well, its not like the Pentagon isn't full of politicians.... the ones that were willing to tell the truth (cf Shinseki) were pushed aside, and the ones that could be relied upon to follow the Bush/Rumsfeld line (Abizaid, Casey) were put in charge of Iraq and Afghanistan.

its been pretty well established for ages that junior officers were asking for more troops to accomplish their mission -- nevertheless, Abizaid and Casey never asked Bush for more troops. The only reason I can think of why these two Generals would not ask for more troops would be that they wanted to keep their jobs --- and asking for more troops was an admission of "incompetence" as defined by Rumsfeld and Bush.

Posted by: p.lukasiak at October 29, 2006 07:01 AM | Permalink to this comment

What I really don't understand is how Bush (to some degree at least) seems to get away with proclaiming that he's just listening to the generals, and making sure that they get what they say they need. If Lincoln had done the same during the Civil War, there would still be a Confederate States of America. At some point, doesn't someone in the press have to ask why "the Decider" doesn't make up his own mind about something?

Posted by: Former Republican at October 29, 2006 12:08 PM | Permalink to this comment

Fiasco and the other recent books about the Iraq war reveal all we need to know about this. Support for the war was tepid in the Pentagon but nobody was willing to step in front of the train. Rumsfeld is almost univerally percieved to have a broad streak of contempt for the Brass which isn't a surprise because he demonstrates with his every word a streak of contempt for everyone. So the military took on the impossible job and the outcome is what we have now.

Sure they are to blame but even I, a bleeding heart liberal, think it's silly to spend much time calling them to account now. There is no way in the system for the military to make policy decisions even on war. Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, all were determined to do the war and there was no way for the military to stop it. None, short of a mass coordinated wave of resignation or public protest. If and when generals coordinate for a political purpose it won't be to step aside from war so let's be thankfull that these men don't and seemingly can't coordinate.

Besides, we didn't lose the war. We lost the aftermath which was only half a military operation.

War is the last great hope of the incompetent to order the unwilling to attempt the impossible.
William Eastlake 'The Bamboo Bed'

Posted by: rapier at October 29, 2006 01:18 PM | Permalink to this comment

This really is nothing new. It's called careerism, and it was what corroded the military in Vietnam. It mirrored the mechanisms of the corporate ladder, already well established by the '60s, which theoretically stipulated greater responsibility and accountability farther up that ladder but had the opposite effect of creating a steep slope where those farther up were protected, and could mouth accountability when in fact it meant more down the line who would pay for what those higher up did. Nowhere so was it more odiously reflected in the tour of duty tenure in Vietnam for officers and enlisted - the former had only to do six months in the field while the latter got a year.

So, the reticence of Abizaid, the unwillingness to challenge Rumsfeld with increased troop requests when it was part of his job to do so, even when his position gave him the authority to make such a call, doesn't show me anything different here. These top brass positions, in addition to this 'corporatization' I've seen, have become politicized as well, all the more so under the Bush administration. The stakes for this politicization are so great that none of the key generals or admirals in question would dare think to resign their commissions in protest, and as I can guess that many of them began their careers with Vietnam, or at least in the immediate post-Vietnam period, it was inbred in so many of them not to jeopardize their career paths, especially when scrambled eggs on their caps loomed in their sights.

The worst part of all this is that it points to a deeper and more damning culture where those who dare to speak out can count on no support - the high ranks not only will not close around them, but will ostracize them all the more to protect themselves. When you couple this with the likes of a Rumsfeld, who has shown nothing but contempt for this top level of the officer corps, is it any wonder that nothing will be done?

Posted by: sekaijin at October 29, 2006 03:07 PM | Permalink to this comment

I have a different recollection from Nam. Career officers in combat units were given 6 months in the field and 6 months at HQ. The service time was a year for everyone, and I never heard of the military letting anyone down in getting them out on time. The reason career officers got only six months in the field was the precedent of WW II. The only way to make general was to compile a good record commanding troops in combat. So everyone was given a 6 month shot at it. This was terrible operationally, because the CO of a unit too several months to get up to speed on the terrain, the local politics, ARVN units, etc. He was up against NVA commanders who were in place for years, learning every square foot of the province, the foibles of the village chiefs, etc.

My source for this is a short diatribe of a book called Playing Soldier. It agrees with what I observed, although I was in a non-combat MOS and wouldn't have known about the personnel politics.

The general complaint about careerism is well taken, of course.

Posted by: Roger Bigod at October 30, 2006 12:49 AM | Permalink to this comment

> So everyone was given a 6 month shot at it. This was terrible operationally

Hackworth agreed with this, in his famous/infamous work About Face, and he certainly was in a combat MOS :)

Posted by: Frank Williams at October 30, 2006 02:21 AM | Permalink to this comment

There is good reason to examine critically the record of senior American generals in Iraq and Afghanistan, irrespective of how one evaluates their relations with civilians in Washington.

No career damage was likely for a four-star to whom Gen. Sanchez had to report for insisting that the Army's response to Abu Ghraib not discipline only enlisted personnel or that Sanchez coordinate operations with CPA head Paul Bremer whether he liked Bremer or not. Abizaid did neither one. I am always a little wary of reports that this or that senior officer is regarded with "reverence," an attitude I think appropriate to adopt only toward the very small number of men who have won great victories on the battlefield or performed some other public service no one else could have. I don't know that John Abizaid or indeed any of the generals who have served in Iraq fall into that category.

Posted by: Zathras at October 30, 2006 03:18 AM | Permalink to this comment

Zathras, I believe you are entirely right about how senior officers are regarded by their subordinates. Few senior officers in the post-Vietnam period have had the opportunity to achieve something worthwhile of being respected, even fewer have actually done so.

Note: A lot of times an outstanding commander is not known publicily unless he has a wartime command. Many generals have been respected in their service for different things, particularly regarding the training of troops & officers that the public never learns about.

Posted by: David All at October 30, 2006 10:00 PM | Permalink to this comment

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Posted by: Phillipa at November 7, 2006 08:20 PM | Permalink to this comment