December 07, 2006

ISG Excerpts (II)

Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq.

Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’s interests would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran’s population is slightly more than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian national security interests.

Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.

Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran’s refusal to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks. [my emphasis]

"Dialogue" and "isolation" are touchstone words in Iran in the context of Iranian national interests and diplomacy, which is to say, the players that matter in Teheran will understand well the meaning of those words. In short, if Bush signs on to the Baker-Hamilton approach, agrees to engage with Iran over the Iraq issue (with possible regional overlays), and is then rebuffed by Teheran--the United States will be on much firmer footing to isolate Iran--even, to a significant degree, with countries like Russia and China. (Not being "rebuffed" doesn't mean there can't be difficult exchanges, but certainly if the U.S. makes a good faith effort to move the Iraq agenda forward cooperatively with Iran, only to then be scuttled by Teheran, the U.S. will be better positioned to move to further isolate Iran, likely materially weakening its global position. Worth noting too, "isolation" is something Iran tries to avoid at all costs, and as they have often in the past spoken of their desire to have constructive "dialogue" with various nations, calling their bluff on this score (at least to a fashion), is a smart move, in my view).

Also important to review in this context is "Recommendation 10", which puts the nuclear agenda on a wholly separate track (not really a major concession, as Baker-Hamilton are speaking mostly of a limited Iraq channel with Iran, not pursuing a "Grand Bargain" with the nuclear issue carved out), and see more at p. 51 (carrots that could be provided to Iran--including reassurance on the regime change issue, see roman "v") and p. 53 (positive actions Iran could take to help us in Iraq). Frankly, if I had to guess, I think Baker is somewhat skeptical that Iran will really step up, but is more interested in peeling Damascus away from Teheran's orbit some.

P.S. On moving Syria away from Iran, see importantly "Recommendation 15" and "Recommendation 16", which might signal to Asad (if Bush signs on to this approach, of course) that the U.S. could be re-emerging as an 'honest broker' on the Arab-Israeli front:

RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace should be:

Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.

Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemay el.

A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s problem with Hezbollah.)

Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.

A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.

A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.

A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.

Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.

Note: See also Recommendation 17 on the Palestinian issue.


Posted by Gregory at December 7, 2006 03:00 AM
Comments

I'm beginning to suspect that the appointment of Gates as Sec of Defense is related to his involvement in Iran-Contra.

Gates definitely went out of his way to make it clear that "regime change" in Iran will not be on the table while he is in charge of the Defense Dept -- and he may have some credibility with the Iranians due to his involvement in Iran-Contra...

Posted by: p.lukasiak at December 7, 2006 05:35 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Why is this laundry list of grievances with Syria quoted approvingly rather than mocked derisively? Suffice to say I'm skeptical that these heretofore intractable issues will somehow be settled now just because "adults" are once again involved.

And what of your other beloved Syrian pretext, the all-important Shebaa Farms? How could that have failed to make the list?

These points, in particular, are mind-bogglingly incongruous with recent history:

A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.

A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.

Your "breathless" linking and quoting of this cant is amusing. You've ranted and raved about the paucity of new ideas from the Bushies, but then you squeal with delight when your State Department buddies recycle tired nostrums that have failed for many decades.

Naturally, I'd love to be wrong. I'd love to see the ISG solve all the world's problems in one fell swoop. But it seems unlikely.

James


Posted by: James at December 7, 2006 06:45 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

James,

Shebaa Farms is a Lebanon issue, not a Syrian one.

Posted by: Dan at December 7, 2006 11:18 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink


James:

Suffice to say I'm skeptical that these heretofore intractable issues will somehow be settled now just because "adults" are once again involved.

What makes the Golan intractable is that the Israelis aren't willing to give the Syrians a deal like they gave the Egyptians, including return to 1967 borders. They made that deal with the Egyptians because it was to their advantage to split the opposing coalition by making a separate peace with their strongest enemy. At present they have no such incentive to make a similar peace with Syria.

Your objection, however, misses the point. The U.S. isn't going to broker an Israeli/Syrian peace any time soon, but it's good public diplomacy to appear to try.

And what of your other beloved Syrian pretext, the all-important Shebaa Farms?

Sorry to be blunt, but this question suggests that you know roughly zero about the Shebaa Farms issue. I suggest googling 'Shebaa Farms' and reading two or three articles.

The Israeli position is that the Shebaa Farms are Syrian territory and part of the Golan. (For once the Israelis are right.) Ending Israeli occupation of the Golan would automatically resolve Shebaa Farms as far as Israel is concerned. Theoretically it would then be an issue between Syria and Lebanon. My guess is they would save face either by resolving the issue quickly and quietly, or by postponing formal resolution indefinitely. Either way it would cease to be a live issue.

What's with 'other'? Shebaa Farms is a pretext, but the Golan is not. Bias is one thing, but that's just ridiculous.

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 7, 2006 11:35 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Nothing in that excerpt about Iran acknowledges the persistant reports that US intelligence and military assets are already working with and encouraging separatist Iranian groups. Maybe one of their classified recommendations is that we cut that out.

Posted by: Jackmormon at December 7, 2006 02:13 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

A few replies.

Dan writes:
Shebaa Farms is a Lebanon issue, not a Syrian one.

First, as David Tomlin explains in the comment after yours, Shebaa Farms is relevant, and arguably more relevant to Syria than Lebanon. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shebaa_Farms as a possible startiing point.

Second, the supposed benefit of ISG regional approach is that it's comprehensive. So even if this were just a Lebanon issue, it would need to be addressed since it was ostensibly a root cause (per BD himself) of the Hezbollah-Israeli battles this summer, and would therefore be tied to many of the ISG goals in the list.

David Tomlin:

Nice. First, assume that everyone else is an idiot. Classy as ever.

FWIW, I added the Shebaa Farms comment only because BD harped endlessly on its importance this summer as part of his posts on the Hezbollah-Israel conflict. It may well be that Israel (and possibly the ISG too) think of this as subset of Golan. But it was, apparently, an important subset (again, per BD) and calling it out hardly seems to warrant your response.

Your objection, however, misses the point. The U.S. isn't going to broker an Israeli/Syrian peace any time soon, but it's good public diplomacy to appear to try.

I agree with the first part. But I question the benefit of second, especially since, in this case, the first part is so incredibly unlikely to happen. What audience exists that will both be fooled and is relevant to actually resolving the issues?

Shebaa Farms is a pretext, but the Golan is not

That's true. I didn't intend to imply that Golan is a pretext. Poor editing.

Having said that, I will also say that I reject the idea that Golan is the bargaining chip that will achieve all of the ISG's stated goals. But this objection is, arguably, irrelevant if we assume your previous point about maintaining appearances.

James

Posted by: James at December 7, 2006 05:17 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink


James:

I added the Shebaa Farms comment only because BD harped endlessly on its importance this summer as part of his posts on the Hezbollah-Israel conflict.

Did he?

I searched the archives (using four variant spellings) and didn't find one post in which Greg discussed Shebaa Farms at any length. There are passing mentions, and one post in which he linked to an article on the subject and added a couple of comments.

Perhaps you could point to one or two posts in which Greg 'harped endlessly'?

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 7, 2006 06:50 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink


ISG report:

They attribute this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.

There is a disingenuous avoidance of acknowledging that 'regime change in Iran' is official U.S. policy, expressed in an act of Congress signed by the incumbent president.


http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/IranFreedomSupportActSignedIntoLaw.htm


http://mysite.verizon.net/lardil/id70.html

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 7, 2006 07:12 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Why in the world would Syria agree to abandon Hezbollah and its claims in Lebanon? Even if it would get the Golan Heights back?
Syrian control of Lebanon is far more important to Assad & Co. then the Golan is. And expecting Assad to cooperate with investigations of Hairi, Geymal and all would be like expecting the Corleones to cooperate with Federal investigations of their Family's business. What can the US do to make either Syria or Iran cooperate with us? Didly Squat I believe, particualry since the new SecDef has rule out any US military action against either country.

Posted by: David All at December 7, 2006 10:41 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Perhaps you could point to one or two posts in which Greg 'harped endlessly'?

Let's start with this one:
http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/2006/07/the_importance_of_shaba_farms.html

By the standards that BD applies in his inane criticisms of Instapundit, this alone counts as "endlessly harping" (along with "breathless linking"...)

Next, you could work your way through these 4 pages of links:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&as_qdr=all&q=Farms+Israel+Hezbollah+site%3Abelgraviadispatch.com

Given the Shebaa Farms issue is, as you acknowledged in an earlier post, a pretext, it appears in BD's analysis far more frequently than it should. Perhaps "endlessly harping" is rhetorical excess, but now you are quibbling. What next, spelling corrections?

Any chance you could return to the major topics and identify the audience that will be mollified by seeing the ISG publish a laundry list that all observers know will not be addressed and then explain how appeasing that audience will matter?

James

Posted by: James at December 8, 2006 03:46 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Perhaps you could point to one or two posts in which Greg 'harped endlessly'?

Let's start with this one:
http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/2006/07/the_importance_of_shaba_farms.html

By the standards that BD applies in his inane criticisms of Instapundit, this alone counts as "endlessly harping" (along with "breathless linking"...)

Next, you could work your way through these 4 pages of links:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&as_qdr=all&q=Farms+Israel+Hezbollah+site%3Abelgraviadispatch.com

Given the Shebaa Farms issue is, as you acknowledged in an earlier post, a pretext, it appears in BD's analysis far more frequently than it should. Perhaps "endlessly harping" is rhetorical excess, but now you are quibbling. What next, spelling corrections?

Any chance you could return to the major topics and identify the audience that will be mollified by seeing the ISG publish a laundry list that all observers know will not be addressed and then explain how appeasing that audience will matter?

James

Posted by: James at December 8, 2006 03:47 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink


James:

Let's start with this one:

http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/2006/07/the_importance_of_shaba_farms.html

That's the one I mentioned, in which Greg 'linked to an article on the subject and added a couple of comments.'

Next, you could work your way through these 4 pages of links:

I think it's poor etiquette to answer a question by running a search and throwing the pages in someone's face, without checking the posts for relevance yourself.

Some of these posts aren't from last summer. They go back to 2003. Some of them don't mention Shebaa Farms in the post itself. They made the search because in a sidebar link. Some made the search because of a passing mention in a long article that Greg was citing for some other reason.

I said I had done my own search, and specifically asked if 'you could point to one or two posts in which Greg "harped endlessly"?' It's no answer to throw up results of a search like the one I had already done.

By the standards that BD applies in his inane criticisms of Instapundit, this alone counts as "endlessly harping" (along with "breathless linking"...)

I took issue with your statement because it was factually misleading, not because I was concerned about fairness.

You might have added the qualification in parentheses. '(He didn't really harp, but by the standards . . .)' Then I wouldn't have wasted my time in the archives finding out what Greg really said.

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 8, 2006 11:43 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink


James:

Any chance you could return to the major topics and identify the audience that will be mollified by seeing the ISG publish a laundry list that all observers know will not be addressed and then explain how appeasing that audience will matter?

No chance, as that doesn't resemble anything I actually said.

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 8, 2006 11:52 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Let's try this one more time...

1) ISG published a laundry list of issues related to Syria that no one expects them to resolve
2) BD approved
3) I mocked BD for approving
4) You wrote:
Your objection, however, misses the point. The U.S. isn't going to broker an Israeli/Syrian peace any time soon, but it's good public diplomacy to appear to try.

Your use of "good public diplomacy" suggests that you think that
a) some group will be positively influenced by the ISG pretending to seriously address Syria/Lebanon/Israel
b) influencing that group will contribute to the resolution of this issue, or possibly some other issue ISG is addressing

I submit there is no group of people that meet both criteria. Any group foolish enough for (a) is irrelevant for (b). And any group that matters for (b) is not positively influenced by the ISG laundry list since they know it's delusional.

Sooooo...any chance you could elaborate on your usage of "good public diplomacy"? Who is the audience and what is the benefit?

James


Posted by: James at December 8, 2006 05:13 PM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

About Belgravia Dispatch

Gregory Djerejian, an international lawyer and business executive, comments intermittently on global politics, finance & diplomacy at this site. The views expressed herein are solely his own and do not represent those of any organization.


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