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August 18, 2006The Israeli-Lebanese Denouement: A Tragicomedy of ErrorsWhen the Israeli-Lebanese situation began to deteriorate, I wrote in this space that the conflict amounted to a “futile, little war”. I subsequently regretted this verbiage, only because it could be construed in a manner that appeared to diminish the tragic loss of life on both sides. This was never my intent. I merely sought to explain that I felt Israel’s effort was doomed from the get-go to be rather futile, not least given the manner by which she was pursuing the campaign. I believe events have, more or less, fully borne my analysis out. First, let me stress that no comprehensive, lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be achieved by force of arms. So while Israel certainly has a right to self-defense, it should not labor under the misconception that it can eradicate or totally defang or otherwise defeat her foes militarily in some maximal fashion. This is simply not possible, short of a series of nuclear holocausts, perhaps, and so it was surprising to see so many rabid commentators, both here and in Israel, chanting on about Israel not having the will to win, to win totally, that is. This is claptrap, chimerical, absurd—although it appears to provide varied commentators here in New York City and down in Washington with a frisson of macho-thrill—that is, before they abscond back to their think-tank cubicles feeling manlier about having called for a good, old-fashioned bombs-away Armageddon in the Holy Land. Let’s be clear. Beating Hezbollah ultimately must rely more on what might be described as counter-insurgency tactics, not some Dresden redux. To beat back Hezbollah one must moderate the 40% of Lebanese who are Shi’a, by over time having them pledge their primary allegiance to a strong central government, one that is sharing the economic fruits of Lebanon’s revival with all ethnic groups, so as to ultimately render the social welfare arm of Hezbollah largely irrelevant. Given this, it is manifestly clear that Israel’s reaction to Hezbollah’s provocation should have always been limited to targets south of the Litani River (save the very exceptional target to the north of truly imperative strategic value). This is so that the greatest pain would have been inflicted solely on the perpetrators of the rocket attacks and kidnapping themselves, rather than Lebanon writ large. (One might have thought, for instance, that some of Israel’s best commandos might have been air-dropped at the Litani, worked their way southwards so as to catch Hezbollah by surprise, and in conjunction with the judicious use of airpower, inflicted some significant pain on Hezbollah guerillas acting near the border. This would have been more by way of an intense 7-10 day security operation, serving to create a deterrent effect, and with the Americans fully briefed on the details and moving swiftly to put a cease-fire in place a week or so into the Israeli action). Instead, of course, Israel fought a month long war (mostly a rather brutal, too often indiscriminate air campaign) that involved the death of hundreds and hundreds of civilians, as well as: 1) imposition of a total naval and air blockade on the entire country, 2) the destruction of a very significant number of roads and bridge networks, 3) an environmental disaster in the Mediterranean Sea of worrisome scope, 4) a massive pummeling to much of Lebanon’s infrastructure causing billions of dollars of damage, not to mention 5) reducing large swaths of southern Beirut neighborhoods to rubble, as well as so many towns in the south, including important population centers like Tyre. Such a strategy was doomed to failure, as it has had precisely the opposite effect than that Israel had (or should have) intended. The population of Lebanon, including Sunnis and even Christians and Druze, stand today united in their disgust at Israel’s tactics. To be sure, this pervasive anti-Israeli sentiment will diminish some in coming weeks, as internal fissures increasingly rise to the fore instead. But none of us should cheerlead such internecine tendencies with too much alacrity, as a Lebanese civil war would be the final nail in the coffin to a Cedar Revolution already torn asunder by a combination of Iranian (and perhaps Syrian) adventurism and Israeli overreaction (and a lack of timely American diplomatic leadership, I hasten to add). To be sure, Israel’s action will be long remembered for its gross excesses, and as legions of internally displaced returning south, or returning to their apartments in Beirut, all the while waving Hezbollah flags in victory attest, we can be confident that Israel has only alienated anew another generation of Lebanese. Moreover, as we are all so painfully aware, there is a regional overlay to all this. For one, the hand of Iran and Syria were very much apparent as having probably provided some tacit or explicit approval to Nasrallah’s kidnapping of the IDF personnel (partly an act of solidarity with Gazan militias, so that some of Hamas’ more radical leadership in Damascus probably played a role in egging Nasrallah on too, to the extent he needs to be, that is). For another, the splintering of some Sadrite elements in Iraq into even more radical factions probably saw the war in Lebanon serving, at least to some extent, as contributing factor. There is also the fact, however old fogey-like and apparently drearily Scowcroftian this may sound, that getting at the real “root causes”, as our rather impressionable Secretary of State is so fond of saying, means addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict on a comprehensive basis. As for Hezbollah, it means talking to the Syrians in serious fashion (that is to say, no more of the “they know what they need to do” woeful cop-out), lest Hezbollah arms coffers simply be replenished by Damascus going forward—even if mostly to Hezbollah assets north of the Litani. Put simply, to speak of getting to the "root causes" of Hezbollah, without broaching the overall Arab-Israeli peace process, or the Syrian and Iranian role, well, it's just a joke. And so what now, who were the winners and losers, in the Beltway parlance we all gravitate towards like breathless Pavlovians? Well, the Lebanese and Israeli publics, of course, were losers—having suffered under, on the one hand, an untested and embarrassingly clumsy Israeli PM, and a too eager Iranian proxy on the other. Still, Nasrallah is undoubtedly the winner in this sad affair, having outlasted the combined might of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies in a head on struggle with Israel. Israel has been shown to be strategically vulnerable to rockets (to which one might query, what is so important about the Golan when rockets can fly over it?), and Assad and Ahmadinejad have surely taken note of same. The French were somewhat winners, flexing some muscle with boots on the ground in the international force and so having a stronger hand to play going forward (if they aren’t attacked and scared away, that is, as in previous Lebanese deployments). And what about the USA, you ask? Not too swell, I’m afraid. Condi Rice's unfortunate talk referencing the “birth pangs” of a New Middle East, or presence in Jerusalem amidst the carnage in Qana—well, no one could have really divined better blows to America’s image in the region if they had tried mightily. It is true, of course, that if a bunch of things happen (if the Lebanese wake up two weeks hence hating Hezbollah, if the bolstered UNIFIL force proves effective at disarming Hezbollah, if the arms embargo isn’t a joke (which it is), and so on), American diplomacy, while so very late and slow-coming, might end up having somewhat improved the situation vis-a-vis Israel's exposure to Hezbollah in the south. But the reality is likely very different. The reality is that, apart from Washington’s piddling USD 50MM, it is Hezbollah, in the main, that will be manning the lion's share of the reconstruction in impoverished Shi'a parts of Lebanon (helped on by the wind-fall of Iranian oil money). The reality is that, without talking to the Syrians, Damascus has absolutely no incentive (zip, zero, nada) to refrain from smuggling in even better rockets to Hezbollah in the future. The reality, in short, is that the strategic situation in the south, over the mid to long term, will probably not change materially, which is to say, Hezbollah lives to fight another day--and its regional sponsors have been emboldened. And so we had a rather big exercise in futility, a futile little war, as I said, only a tragic one too, with all the blood spilled and damage done. The reality is that Lebanese hearts and minds, certainly Shi'a ones, are going to support Nasrallah even more now, not to mention the many in Cairo and Baghdad and points beyond hailing Nasrallah as a new Nasser. Hezbollah is far further from 'eradication', however absurdly unrealistic a goal that was regardless (particularly given the U.S. and Israeli approaches), than before. What we've just witnessed is a (tragi)comedy of errors, really, featuring incompetence (the bungled Israeli military campaign), fake showmanship (Bush and Olmert finally talking four weeks into the war with Olmert thanking the American President for his help with the UN Resolution, in a butt-covering, farcical coup de theatre par excellence!), historical innocence mixed with hubris (that because Israel unilaterally pulled out of Gaza and south Lebanon, in her self-interest more than anything else, this would mean no attacks from either quarter--in the absence of an overarching settlement--so that any attack would demand a hugely asymetrical response, the better so as to discipline the recently liberated ingrates), another low ebb for America's repute in the region (the disasterous Rome Conference where the world judged, correctly, that only the U.S., and perhaps Tony Blair, to the ire of his government colleagues and people, were willing to give Israel's ill-fated campaign additional time), and more. One that occured, to boot, in the midst of an Iraq debacle that grows worse by the day, where Iranian influence is increasing in lockstep with America's mushrooming impotence there. The entire sad spectacle must look almost amusing from Teheran. MORE: For additional insight into why Iran emerges stronger from the latest ill advised adventure undertaken in the 'region', don't miss Olivier Roy writing in the FT. Excerpt: The Iranians are taking revenge for their defeat at Iraq’s hands back in 1988, when Arab Sunni nationalist and Islamist movements supported Iraq against Iran, and only part of the Shia population supported Iran (hence Tehran’s desire to help create Hizbollah as a client party from the Shia movement in Lebanon). Iran has never been able to unite the Shia under its patronage on a religious basis nor a purely political one. Now Tehran is playing the “Arab street” and undermining the legitimacy of the ruling Arab regimes by leading this new alliance of Islamism and Arab nationalism in the near east. In Iraq, however, the same alliance works against Iran. Hence Iran’s leadership of the new radical front will not necessarily help bridge the Shia-Sunni gap in Iraq.
Comments
Hey, the comments are back!!!!!! Um..hi! Posted by: Matt at August 18, 2006 04:47 AM | Permalink to this comment
Sadly, I think you summed the outcome properly. But I don’t think your 7-10 day security operation scenario would have changed anything; Hezbollah almost immediately started reigning rockets into Israel when Israel sent troops after the kidnapped soldiers, and they certainly would have done the same thing when it became apparent Israeli commandos were at the Litani…
That's a long way of saying a little. I don't disagree with the idea that the massive bombing campaign was a mistake, but I think the notion that confining the fighting to south of the Litani would somehow have swayed many Lebanese hearts and minds is unlikely. Or hearts and minds anywhere else, for that matter. Last time I checked Qana is south of the Litani. And... why the hell would Hezbollah simply sit around while their influence and relative position in Lebanon diminish? Pretty clearly it's in their interest to provoke a conflict, and I don't see any reason to think they could be stopped from doing so. Similarly, I don't see much in the way of Israeli bargaining chips with Iran. Or American bargaining chips, for that matter. So it's pretty unclear to me what, exactly, we'd be negotiating with. Everything we have that they want (and probably more), they should comfortably feel they can get even without negotiating with us Posted by: mike at August 18, 2006 05:32 AM | Permalink to this comment
Right you are- I see a crude analogy between the Israelis and the Spartans and the Helots and the Palestinians. The Israelis may not exploit the Palestinians for economic gain, but they have established a segregated society, like the Old South, and one which must surely end in destruction of the elite class, or major reform in which the Helots are elevated to a much better life. Given the willingness of many young Palestinians to die for the cause, repression and intimidation just won’t work. Hezbollah, no pacifists, were the victors of this 2006 Thermopylae. However, the notion of victory doesn't really apply. He whom the Gods would first destroy, they first make drunk with power, to quote Charles Beard. GW Bush is clearly drunk with power and Nasrallah is climbing up onto a separate pedestal. He may unfortunately draw the wrong conclusions from this fiasco. I don't support Hezbollah or the Israeli leadership. Both sides have sought to provoke a war for at least five years. Both sides blithely kill innocent civilians. We know from the SF Chronicle and from Sy Hersh that the Israelis prepared this invasion for more than a year See www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/07/21/MNG2QK396D1.DTL&hw=kalman&sn=001&sc=1000 There were loser, but no real winners in Lebanon. The biggest losers are air farce generals. Air power is good for destroying tanks, buildings and ships but bombing strengthens the will of the survivors- it did in WWII, and it will again if the US is stupid enough to bomb Iran. Unfortunately the Pentagon plans to spend billions on new aircraft. One can understand bin Laden’s boast that he will make the US spend itself into bankruptcy. Posted by: maracucho at August 18, 2006 05:57 AM | Permalink to this comment
FWIW those French boots on the ground seem to have declined greatly in number over the past day: France Declines to Contribute Major Force for U.N. Mission.
"...it is Hezbollah, in the main, that will be manning the lion's share of the reconstruction in impoverished Shi'a parts of Lebanon." Is this a bad thing? I came across a good observation the other day that keeps drumming in my head: "The problem for the Shia is that those neighborhoods are gone. Israel's tactic of avoiding death and sticking to destruction has created a logistical nightmare for Hizbollah. They now have a vast Army of walking wounded to deal with. The dead are low maintenance, the wounded are high maintenance. This is a very expensive problem. Food, shelter, and housing must be provided to all those supporters and their families. The tall apartment complexes that housed so many are rubble. So people used to living in Beirut must now be housed in the country side in tents. To these tents must be delivered food, water, blankets, and sanitary facilities. They have to deliver all this over a road net that has numerous blocks. This is not Hezbollah's area of expertise." The disconnect between PA and PLO derived from very mundane problems like taking away the garbage and controlling garden-variety crime not deriving from political idealism. I think that may be part of the problem in Gaza. Hamas could afford to hold its breath for whatever time it took to win an election, but with the mundane challenges of practical governance along with the challenge of getting along with a "loyal opposition" they show how poorly equipped they were/(are?) to actually be in charge. Could it be that Hezbollah is at the start of a learning curve that could lead to some kind of legitimacy? Pretty boring idea, with all the excitement of war pumping in everyone's veins, but it would not be the first outfit with blood on its hands to get cleaned up and join the ranks of civilization.
Hootsbuddy, if Iran comes up with the serious dough needed for Hezbollah to step up with the reconstuction, then Hezbollah will be in a much better place in Lebanese society than it was. And I suppose this means that Hezbollah's political arm does better, especially after a post-Taif census of some kind. It has become evident that the primary goal of US foreign policy is to accomplish Iran's strategic objectives in each and every sphere. Wouldn't it be more efficient if Sec. Rice just went to Teheran and asked what they want her to do -- say about the former Soviet republics, or Kurdish guerillas -- than the past practice of announcing a new Middle East, only to end up, much blood and treasure later, advancing Iranian policy? Posted by: CharleyCarp at August 18, 2006 12:51 PM | Permalink to this comment
Hootsbuddy, It is a bad thing if you hope to weaken Hezbollah's grip on power in south Lebanon. All the things you say about caring for the wounded and placing survivors and so forth are true, and already Hezbollah is doing a far better job of looking after people and "taking away the garbage" than the Lebanese government or the currently absent international community. They already have a large and well-organized social services wing that hit the ground running as soon as the ceasefire took effect. Whoever it was who observed that this isn't Hezbollah's area of expertise better get his eyes checked. Nasrallah himself stated the importance of the reconstruction in completing their victory. Leave the Lebanese people in their current state and Hezbollah will consilidate the popularity gains it made in the war as the only provider the Lebanese can count on. The Israelis are worried about this too. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/16/AR2006081601341_2.html Hezbollah is not at the start of the learning curve here, they've already hit the plateau. They already have legitimacy everywhere outside of Israel and North America, (which will never extend legitimacy to them regardless what they do), and are working hard to expand their influence. Somebody has to take care of the wounded, rebuild the houses, take away the garbage, repair roads, and rebuild bridges. If the US and other westen powers sit back and offer piddling amounts to the Lebanese for reconstruction, then Hezbollah can and will step forward into the vacuum and take credit for it, and become stronger for it. Posted by: Northman at August 18, 2006 02:33 PM | Permalink to this comment
While I agree with most of what was stated, I don't think I can agree with this: Hezbollah shot about 3000 rockets into Israel, targetted primarily at Haifa. It is a city with oil refineries, shipyards and railyards, and also a quarter-million people. The rockets killed about 50 people and caused insignificant strategic damage. For the costs involved and the strategic affect achieved, the rockets were failures. Terrorist car-bombings are phenomenally more effective. What is more accurate to say is that the Israelis are politically and diplomatically vulnerable to rockets. The Israeli people don't want to live in fear. They don't want the humiliation of having an enemy strike at them with apparent impunity. They will be less willing to fight wars of choice or opportunity, or even justified but non-critical wars. I don't think this would deter Israel from fighting a war that was a genuine necessity even slightly, nor would Hezbollah's strategic use of rockets affect the outcome of such a war at all. Posted by: Njorl at August 18, 2006 02:38 PM | Permalink to this comment
Maracucho - Your analogy between the Israelis and the Spartans and the Helots and the Palestinians doesn't seem to make sense. The Israelis are not the slavemasters of the Palestinians. Its not the old south, and Israeli wealth/power/security is not based on labor from the Palestinians, with the Israelis lording it over them like some plantation owner. The Israelis make their money off of tourism, the technology and military industries, some import-export trade, and some agriculture. It may have been true that 20 years ago the Israelis relied on Palestinians from the occupied territories for manual labor, but since the first intifada, and especially since the second, they have brought in almost a million temporary workers from Thailand and China (as well as Russian Jews and others) to do the work the Palestinians used to do. Some of those workers will go home, and some will stay and become Israeli citizens, but neither are a threat to Israel. If Israel can safely have a million Muslim Israeli Arabs, it can easily absorb a million secular or Christian Asians. Tweny years ago, in the first intifada, a Palestinian work-strike was a mild drain on the Israeli economy. Today, most Palestinians haven't worked in several years, living off of international charity, and it hasn't hurt anyone but them. Most Israelis have little or no interaction with Palestinians (part of the problem), and don't rely on them for anything. The only way the Palestinians can hurt the Israelis is through terrorism, by inciting fear, and hurting the tourism industry. As for armed revolt, the Palestinians have been trying to "overthrow" the Israelis for 20 years or longer. If they haven't been the downfall of Israeli society yet, I don't think they will be in the future. Additionally, the Palestians and Israelis have always both played to the cameras and kept their attacks, while horrible, very limited in scope. They have aimed for increased levels of pain, not outright destruction. At the end of the day, they have to occupy the same small bit of land. I could not envision the Palestinians setting of a nuclear weapon because it would wipe out the Palestinians as well as the Israelis. Iran, on the other hand, or parts of Iran, I believe would gladly sacrifice the Palestinians (which they don't realy care about anyway) to get rid of the Israelis. Bottom line to me, Iran's the real threat... Posted by: Corey at August 18, 2006 08:18 PM | Permalink to this comment
Northman - You wrote, "If the US and other westen powers sit back and offer piddling amounts to the Lebanese for reconstruction, then Hezbollah can and will step forward into the vacuum and take credit for it, and become stronger for it." The western powers are paying for Lebanese reconstruction, they are just doing it through Iran and Hezbolla. Haven't you seen the price at the pump lately? Posted by: Corey at August 18, 2006 08:23 PM | Permalink to this comment
Hootbuddy, Hizbullah is already very good at delivering aid and services. We might well ask, who will get a new house first: the Shiites in Southern Lebanon, or the poor folks in the Ninth Ward of New Orleans. The Lebanese Daily Star, a pro-western paper, has an editorial praising Hizbullah's efficiency and dedication. "Hizbullah did not suddenly materialize magically on a Persian carpet or a divine edict. The organization methodically built itself up and sharpened its capabilities in all fields over a period of years. The core of its success is its capacity to identify the real needs of its constituents, meet those needs systematically through an efficient network of staff and managers, and not to waste time bragging about the fact in public." .......We would suggest, rather, that the enormous physical and political reconstruction demands of Lebanon in the months ahead would benefit from the sort of efficiency, focus, strategic planning, diligence and follow-up that have characterized Hizbullah's efforts in all the fields it has entered.......... Politically, Hizbullah will be challenged, engaged, opposed and long debated. Organizationally and logistically, it has historic lessons to teach all other Arabs in the country and the region. Those Arabs, including the Lebanese, should be alert enough to recognize the rare capacity for efficacy that Hizbullah has developed, and apply it in those crucial fields of public life and national development that have suffered so much mediocrity in the recent past." http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=17&article_id=74792 More from the Daily Star: "Only four days after the cessation of hostilities took effect in Lebanon, Hizbullah began handing out compensation - in the form of crisp $100 bills - to residents who lost their homes during the war with Israel. Starting on Monday afternoon, the very day that the cease-fire took effect, Hizbullah, acting immediately on the initiative of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, sent out representatives to do comprehensive assessments of the damage on the ground. By Thursday, Hizbullah social workers had set up temporary offices to start handing out cash payments. Hizbullah's mind-boggling efficiency and professionalism - fresh out of the throes of war - contrasts starkly with the inefficiency of the government, which has not yet responded adequately to the needs of citizens whose homes have been ruined. It is difficult not to notice the enormous difference between the government's inability to move quickly on an urgent issue and the rapid and efficient response of Hizbullah. It is this contrast between hyper-organization and utter disorganization that lies at the very heart of the ailment of the Lebanese state." http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&article_id=74853&categ_id=17 Posted by: chew2 at August 18, 2006 09:39 PM | Permalink to this comment
“First, let me stress that no comprehensive, lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be achieved by force of arms. So while Israel certainly has a right to self-defense, it should not labor under the misconception that it can eradicate or totally defang or otherwise defeat her foes militarily in some maximal fashion. This is simply not possible, short of a series of nuclear holocausts,” For any military conflict the outcome of which is in any way in doubt, there will always be those who claim that no settlement can be achieved by military means. Such a claim reflects the psychological type of the person making the claim, rather than any logically supportable conclusion about the real situation. Wars are highly complex human interactions, and positive conclusions about whether they are winnable or not in specific cases are not accessible to human intelligence. Many conflicts have been settled by military means throughout human history, and many have not. The conclusion that the conflict between Israel and her enemies is so different from the entire set of historical conflicts that have been settled by military means that it can be positively concluded that it can never be included in that set is not reasonable. It may be that this particular conflict can be settled militarily, and it may be that it cannot. We cannot be certain one way or the other. We can be a great deal more certain that anyone who claims they know for sure is wrong. “…and so it was surprising to see so many rabid commentators, both here and in Israel, chanting on about Israel not having the will to win, to win totally, that is. This is claptrap, chimerical, absurd—although it appears to provide varied commentators here in New York City and down in Washington with a frisson of macho-thrill—that is, before they abscond back to their think-tank cubicles feeling manlier about having called for a good, old-fashioned bombs-away Armageddon in the Holy Land.” The author often indulges in this sort of supercilious name-calling and hand waving as a substitute for actually attempting to address his opponents arguments. For example, “Just when you think your capacity to be surprised by some blunder or mishap committed by this Administration has reached some sad apex--so that your ability to get dumbfounded anew has just plain maxed out--you are left sadly awestruck by the sheer scale of the bollixing yet again.” “I continue to believe our reluctance to broker an immediate cessation of hostilities still dangerously risks this conflict spreading to other theaters. Something akin to a wet dream for grotesquely irresponsible neo-cons, I know, but for those of us concerned with a saner pursuit of the national interest, a very worrisome prospect.” “P.S. Speaking of "diplomatic blather, more international confabs" and related Steynisms more fit for the hurly-burly of dormitory room bull sessions than serious discussion, I prefer to listen to, shall we say, more experienced people like Richard Haass:” You get the idea. “To beat back Hezbollah one must moderate the 40% of Lebanese who are Shi’a, by over time having them pledge their primary allegiance to a strong central government, one that is sharing the economic fruits of Lebanon’s revival with all ethnic groups, so as to ultimately render the social welfare arm of Hezbollah largely irrelevant.” There is no logical basis for the conclusion that the Lebanese Shi’a will become more moderate by virtue of “over time having them pledge their primary allegiance to a strong central government, one that is sharing the economic fruits of Lebanon’s revival with all ethnic groups, so as to ultimately render the social welfare arm of Hezbollah largely irrelevant.” Assuming all these things happen, the argument here appears to be that, if the Shi’a are economically empowered citizens of a state with a strong central government, to the point that they have no need of social welfare, their support for Hezbollah will gradually “wither away,” like the State under Communism. One can cite historical examples of populations that have become more ideologically or theologically extreme as their economic circumstances improved, and one can cite examples where the opposite was the case. There is no logical basis for the positive conclusion that they will become moderate and turn away from Hezbollah as their economic status improves. It goes without saying that waiting for this “solution” to come about will require a rather large measure of patience on the part of the Israelis. “Given this, it is manifestly clear that Israel’s reaction to Hezbollah’s provocation should have always been limited to targets south of the Litani River (save the very exceptional target to the north of truly imperative strategic value). This is so that the greatest pain would have been inflicted solely on the perpetrators of the rocket attacks and kidnapping themselves, rather than Lebanon writ large.” This may be manifestly clear to the author, but it is not manifestly clear to me. What is manifestly clear is that, if Israel were not being attacked from Lebanon, she would have no reason to “occupy” Lebanese territory and no reason to attack Lebanese targets, and Hezbollah would, consequently have no reason to “defend” Lebanon. People tend to be very acute judges of circumstances that affect their personal welfare. It is not out of the question that, if they see their infrastructure and the possibility of a better life for themselves and their children go up in smoke a few more times for no good reason whatsoever except for the fact that their country tolerates the presence of an autonomous armed force that is attacking a neighboring country, they will conclude it is time to insist that that entity leave, rather than siding with it and becoming more radicalized. There is, in fact, a root cause for this conflict, and its fundamental nature is simple in spite of the complexity of the situation at any given time. The root cause is the determination of Israel’s enemies to deny her the right to exist, and, instead, to wipe her off the map. Peace is in the hands of Israel’s enemies. They could bring peace to the region tomorrow if they conceded her the right to exist. We must demand that they concede her that right loudly and persistently. We must loudly and persistently draw attention to the fact that the fighting and misery will go on until they do so, regardless of any act on Israel’s part, with the exception of national suicide. “There is also the fact, however old fogey-like and apparently drearily Scowcroftian this may sound, that getting at the real “root causes”, as our rather impressionable Secretary of State is so fond of saying, means addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict on a comprehensive basis. As for Hezbollah, it means talking to the Syrians in serious fashion (that is to say, no more of the “they know what they need to do” woeful cop-out), lest Hezbollah arms coffers simply be replenished by Damascus going forward—even if mostly to Hezbollah assets north of the Litani. Put simply, to speak of getting to the "root causes" of Hezbollah, without broaching the overall Arab-Israeli peace process, or the Syrian and Iranian role, well, it's just a joke.” The “root cause” of the conflict is the failure of Israel’s enemies to recognize her right to exist. This is the “root cause” we need to broach. Unless Israel’s right to exist is accepted, the “peace process” is a chimera. The author seems to think that, by virtue of much clever diplomacy, we will be able to jawbone Israel’s enemies into accepting this right. There is simply no logical reason to believe that this will be the case. It is a fundamental tenet of Islamist dogma that Israel must be destroyed. We can send a thousand or a 100,000 diplomats to the Middle East, and it won’t shake the existence of this fundamental tenet one iota. “Well, the Lebanese and Israeli publics, of course, were losers—having suffered under, on the one hand, an untested and embarrassingly clumsy Israeli PM, and a too eager Iranian proxy on the other. Still, Nasrallah is undoubtedly the winner in this sad affair, having outlasted the combined might of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies in a head on struggle with Israel.” Belief in the “incompetence” of any leader who disagrees with him, as well as in the near invincibility of our enemies, like the inevitable belief that “this problem has no military solution,” are hardly unique to the author. Such beliefs tend to say more about the psychology of the author than about the actual incompetence of our leaders, the real invincibility of our enemies, or the impossibility of a military solution to any problem. “And so we had a rather big exercise in futility, a futile little war, as I said, only a tragic one too, with all the blood spilled and damage done. The reality is that Lebanese hearts and minds, certainly Shi'a ones, are going to support Nasrallah even more now, not to mention the many in Cairo and Baghdad and points beyond hailing Nasrallah as a new Nasser. Hezbollah is far further from 'eradication', however absurdly unrealistic a goal that was regardless (particularly given the U.S. and Israeli approaches), than before. What we've just witnessed is a (tragi)comedy of errors, really, featuring incompetence (the bungled Israeli military campaign), fake showmanship (Bush and Olmert finally talking four weeks into the war with Olmert thanking the American President for his help with the UN Resolution, in a butt-covering, farcical coup de theatre par excellence!),…” See the comment above, as well as the reference to supercilious hand waving. Posted by: Helian at August 18, 2006 09:44 PM | Permalink to this comment
Speaking of supercilious hand-waving, Helian, you've made with quite a bit of smoke and mirrors yourself. Congradulations on making the metaphysical aphorism that many wars have been ended/solved by military means and many have not, and that we do not have 100% predictive capacity over the future and the potentialities of military means in this war. Since we don't have that, I suppose we should cease offering any form of advice about whether war or peace is smarter in any given political situation, right? Let's just stay home and drink, huh? Bullsh*t. Whether or not we can *know* with divine certainty if a war can be one by military means, we certainly can differentiate between ancient, irrelvevant history and comparable, symettric recent events and world trends in warfighting. It's fantastically unlikely that Israel had any shot of annihilating Hizballah or forcing its surrender: these are the only ways I can think of for Israel to achieve a decisive victory through military means alone. The IDF knows this, even if you don't. The rest of your post is full of ironclad assertions about Islam, Arabs, and the political goals of organizations you know nothing of, that are much less certain and rigid than military assessments. Yet somehow your unifiying principle of 100% uncertain knowledge no longer applies. It may not be out of the question in your scholarly mind that a little Israeli slash-and-burn of Lebanese civilians might lead the Lebanese to hate Hizballah instead of Israel, but reality is, once again, proving you wrong. Behind all of your pompous and disingenous calling of the pot black by the kettle, there is the tired, old canard of total war and existential struggle. Now here's something we've seen across history - in the hands of facists and demagogues. You're part of the problem, not part of the solution. Posted by: glasnost at August 19, 2006 03:05 AM | Permalink to this comment
There will be more acts in this drama, and more indiscriminate killing by the bloodthirsty leadership of both Hezbollah and Israel. I see that the IDF unleashed a “defensive raid” into the Bekaa Valley 6 days after the cease-fire took effect. It’s not difficult to predict a symmetrical attack from Hezbollah soon and President Bush saying that of course Israel has the right to defend itself, that the IDF is always successful by definition, and that Hezbollah must be eradicated. Some people never learn- should we believe that they can use NSA intelligence wisely and refrain from extorting those whose phone calls reveal sexual or financial peculiarities?
No silly it is American drivers who will pay for lebanon's recovery. It goes like this. We pay 3.10 for gas. A big percentage goes to origonal producers like Iran. Iran now has $50 billion in free cash in part because America does not have a prudent energy policy. Probably 3 or 4 0f Iran's slush fund will go to Hizballah. It's not a perfect world. Posted by: David J kenney at August 19, 2006 05:59 PM | Permalink to this comment
Corey upthread raises an important issue for both the Palestinians and the Shia in Lebanon: assuming they aren't engaged in fighting Israel, what do we expect them to do? The Mideast is subject to the same economic trends as the rest of the world, and one of those is that workers with fewer skills and education have fewer opportunities. Political decisions made by the Palestinians' leadership -- notably the Arafat's declared sympathy for Saddam Hussein after the latter invaded Kuwait in 1990 -- cut off one source of economic advancement for Palestinians, as Palestinians working in the Gulf States were asked to leave. The two intifadas gradually cut off another, as Corey points out. And the Shia in Lebanon have generally taken a back seat economically to members of other sects. Now, if anything Lebanese and Palestinians have historically prospered more than other Arabs when removed from the politics of their native lands. Ironically they have often filled some of the same economic niches that Jews have. Both Palestinians and Lebanese also have some potential economic assets, especially for tourism, should the political instability of their region ever dissipate. But in the meantime that aid from Iran had better keep coming, because it's difficult to identify other reliable sources of steady income for either population as long as it remains in turmoil, and not all that easy to do so even if it doesn't. Posted by: Zathras at August 19, 2006 08:24 PM | Permalink to this comment
Greg needs to develop a Sullivan-like succinctness if he wishes to attract more of Andy's visitors. So, some YouTube links and shorter posts, please! There's so much to read and watch and very little time. Anyway, all this could have been put to visitors in bytes such as: Those who demanded proportionality of Israel are taking sides as they didn't demand proportionality from the aggressor The dwindling number of French boots on the ground means that Hezbollah, with the help of Syria and Iran, will re-arm and attack Israel at a later date.
Zathras, I'd add the Israelis to your list of people who "better hope the aid keeps flowing." That whole region strikes me as the longest running telethon in history. Maybe they're just providing their donors what they think they want? Posted by: monkyboy at August 20, 2006 12:10 PM | Permalink to this comment
I assume Greg you didn't mean to take credit for the drop troops behind Hez and move south plan since we know that was a plan put forward and rejected by war cabinet. I assume you were just referencing that. No wars are futile - they always lead to something, contribute to an unseen eventuality, and therefore have purpose. Some by nature and circumstance seem more decisive than others and thus the confusion. What unseen eventuality applies here is, well, unseen. That the provocation demanded a response and that the response fashioned by Olmert and the IDF was significantly flawed seem now to be givens. What reality lies between these two marks in the sand is open to conjecture but some things stand out: - the war is not over and to believe in any way that the UN can bring it to a close is absurd and merely aggravates the wound under the pretense of trying to do good - Israel appears weak and vulnerable and this perception will stoke the flames not dim them - Iran has won a victory and will wish to capitalise on it - America has suffered yet another set back and increasingly seems to be a rudderless ship - the above creates a dangerous synergy that will sprout events which, by the dictates of an internal logic, cannot be stopped but will lead to a germination of other events culminating unfortunately in an as yet unseen eventuality. All very ironical. Posted by: groanman at August 20, 2006 01:53 PM | Permalink to this comment
These "Israel doesn't have the will to win" types are, in a word, genocidal. And yet they are thought of as serious commentators by the national media, their voices heard on TV and seen in major newspapers. It gives one pause. Posted by: Theron at August 20, 2006 02:13 PM | Permalink to this comment
This has been the best post yet by a conservative blogger on the Lebanon debacle. I just had to use it in my post: The neocon perspective has always been under heavy influence by Likud party in Israel, partly by reputation due to the what I believe is a mistaken perception that Israel has been highly effective in combating the non-symmetrical warefare of the PLO and Hamas. The truth is that the rules of warfare have changed. The growing effectiveness of hand held weapons combined with the sophisticated propaganda tactics of the PLO, Hizbullah, and Iran, have led to a losing hand for the Neocons in general, the Bush and Olmert Administration in particular. The Neocons have over-estimated the power of the military option and sorely neglected the propaganda and diplomatic efforts. The result is world events and political winds headed in the opposite direction than the Neocons intended. Witness the influence of the Arab on the streets: MOREPosted by: Dave Marco at August 20, 2006 08:34 PM | Permalink to this comment
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