The Belgravia Dispatch: Round I: Here She Is...

August 05, 2006

Round I: Here She Is...

Draft UNSC resolution / Projet de résolution du Conseil de Sécurité
The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes [ed. note: root?] that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

PP4: Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP3. Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

OP4. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

OP5. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty and authority;

OP6. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and Lebanon;

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

- delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- deployment of an international force in Lebanon, consistent with paragraph 10 below;

- establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;

- elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

OP7. Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;

OP8. Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;

OP9. Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this regard;

OP10. Expresses its intention, upon confirmation to the Security Council that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the deployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP11. Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons;

OP12. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

OP13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Council's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;

OP14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

So, what now? Comment thread open for those who may wish to weigh in.

N.B: Bolds just sections I found of particular interest by way of kicking off debate, histrionics, etc.

Posted by Gregory at August 5, 2006 11:03 PM | TrackBack (0)

Comments

3 more weeks of conflict, at least?

Posted by: skeptic at August 5, 2006 11:38 PM | Permalink to this comment

well, I think this resolution will not do anything until the Bush administration either 1) puts pressure on Israel to stop its incursions into Lebanon (which won't happen), or 2) talks to Syria and Iran officially (which also won't happen). Israel says they won't stop their incursions until Hezbollah stops firing its missiles and returns the two soldiers, while Hezbollah says it won't stop firing until there is not one Israeli soldier in Lebanon. Both patrons of this proxy battle, Iran and America, are not telling their warriors to back down, so it won't end until one side finally says "enough."

Posted by: Daniel at August 6, 2006 12:38 AM | Permalink to this comment

I LOVVVVVVVVVVE the schadenfreude here. The Bush Admin. working with "Old Europe" (France no less!)! Awesome.

On a non-political note, Bolton did a nice job here. End of next week, both sides will be thoroughly sick of this, so its definetly time.

BTW: Siniora might, publicly, be expressing "reservations" about the text, but given that an Asst. Secy. of State met with him yesterday, I'm guessing he knew what was coming and that, privately, he's cool with it.

Posted by: KevinA at August 6, 2006 12:47 AM | Permalink to this comment

Greg: Something to consider for another post: Will Lebanese public opinion turn against Hezbollah after the shooting stops and aid starts flowing? Understandably, its very pro-Hezbo now, though some ignorant US conservatives don't understand the concept of unifying when being bombed to hell, but will reflection change attitudes?

Posted by: KevinA at August 6, 2006 12:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

One rather suspects with a regain in Shia influence and Hezbullah prestige that the Lebanese might opt for an artful dodge. As in finding a fine little fiction of 'integrating' Hezbullah forces into the military. On paper.

As for the question supra, I would suggest that it is unknowable. It was easy enough to see that the Israeli campaign would generate a rally round the flag effect as it was being executed, presuming at the time what did happen, would. Post-open conflict is subject to too many open questions.

Continue aggressive Israeli pressure - counter productive and misconceived, but typical given their blind spot re Arab politics - will tend to make Jumblatt's critical position less tenable. On the other hand, a back off and a clumsy Syrian re-entry could rebalance.

But do recall, nearly half the Lebanese population is Shia, when you refer to Lebanese public opinion a la the so-called Cedar Revolution, you're refering to non-Shia and urbanite public opinion.

Not synonyms.

So, to quote me very self on 14 July: Second, it strikes me the situ is still too fluid to call winners. Jumblatt is spinning. As he should of course. It depends on what Israel does in large part. Blockade and hitting lots of civilian targets with collateral damage is going over time to provoke nationalist reaction. How long will it take for anger at the foreigners (Israel) to overtake immediate anger with Hizbullah. A balance, both are true, which one wins out depends on how long this lasts. In the long run, the hatred of the foreigner almost always wins.

Who gets to play the role of the hated foreigner, that is your question.

Hezbullah?
Israel?
'Int'l Interposition Force' of bleeding suckers?
Syria?
Iran?

A sporting man might say the odds tend to Israel and Syria being neck-in-neck.

Posted by: The Lounsbury at August 6, 2006 02:41 AM | Permalink to this comment

Unconditional release of the IDF soldiers? I'm sure they're having a good laugh at that one in the Nasrallah bunker. The IDF best get out its checkbook instead.

And what of the Lebanese grocer the IDF plucked out of the Bekka? Does the IDF return that "tasty fish" unconditionally?

And who pays for all this? The "international community." When the US wins a war, it pays for its messes (at least until Iraq came along). Israel always leaves its messes to the "international community."

Bolton vs. Nasrallah! I love it. Bolton will get his clock cleaned.

Posted by: MD at August 6, 2006 02:42 AM | Permalink to this comment

I suspect Hizbollah will honor OP1 and halt its missile attacks, but ignore most of the rest of the provisions. Israel will come under pressure to also stop active offensive operations, and so the violence will slowly wind down. There will be a long after war with many flare-ups of fighting, and no genuine resolution. Eventually Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, and we will pretty much be back to where we started.

Both sides will claim victory. Hizbollah will consider it a victory since it will have survived a war with mighty Israel and still be in Southern Lebanon, and will have increased its prestige. Israel will call it a victory since in the after war it will succeed in destroying most of the rockets and many of the Hizbollah fighters (but both can be replaced). The only big losers will be the hapless civilians (many of them old and feeble or women and children) who always suffer the most in this kind of war, and Lebanon itself which will have to stoically try to rebuild its infrastructure again.

Not a good outcome, but I suppose it's better than a regional war.

Posted by: Levi at August 6, 2006 02:44 AM | Permalink to this comment

'And what of the Lebanese grocer the IDF plucked out of the Bekka? Does the IDF return that "tasty fish" unconditionally?'

Let's hope.

I'm thinking of the Battle of Mogadishu. It's often overlooked that the U.S. forces achieved their objective. Two of Aidid's top men were captured. After the U.S. withdrew they were released unconditionally. The U.S. soldier captured in the battle was also released unconditionally. They absolutely, positively, were NOT swapped for one another.

Posted by: David Tomlin at August 6, 2006 03:28 AM | Permalink to this comment

Strategically (militarily, not perceptually) a cease fire now isn’t to Israel’s advantage. If they agree to a cease fire now, and agree to swap prisoners for the kidnapped soldiers, and even agree to return the sliver of disputed land Hezbollah claims it’s fighting to retrieve, but in return only get an international peace-keeping force as a buffer – they will have ended up with the proverbial short end of the stick.

Hezbollah still possesses at least 7,000 rockets (maybe a lot more), including hundreds of long range missiles capable of reaching major population centers.

Hezbollah isn’t going to turn over those weapons to the Lebanese government. At best, they may move them back if peacekeepers are allowed into Lebanon; and the moment a cease fire is in place, more Iranian weapons will be smuggled into Lebanon, most likely with bigger and badder payloads.

One of the posters above said 3 more weeks of fighting -- I wouldn't be suprised to see 3 more months-- or until Isreal is satisfied they've done significient damage to Hezbollah's longer range missile arsenal....

Posted by: Jay Jerome at August 6, 2006 05:40 AM | Permalink to this comment

As I have written at my blog I think this resolution is DOA because I simply cannot see how Hezbollah can agree to it

http://www.di2.nu/200608/06.htm

Posted by: Francis at August 6, 2006 10:29 AM | Permalink to this comment

I'm struck by the qualifying term “current” placed before the word “crisis” in PP3. Wonder how both sides will spin that? Its there for a reason/s.

Posted by: jonst at August 6, 2006 11:35 AM | Permalink to this comment

What this looks like to me is an effort to craft a UN position that Israel can live with. Under current circumstances, if Israel can live with it Hezbollah cannot.

One could argue that a UN resolution accepted by Israel and rejected by Hezbollah could generate pressure on Hezbollah within Lebanon by people desperate to stop the fighting. According to this theory the fact that sympathy for Hezbollah has skyrocketed among Lebanon's non-Shiite population doesn't mean it has signed on to all of Hezbollah's objectives, and will eventually return to its earlier attitude of resentment of Hezbollah for having dragged the country into a war without consulting anyone.

This argument could of course be completely wrong. The presence of large numbers of Israeli troops on Lebanese territory, plus the damage done by Israel's air campaign to many places unrelated to Hezbollah, may render Lebanese (and public opinion in other Arab countries) indifferent to what governments say at the UN. I have no crystal ball; I'm only saying what it seems to me the UN resolution is intended to do.

Posted by: Zathras at August 7, 2006 12:39 AM | Permalink to this comment

Does Israel trust France? If so, perhaps we're seeing a below-the-surface transformation in French and Old Europe attitudes toward Islamic irridentism. I've read that the most popular candidate in France to replace Chirac has recommended mandatory conscription as one tool to crack down on the Muslim rioters in the banlieues. Perhaps they will be the modern day equivalent of the Buffalo soldiers.

Posted by: wks at August 7, 2006 12:44 AM | Permalink to this comment

At the moment, Hezbollah and the Lebanese government do not seem to be prepared to accept a ceasefire, unless Israel withdraws from Lebanon. Obviously, that would not be acceptable to the Israelis. And the French and anyone else who is prepared to take part in an international force do not see their role as disarming Hezbollah.

But maybe some sort of compromise could be reached with Iran that would allow the violence to cease. There does not appear to be a mood in Tehran for confrontation. Their main aim is to keep Hezbollah as a deterrent against Israel and the US. So perhaps a deal could be reached whereby an international force would take over the areas now controlled by Israel and prevent resupply of rockets to Hezbollah positions, but would not actively seek to further disarm Hezbollah. Maybe Hezbollah would get their convicted killer back in exchange for information on the missing airman.

A deal along those lines of course would be far from implementing resolution 1559. This would have to wait for a longer term deal with Iran, where they were offered security guarantees in exchange for abandoning nuclear fuel enrichment/ development of nuclear weapons.

It is of course possible that Iran would reject any such deal. If so, the future for Lebanon and the region would be bleak.

http://davidp1.blogspot.com/2006/08/what-will-happen-now.html

Posted by: DavidP at August 7, 2006 11:00 AM | Permalink to this comment

A couple more points: mention of Shebaa farms in the draft resolution, but not of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel (not in the Operative Paragraphs). Lebanese government spokesmen are still complaining about the land mines issue, in spite of OP6.

Posted by: DavidP at August 7, 2006 11:30 AM | Permalink to this comment