The Belgravia Dispatch: ISG Excerpts (III)

December 07, 2006

ISG Excerpts (III)

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

I'm going to go out on a limb and call this the Panetta/Perry clause.

See also, very importantly:

While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions:
Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order
to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country.

Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using special operations teams.

Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.

Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.

Amidst this withdrawal oriented talk, however, do note at p. 73:

Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.

I think the Baker-Hamilton Commission (as well as people like Zinni) are holding open the "surge" option for various reasons, including: A) by not going the Gelb-Biden federalism route, trying to stabilize Baghdad becomes even more critical (as some sustainable central authority being nurtured there is imperative if hopes of securing a viable, unitary polity are to be credibly maintained) and B) diplomacy with Syria and Iran would likely be enhanced by a show of American strength in the Iraqi capital, so that we are not seen to be negotiating from a position of blatant weakness.

Posted by Gregory at December 7, 2006 03:48 AM

Comments

This is the really crucial section. How many "unexpected developments" do you think we'll see between now and the middle of the next decade?

Posted by: sglover at December 7, 2006 07:07 AM | Permalink to this comment

....so that we are not seen to be negotiating from a position of blatant weakness.

What gestures could we make to keep that from being seen?

How can we even fool ourselves that we aren't negotiating from a position of blatant weakness?

If we want a strong negotiating position we need a draft, and we need high taxes to pay for what we do, and we need a solid national commitment for victory.

We need a lot of 18-year-olds who understand that the world needs them to be in iraq, and that filling that need is worth putting their lives on hold for the duration. They can go to college later.

We need a lot of old people who understand that their medical care isn't really important compared to winning in iraq. They need to understand that their sacrifice, living on dog food and dying early for lack of medical care, is worth it because future generations need us to win in iraq.

We need a whole lot of stockbrokers and insurance salesmen and telemarketers and real estate professionals and such to go do something useful for the war effort. America doesn't have time for them now. They can work in factories or recycling or do logistics or whatever they're good for, for the duration.

We need americans generally to accept a third-world lifestyle until the crisis is over. We use far too much electricity. We heat our buildings far too hot. Wear sweaters, stop eating meat, sacrfifice for the war effort.

We need rich americans to understand that their money must be requisitioned for the war. They can get compensation after the crisis is over and the terrorists have lost.

We need a national commitment that if we continue to lose, we will nuke as much of the world as it takes to turn the war around. Iraq is an existential threat to us and unless we win, we're doomed. Once the whole world understands that we passionately believe this, they'll understand why we have to do whatever it takes to win. No sacrifice too large. If we lose half our population but we win, that's better than losing everybody.

At that point we will have an extremely strong bargaining position. In fact the rest of the world will be scared shitless and they'll pretty much agree to all our terms.

But it isn't enough to talk about it. We have to actually do it. We have to persuade the US public that we'll all die unless we win in iraq, we have to persuade the old people to die and the young people to leave their raves and be soldiers for the duration, we have to persuade the rich to give up their money and the middle class to give up their standard of living. We have to put everybody to work.

Until the voters are convinced to make whatever sacrifice it takes, why would the rest of the world believe we're ready to back up our hollow words?

Quick, somebody make an argument why iraq is worth it.

Posted by: J Thomas at December 7, 2006 12:23 PM | Permalink to this comment

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran, declared the intention of overturning their government (excuse me, 'regime'), and threatened them with bombing (as a 'last resort') if they don't agree to U.S. demands regarding their nuclear program. Is a little 'surge' of troops into Baghdad going to intimidate them into helping?

It seems Baghdad is to be the lever that activates the Iranian/Syrian machina that delivers the deus (aka 'pony'). It all sounds like Rube Goldberg nonsense to me.

Let's not forget that some of the people 'surged' will be coming back in boxes.

Posted by: David Tomlin at December 7, 2006 12:27 PM | Permalink to this comment

J Thomas has it about right.

Until American right-wingers start advocating that list, they are just wimps pretending to have a pair.

Posted by: me at December 7, 2006 05:26 PM | Permalink to this comment

They're holding the surge option open because it is the only alternative to withdrawal. And I believe the next troop movement planned is adding 10,000 new trainers. So troop levels are going up before going down.

Posted by: jayackroyd at December 7, 2006 07:25 PM | Permalink to this comment

	« ISG Excerpts (II) \| Main \| ISG Excerpts (IV) » December 07, 2006 ISG Excerpts (III) RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. I'm going to go out on a limb and call this the Panetta/Perry clause. See also, very importantly: While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions: Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using special operations teams. Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran. Amidst this withdrawal oriented talk, however, do note at p. 73: Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. I think the Baker-Hamilton Commission (as well as people like Zinni) are holding open the "surge" option for various reasons, including: A) by not going the Gelb-Biden federalism route, trying to stabilize Baghdad becomes even more critical (as some sustainable central authority being nurtured there is imperative if hopes of securing a viable, unitary polity are to be credibly maintained) and B) diplomacy with Syria and Iran would likely be enhanced by a show of American strength in the Iraqi capital, so that we are not seen to be negotiating from a position of blatant weakness. Posted by Gregory at December 7, 2006 03:48 AM Comments This is the really crucial section. How many "unexpected developments" do you think we'll see between now and the middle of the next decade? Posted by: sglover at December 7, 2006 07:07 AM \| Permalink to this comment ....so that we are not seen to be negotiating from a position of blatant weakness. What gestures could we make to keep that from being seen? How can we even fool ourselves that we aren't negotiating from a position of blatant weakness? If we want a strong negotiating position we need a draft, and we need high taxes to pay for what we do, and we need a solid national commitment for victory. We need a lot of 18-year-olds who understand that the world needs them to be in iraq, and that filling that need is worth putting their lives on hold for the duration. They can go to college later. We need a lot of old people who understand that their medical care isn't really important compared to winning in iraq. They need to understand that their sacrifice, living on dog food and dying early for lack of medical care, is worth it because future generations need us to win in iraq. We need a whole lot of stockbrokers and insurance salesmen and telemarketers and real estate professionals and such to go do something useful for the war effort. America doesn't have time for them now. They can work in factories or recycling or do logistics or whatever they're good for, for the duration. We need americans generally to accept a third-world lifestyle until the crisis is over. We use far too much electricity. We heat our buildings far too hot. Wear sweaters, stop eating meat, sacrfifice for the war effort. We need rich americans to understand that their money must be requisitioned for the war. They can get compensation after the crisis is over and the terrorists have lost. We need a national commitment that if we continue to lose, we will nuke as much of the world as it takes to turn the war around. Iraq is an existential threat to us and unless we win, we're doomed. Once the whole world understands that we passionately believe this, they'll understand why we have to do whatever it takes to win. No sacrifice too large. If we lose half our population but we win, that's better than losing everybody. At that point we will have an extremely strong bargaining position. In fact the rest of the world will be scared shitless and they'll pretty much agree to all our terms. But it isn't enough to talk about it. We have to actually do it. We have to persuade the US public that we'll all die unless we win in iraq, we have to persuade the old people to die and the young people to leave their raves and be soldiers for the duration, we have to persuade the rich to give up their money and the middle class to give up their standard of living. We have to put everybody to work. Until the voters are convinced to make whatever sacrifice it takes, why would the rest of the world believe we're ready to back up our hollow words? Quick, somebody make an argument why iraq is worth it. Posted by: J Thomas at December 7, 2006 12:23 PM \| Permalink to this comment The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran, declared the intention of overturning their government (excuse me, 'regime'), and threatened them with bombing (as a 'last resort') if they don't agree to U.S. demands regarding their nuclear program. Is a little 'surge' of troops into Baghdad going to intimidate them into helping? It seems Baghdad is to be the lever that activates the Iranian/Syrian machina that delivers the deus (aka 'pony'). It all sounds like Rube Goldberg nonsense to me. Let's not forget that some of the people 'surged' will be coming back in boxes. Posted by: David Tomlin at December 7, 2006 12:27 PM \| Permalink to this comment J Thomas has it about right. Until American right-wingers start advocating that list, they are just wimps pretending to have a pair. Posted by: me at December 7, 2006 05:26 PM \| Permalink to this comment They're holding the surge option open because it is the only alternative to withdrawal. And I believe the next troop movement planned is adding 10,000 new trainers. So troop levels are going up before going down. Posted by: jayackroyd at December 7, 2006 07:25 PM \| Permalink to this comment		Reviews of Belgravia Dispatch "Awake" --New York Times "Always-Worth Reading" --Andrew Sullivan Recent Entries A Brief (and Belated) Word on Chas Freeman What Would Real--Rather Than Rhetorical--Change in U.S. Foreign Policy Look Like? Of War, and Tent Hospitals The Obama Imperative Some Addt'l Thoughts Re: Georgia McCain: Let's Compound the Blunder! Georgia On My Mind Should We De-Emphasize The Terror Threat in U.S. Foreign Policy? 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