nothing real because there is no bargain acceptable to both sides, and the Israeli and Palestinian centre not only cannot hold, it cannot move forward. Worse, Hizbollah and Iranian, Syrian and Islamist extremists can all play a spoiler role at any time, and broaden the conflict at minimal risk, attacking both the US and Israel indirectly with considerable safety.

If there is to be any real hope, two things have to happen. First, the UN has to help Lebanon actually disarm Hizbollah, stop it from receiving further arms from Iran and Syria and prevent it sending military aid to Hamas. Brokering a ceasefire and another hollow UN peacekeeping force will have a short-term cosmetic impact, at best. Second, the Quartet group of Middle East mediators – the US, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations – should break its near silence to put major pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians: on Israel, to halt unilateral expansion into the West Bank and aid moderate Palestinian voices such as Mr Abbas; and on the Palestinians, to understand that aid and support are tied to either Hamas changing or going. This must be followed by a “road map” that confronts both sides with a true peace plan, specific final settlement proposals and time schedule – a plan over which the Quartet members unite and constantly pressure both sides to adopt. Half measures and conventional diplomacy in the current situation have all the value of putting lipstick on a pig and will be neither Halal nor Kosher. [emphasis added]

Fat chance, Mr. Cordesman. Under this Administration, we've totally abdicated any real leadership role on peace process diplomacy. It's another "quaint" figment from the past, not appropriate for these brave new times. John Judis, over at TNR, explains more:

When George W. Bush assumed the presidency in January 2001, he withdrew from the ongoing negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians that had begun at Camp David and continued at Taba. These might have broken down anyway--the second intifada had started--but Bush's alternative of letting matters take their own course only made things worse. Bush waited until April 2002 to declare the mounting violence between Israelis and Palestinians unacceptable, but even then he proved incapable of bringing the two sides together to halt it. By that point, Bush had his own preoccupation: the coming invasion of Iraq.

Pressured by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush eventually agreed to a "road map" for peace, but his principal means of seeking peace in the region were based on a neoconservative fantasy about the road to Jerusalem passing through Baghdad (which presumed the success of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq) and on the assumption that Palestinian elections would result in a moderate alternative to the late Yasir Arafat. When these strategies failed, the administration pulled back its diplomatic effort. Its response to Hamas's election has been confused and divided, and helped set the stage for the present crisis. As it began, the United States was nowhere to be found. On July 5, Yossi Beilin wrote in Haaretz:

One of the most striking phenomena of recent weeks, given the stepped-up launching of Qassam rockets on Sderot, the painful incident at Kerem Shalom, and the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, is the absence of the American factor. ... [I]n terms of direct influence on the ground, there has been absolute American silence.

What to expect next? One can hope that the Bush administration, like the Nixon administration, will learn from its failures and devote itself to easing, if not resolving, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Unfortunately, Bush's public and private (but overheard) statements at the G-8 summit were not promising.

No, the petulant butter-roll side-bar with Blair, with its profanity-laced musings, and querulous calls for Kofi to "make something happen", and other assorted locker room fare, none of it was particularly promising, it is true.

Not one bit.

Posted by Gregory at July 20, 2006 04:23 AM