The Belgravia Dispatch: Losing Anbar

September 11, 2006

Losing Anbar

The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western al Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there, said several military officers and intelligence officials familiar with its contents.
The officials described Col. Pete Devlin's classified assessment of the dire state of Anbar as the first time that a senior U.S. military officer has filed so negative a report from Iraq.

One Army officer summarized it as arguing that in Anbar province, "We haven't been defeated militarily but we have been defeated politically -- and that's where wars are won and lost."

The "very pessimistic" statement, as one Marine officer called it, was dated Aug. 16 and sent to Washington shortly after that, and has been discussed across the Pentagon and elsewhere in national security circles. "I don't know if it is a shock wave, but it's made people uncomfortable," said a Defense Department official who has read the report. Like others interviewed about the report, he spoke on the condition that he not be identified by name because of the document's sensitivity.

Devlin reports that there are no functioning Iraqi government institutions in Anbar, leaving a vacuum that has been filled by the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has become the province's most significant political force, said the Army officer, who has read the report. Another person familiar with the report said it describes Anbar as beyond repair; a third said it concludes that the United States has lost in Anbar.

Devlin offers a series of reasons for the situation, including a lack of U.S. and Iraqi troops, a problem that has dogged commanders since the fall of Baghdad more than three years ago, said people who have read it. These people said he reported that not only are military operations facing a stalemate, unable to extend and sustain security beyond the perimeters of their bases, but local governments in the province have also collapsed and the weak central government has almost no presence.

Yes, Anbar is only one province, the Administration's increasingly desperate cheerleaders will say, but a quick look at any map explains why it's such an important one, not least as it's Iraq's biggest (constituting 30% of Iraq's land mass), is home to key urban centers like Ramadi and Fallujah, where increasing influence better allows Sunni insurgents opportunities to reinforce allies in Sunni areas of Baghdad. Meantime, on the Shi'a front, SCIRI head Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim has been calling more vigorously for a so-called Shi'a 'super-state' in the south (read: more lebensraum for Iran). In countering Hakim's objectives, it appears we are pinning our hopes on Maliki, probably a losing proposition, though perhaps too Sadr can be deftly used to counter Hakim on this issue (Sadr's firebrand nationalism is, of course, deathly opposed to the US, but on the issue of federalism, his inclination is likely still more oriented towards preservation of a unitary state). No wonder so many bloggers are grasping onto Peter Galbraith's 'send the GIs to Kurdistan' gambit, as the Kurds are friendly to us--not least as they want protection from the Turks--which could create something of a mess going forward. Regardless, as long as US forces don't put real pressure on the Kurds to cease the reverse Arabization underway, and Kurdistan gets its fair share of oil revenues--the amicable relations won't turn sour, at least in the short to mid-term.

And then there is the world beyond Iraq, beyond Anbar. Between the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, growing Islamist influence in Somalia, and Islamabad's 'truce' with tribes in North Waziristan (Musharraf appears somewhat keen to seek 'strategic depth' again in Afghanistan, that is to say, is reverting, at least to a limited degree, to Pakistan's pre- 9/11 posture re: Afghanistan, where staving off perceived encirclement by Delhi was and is the paramount Pakistani strategic concern)--it's almost as if prospective al-Qaeda sanctuaries and safe havens are mutiplying these days, isn't it? More gloom here.

Posted by Gregory at September 11, 2006 04:09 AM

Comments

Greg,
Another great post...but You fail to mention that a Shia domintated Iraq would prevent any potential sanctions on Iran from ever being effective.

Posted by: centrist at September 11, 2006 02:57 PM | Permalink to this comment

No no no. The official "What, Me Worry?" response to the Anbar report will be, "That's old news. The intelligence report was filed clear back in mid-August. Things are already getting better and Real Soon Now, the news from Anbar province will be better yet!"

Posted by: Jim Henley at September 11, 2006 03:36 PM | Permalink to this comment

And even while fully aware of all this, Cheney insists, on Meat the Press, that we are safer:

"You don’t have a government in Baghdad that’s pursuing weapons of mass destruction, you don’t have a government in Baghdad that is a state sponsor of terror. You don’t have a government in Baghdad that is doing all those things that Saddam Hussein did for so long. So we’re safer."

Dishonest? Or is this actually what our leaders believe? Not very reassuring, either way.

Posted by: lewp at September 11, 2006 05:12 PM | Permalink to this comment

There is no oil in Anbar. Maybe the plan is to isolate them after Iraq has been split up

Posted by: jesus reyes at September 11, 2006 07:34 PM | Permalink to this comment

I know a Marine serving in Anbar. To quote him exactly: "You would not believe how fucked up things are here. The COs are fried".

My question is: does the administration deny the reality of what they have done because they are delusional? or because denial is the only face saving mechanism left to them? Listening to Cheney on talk shows Sunday I'm not sure if he's nuts or just playing his bluff to the bitter
end.

Posted by: J. J. at September 11, 2006 09:08 PM | Permalink to this comment

I'm sure that Marine Officer is just another Terrorist Appeaser blaming America first for all the world's problems. Semper Fidelis? Hardly, he should be flamed on the floor of the Senate like Murtha and all the other wussy Marines.

(This is sarcasm, no need to flame me.)

Posted by: tregen at September 11, 2006 09:26 PM | Permalink to this comment

I have a question for those who advocate pulling back to Kurdistan: how the hell do we supply the troops? Last time I checked, Kurdistan is landlocked, and every ground route from a port to there would be controlled by some group hostile to our presence there. Are we going to smuggle everything in to them?

Posted by: J. Michael Neal at September 11, 2006 10:21 PM | Permalink to this comment

Kurdistan/Shmurdistan. We've got perfectly fine bases for American troops right here in the Good Old USA.

Posted by: Jim Henley at September 11, 2006 10:25 PM | Permalink to this comment

J. Michael,

I think the idea is that we would either supply them through Turkey, or via airdrops. Of course, the first of these alternatives would never work, since the Turks would insist that we crack down on the peshmerga as a precondition for moving supplies through Turkey, and the peshmerga would start one hell of a nasty insurgency against us if we were stupid enough to side with the hated Turks against them.

So, I think Galbraith's plan basically relies on whether or not the Air Force's eternal promise that "our fancy new air technology has revolutionized the nature of warfare and made obsolete the old way of waging wars and conducting occupations" can be fulfilled. Since every time in history the Air Force has said "trust us, we can do it from the air without resources on the ground", a total clusterfuck has resulted, I personally don't have any faith at all that an army can be maintained indefinitely in landlocked Kurdistan.

Posted by: Jay at September 12, 2006 12:28 AM | Permalink to this comment

Since every time in history the Air Force has said "trust us, we can do it from the air without resources on the ground", a total clusterfuck has resulted . . . ,

That's not quite true. The Berlin Airlift was a magnificent success.

I'm not aware that anyone claims a significant American military presence in Iraq can be sustained by air. I thought someone had run the numbers, and the capacity just isn't there.

Posted by: David Tomlin at September 12, 2006 12:50 AM | Permalink to this comment

The Turkish govt has been doing stuff for us, even thought their people have grown to hate the US, for years--much like Saudia Arabia and Egypt, our other two major allies in the Levant.

It might be tricky running supplies through Turkey to directly support a US presence in Kurdistan, but continuing military bribes work pretty well -- we've been doing them to Turkey for decades now.

Plus, look at Indonesia -- their hate of us lessened after we sent them help after the last natural disaster. Bribes help both at the govt level and the popular level -- that is my takeaway.

Or, buddying up to Syria to run supplies across Syria would be pretty smart strategically, wouldn't it? Syria is a great natural enemy to Iran, so we ought to want to buddy up to them...

re: Berlin airlift

I wonder what 200,000 flights would cost today; they couldn't have been too cheap then, and the US afforded it then somehow.

Posted by: howie's end at September 12, 2006 02:34 AM | Permalink to this comment

Transport planes are much larger now.

Posted by: Tom S. at September 12, 2006 03:14 AM | Permalink to this comment

" Of course, the first of these alternatives would never work, since the Turks would insist that we crack down on the peshmerga as a precondition for moving supplies through Turkey, and the peshmerga would start one hell of a nasty insurgency against us if we were stupid enough to side with the hated Turks against them"

Perhaps, but we'd probably be able to argue, at first, that Turkey should cooperate because we'd be able to keep the Kurds in line.

That might work. At first.

Posted by: Jon H at September 12, 2006 04:20 AM | Permalink to this comment

Jon,
That assumes that we can keep the Kurds in line without ending up fighting the peshmerga. Betting the lives of 140,000 troops on the possibility of keeping Kurds and Turks from fighting without using force against either side is a pretty stupid gamble.

David,

We only had to keep Berlin fed, our Army and Marines need gasoline as badly as they need food to function. Transporting large quantities of liquids by air is a logistical nightmare. Relying on local production would mean the Kurds themselves would be forced to do without, since they don't exactly have a lot of refinery capacity in Kurdistan. My guess is they would tire of us pretty quickly if we were using up all their gas and interfering in their raids on Turkey.

Posted by: Jay at September 12, 2006 08:24 AM | Permalink to this comment

Jay, that's part of why we built a great big base around some oil wells. Build our own refinery and we don't have to ship in gasoline from outside. And we aren't using oil the kurds are about to sell, marginal oil, we're using oil they couldn't pump anyway because we have a base on it.

We could supply our bases through iraq unless the iraqis were still upset at us. Or jordan and some of iraq -- the sunnis will likely be strapped for cash and we could pay them. Or syria, if we give up demonising syria. Or turkey, with big enough bribes. Or even iran once we're on better terms with them. We wouldn't be in trouble until every route is closed.

Maybe in the coming war with iran we could help the kurds extend their border east until they get a port. Then we're set provided we have some other friendly country on that sea.

So we could get bases -- kind of like guantanamo except landlocked. And -- what's it all about again? How much are those bases worth to us?

Posted by: J Thomas at September 12, 2006 01:06 PM | Permalink to this comment

I have a question for those who advocate pulling back to Kurdistan: how the hell do we supply the troops?

I don't particularly advocate this, but if we want to keep a presence in kurdistan we could use special forces whose supply needs aren't as great. They could train the peshmerga in using the hi-tech weapons we'd supply them. They could do various things, without the volume of firepower and logistic tail the regular army would have. They couldn't do everything the regular army could do, but they could do some things and we could supply them by air.

It's the obvious choice if we don't want to abandon the kurds.

Of course, the more special forces we have pinned down in kurdistan the fewer are left for other fronts. Those elites are the hardest for us to recruit and train, and the hardest to ramp up when we want more of them.

Posted by: J Thomas at September 12, 2006 01:21 PM | Permalink to this comment

the problem here is that the smaller the US troop presence in Kurdistan, the less we will be able to deter military action in the name of Kurdish expansion -- or to deter the Turks (or Iran or Syria) from using to force to contain that expansion.

And the bigger the force, the more we become the hostage of Turkey and Kurdistan.

In other words, like most ideas about "what should we do about Iraq", whatever we do we will probably get screwed.

**********

it's almost as if prospective al-Qaeda sanctuaries and safe havens are mutiplying these days, isn't it?

Almost?

I admire Greg's gift for understatement.... personally, were I Greg, by this point my blog would consist of 64 point headlines screaming

HOW THE FUCK DID WE GET HERE!??!

Posted by: p.lukasiak at September 12, 2006 05:53 PM | Permalink to this comment

And the bigger the force, the more we become the hostage of Turkey and Kurdistan.

Sure. But what you do is you look at the logistics, and you make some sort of plan that's compatible with them.

We can't keep a big force in kurdistan and supply it by air, and if we depend on ground transport then somebody has to let us do that.

Depend on turkey to let us transport to kurdistan? That sure isn't a way to deter the turks. Depend on syria? We could do that, but it would be a big switch. Maybe we could offer them nuclear technology? Depend on iran? An even bigger switch. Depend on iraq? Very risky. Transport through israel and jordan and anbar? Doubtful.

So our conservative choices are to leave a force small enough we *can* supply it by air, or pull out of kurdistan. And our bold choice is to attempt to create a kurdistan that is not landlocked.

Posted by: J Thomas at September 12, 2006 07:22 PM | Permalink to this comment

it's almost as if prospective al-Qaeda sanctuaries and safe havens are mutiplying these days, isn't it? More gloom here.

Greg, I feel the same way, and I think this is pretty perceptive. Good work. We have passed the peak of military pressure on Al-Qaida, and we are backsliding.

Guys, there's no threat to our supplies in Kurdistan. I mean, I appreciate the attempt to think outside the box, but there's no way Turkey would attempt to block us from resupplying through there, and their ability to impose quid pro quos on us is limited. We have a lot of lean on their economy, and we are the key to their military hardware. I'm sure we wouldn't mind maknig promises to 'crack down' on the peshmerga, but I'm also pretty sure it wouldn't fly, politically, and amount to nothing. I'm also sure that Turkish hot pursuit would be a dead letter.
Good.

Hell, even Syria wouldn't block our resupply through Kurdistan if it came to that.

Posted by: glasnost at September 13, 2006 01:09 AM | Permalink to this comment

Glasnost, let's review the bidding here.

The claim is we'll need troops in kurdistan to keep the turks from invading.

If that's what we're there for, why would we expect the turks to provide the supply lines for our troops in kurdistan and for supplying the kurds with military hardware etc?

If we have enough influence on them to make them supply us and the peshmurga, we have enough influence to stop them from invading kurdistan without our army being there.

And if we don't have enough influence to stop them without parking an army in kurdistan, then we also don't have the influence to make them transport supplies for that army through their country.

I expect syria might very well give us supply routes, provided we do enough for them first. That might start with a public statement that we never had any reason to think Saddam's WMDs went to syria. And we never really meant the bad things we said about syria. And we fully support syria's legitimate grievances against israel and we will do whatever we can to further an early peace treaty for syria with israel, and we will give syria MFN status and a bunch of arms and we'll pay for them to buy arms from other nations.

However, syria has their own kurdish problem and they probably don't think they'd benefit in the long run from a strong kurdistan next door.

Perhaps we should look closer at the possibility of resupply through iran.

Posted by: J Thomas at September 13, 2006 04:27 AM | Permalink to this comment

David,

We only had to keep Berlin fed . . .

[Sigh.]

My second paragraph:

I'm not aware that anyone claims a significant American military presence in Iraq can be sustained by air. I thought someone had run the numbers, and the capacity just isn't there.

I wasn't arguing for supplying a U.S. force in Kurdistan by air. I was just pointing out a counter-example to the generalization:

Since every time in history the Air Force has said "trust us, we can do it from the air without resources on the ground", a total clusterfuck has resulted . . .

Posted by: David Tomlin at September 15, 2006 09:35 PM | Permalink to this comment