The Belgravia Dispatch: Haifa Street

January 29, 2007

Haifa Street

“Help!” came the shout. “Man down."
“Sergeant Leija got hit in the head,” yelled Specialist Evan Woollis, 25, his voice carrying into the apartment with the Iraqi family. The soldiers from the sergeant’s platoon, part of the Third Stryker Brigade Combat Team, rushed from one apartment to the other.

In the narrow kitchen, a single bullet hole could be seen in a tinted glass window facing north.

The platoon’s leader, Sgt. First Class Marc Biletski, ordered his men to get down, away from every window, and to pull Sergeant Leija out of the kitchen and into the living room.

“O.K., everybody, let’s relax,” Sergeant Biletski said. But he was shaking from his shoulder to his hand.

Relaxing was just not possible. Fifteen feet of floor and a three-inch-high metal doorjamb stood between where Sergeant Leija fell and the living room, out of the line of fire. Gunshots popped in bursts, their source obscured by echoes off the concrete buildings.

“Don’t freak out on me, Doc,” Sergeant Biletski shouted to the platoon medic, Pfc. Aaron Barnum, who was frantically yanking at Sergeant Leija’s flak jacket to take the weight off his chest. “Don’t freak out.”

Two minutes later, three soldiers rushed to help, dragging the sergeant from the kitchen. A medevac team then rushed in and carried him to a Stryker armored vehicle outside, around 9:20. He moaned as they carried him down the stairs on a stretcher.

The men of the platoon remained in the living room, frozen in shock. They had a problem. Sergeant Leija’s helmet, flak jacket, gear and weapon, along with that of at least one other soldier, were still in the exposed area of the kitchen. They needed to be recovered. But how...?

...An Iraqi soldier rushed in and then stopped, seemingly surprised by the Americans sitting around him. He stood in the middle of the darkened living room, inches away from bloody bandages on the carpet.

“Get away from the window!”

The soldiers yelled at their interpreter, a masked Iraqi whom they called Santana. Between their shouts and his urgent Arabic, the Iraqi soldier got the message. He slowly walked away.

A few minutes later it happened again. This time, the Iraqi lingered.

“What part of ‘sniper’ don’t you understand?” Sergeant Biletski yelled. The other soldiers cursed and called the Iraqis idiots. They were still not sure whether an Iraqi soldier was responsible for Sergeant Leija’s wound, but they said the last thing they wanted was another casualty. In a moment of emotion, Private Barnum said, “I won’t treat him if he’s hit.”

When the second Iraqi left, an airless silence returned. The dark left people alone to grieve. “You O.K.? ” Sergeant B asked each soldier. A few nods. A few yeses.

Private Barnum stood up, facing the kitchen, eager to bring back the gear left. One foot back, the other forward, he stood like a sprinter. “I can get that stuff, Sergeant,” he said. “I can get it.”

The building next door had still not been cleared by Americans. The answer was no.

“I can’t lose another man,” Sergeant B said. “If I did, I failed. I already failed once. I’m not going to fail again.”

The room went quiet. Faces turned away. “You didn’t fail, sir,” said one of the men, his voice disguised by the sound of fighting back tears. “You didn’t fail.”..

...With more than an hour elapsed since the attack, and after no signs of another shot through the kitchen window, Sergeant B agreed to let Private Barnum make a mad dash for the equipment.

Private Barnum waited for several minutes in the doorway, peeking around the corner, stalling. Then he dove forward, pushing himself up against the wall near the window to cut down the angle, pausing, then darting back to the camouflaged kit.

Crack — a single gunshot. Private Barnum looked back at the kitchen window, his eyes squeezed with fear. His pace quickened. He cleared the weapons’ chambers and tossed them to the living room. Then he threw the flak jackets and bolt cutters.

He picked up Sergeant Leija’s helmet, cradled it in his arms, then made the final dangerous move back to the living room, his fatigues indelibly stained with his friend’s blood. There were no cheers to greet him. It was a brave act borne of horror, and the men seemed eager to go.

As Private Barnum gingerly wrapped the helmet in a towel, it tipped and blood spilled out.

As more of the 17,500 men getting surged into Baghdad get killed in such senseless fashion, we will need to check back in with the "17th Street Surgers" frequently to query them re: what strategic goals such men's ultimate sacrifice is meant to achieve. Facilitating Shi'a hegemony in Baghdad? Or, alternately, repopulating increasingly empty Sunni neighborhoods with Sunni internally displaced persons who have fled to relative safe havens like Fallujah? Stoking Kurdish-Sunni Arab tensions when peshmerga get enlisted to clear predominately Sunni Arab neighborhoods? Expanding Iranian influence by helping Dawa and Sciri, many of whose party officials fall, to varying degrees, well within Teheran's orbit?

They will tell us, of course, that we need to establish security to allow 'moderates' to be emboldened so as to make the necessary political compromises that will allow us to turn the corner in Iraq. They will tell us how can we stand by during the humanitarian catastrophe to come, without pausing to think whether a surge-lite can really materially impact the cycle of vicious ethnic cleansing. They will tell us that if we withdraw Iran will move in, but they don't seriously contend with alternatives like redeploying U.S. forces to border regions (to contain Syrian and Iranian ambitions), a maximal emphasis on full-blown, accelerated efforts to train and equip Iraq forces, and more proactive regional diplomacy (beyond "they know what they need to do").

Regardless, I've yet to hear someone persuasively broach why American blood and treasure should be expended in a ghastly urban civil war pitting Shi'a against Sunni, or internecine Sh'a squabbles, or Kurds vs. Arabs. Perhaps someone can assist in comments, with special attention paid to how specifically Iranian influence will be lessened (the New Big Goal) by a surge in Baghdad, assuming it's even half-way successful (the only way to convincingly diminish Iranian influence in the near term would be if we restored Sunni primacy, of course, but then we'd have a war on our hands with the Badr Organization, as well as Sadr's Mahdi militia, not to mention other Shi'a groups). Put differently, who are the "moderate" Shi'a we are seeking to protect, and to what aim? Surge-defenders in comments should be specific, though (this means no B.S. Lieberman-like generalities about "victory")...

Posted by Gregory at January 29, 2007 05:19 AM

Comments

They will tell us that if we withdraw Iran will move in, but they don't seriously contend with alternatives like redeploying U.S. forces to border regions (to contain Syrian and Iranian ambitions), full-blown, accelerated efforts to train and equip Iraq forces, and more proactive regional diplomacy.

Is that the problem with the Iraqi forces? The 'efforts to train and equip' them have been too slow and underblown? Whose idea was that?

Posted by: David Tomlin at January 29, 2007 06:29 AM | Permalink to this comment

"As more of the 17,500 men getting surged into Baghdad get killed in such senseless fashion.."

as if the 3000-plus previously were killed in a sensible fashion.

this war will continue to be fought until the reasons it started are resolved, one way or the other. and those reasons far pre-date the iraq invasion.

or.

yes, flee, flee, flee....for our lives!

Posted by: neill at January 29, 2007 06:31 AM | Permalink to this comment

even so, this war will continue -- even hotter.

Posted by: neill at January 29, 2007 06:34 AM | Permalink to this comment

"As more of the 17,500 men getting surged into Baghdad get killed in such senseless fashion.."

as if the 3000-plus previously were killed in a sensible fashion.

Credit where it's due. For once neill said something smart.

Posted by: David Tomlin at January 29, 2007 06:42 AM | Permalink to this comment

Greg,

War is ugly and frightening. Good men get killed. You didn't realize this when you initially supported the invasion of Iraq? It seems a little late for you to worry about American soldiers dodging snipers now. Fortunately, the soldiers realize this. Everyone in the Army and Marine Corps now enlisted or re-enlisted knowing they would be going to war.

I also find it odd that you seem sanguine about the Iranian nuke threat but you are terrified by the prospect of Iranian influence in a democratic Iraq. Why? Shiite parties hold about half the seats in Iraq's parliament -- will they all do Iran's bidding, just because Iranians have given some of them money? Isn't it likely that these Shiite Arab Iraqis have simply been pragmatic in accepting this aid, and that they will zealously pursue their own interests?

I still don't understand your alternative to President Bush's strategy of trying to lessen the sectarian violence in Iraq and establish some semblance of security to facilitate political reconciliation among Iraqis. You have never fleshed out specifically what you expect to be achieved by the Bush administration conducting "aggressive" diplomacy with Iraq's neighbors. What do you expect Bush to ask Iraq's neighbors to do? What do you expect him to offer them in return? How will any of this stabilize Iraq?

Dave P.

Posted by: Dave P. at January 29, 2007 06:44 AM | Permalink to this comment

There is no such Bush strategy -- simply because those words are mouthed by the Bush administration does not mean that there is any meaningful strategy for bringing about this result.

How are you going to lessen sectarian violence when everyone in the country is devoted to pursuing it? All that Bush is doing is favoring one faction against another. American military power is not going to be able to facilitate political reconciliation when no one wants it.

There are not nearly enough American troops to establish security, and the surge does not meaningfully change that equation.

You ignored the post's request to be specific; there is no Bush strategy -- just a string of platitudes.

The alternative is phased withdrawal -- go google Gen. Odom and read his plan.

Posted by: dmbeaster at January 29, 2007 06:59 AM | Permalink to this comment

I'm not Greg, but I can take a stab at these questions:

You have never fleshed out specifically what you expect to be achieved by the Bush administration conducting "aggressive" diplomacy with Iraq's neighbors. What do you expect Bush to ask Iraq's neighbors to do?

Off the top of my head: Backroom support, aggressive border patrolling, using their contacts and influence within Iraq to, if not stabilize the situation, at least swing it a direction favorable to American intersts, perhaps even material and military support.

What do you expect him to offer them in return?

Leverage in Israeli-Syrian negotiations, frozen Iranian accounts, assurances and deals that will draw the ayatollahs away from the nuclear option.

How will any of this stabilize Iraq?

See above. IMO, that horse left the barn long ago, and it ain't comin' back until its good and ready.

Posted by: Doug H. at January 29, 2007 07:03 AM | Permalink to this comment

dmbeaster,

I just googled a Gen. Odom piece where he was advocating immediate withdrawal. That still leaves the question of what to do next. Here was Odom's response to that:

"For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, re-establishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to knit together a large coalition including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China, and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan."

"Knit together a coalition to back a strategy" to stabilize the region. So much for specifics.

Dave P.

Posted by: Dave P. at January 29, 2007 07:14 AM | Permalink to this comment

The thing that has struck me in the last week or so is that the supporters of escalation and an occupation of indefinite duration are now down to two arguments. 1) It will be really bad in Iraq if the US leaves. 2) Maybe this time, things will work out okay.

In point of fact, I don't think anyone, except maybe Laura, Barney and the President, think this escalation is going to accomplish anything. The "what the hell, let's give it a shot" attitude that they are now adopting in public is really an acknowledgment that the situation cannot be improved. If they actually believed this escalation would be effective, they would say how. Instead, they fall back on pointing to sunk costs and expressions of hope.

Nobody thinks this is going to work. They're just refusing, Nixon-like, to accept that this going to end on their watch. I'm reminded of The Haldeman Diaries, with Kissinger's promises, repeated over and over again that if he just has a little more time, he'll get the US out.

Posted by: jayackroyd at January 29, 2007 07:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

Specifically, that would clearly entail attempts at the following:

—The internationalization of the occupation under UN authority, which would allow for a large enough influx of troops to prevent the civil war from escalating and devolving into a proxy war. Too bad for our ambitions as a regional hegemon, but we may have to give that up if we don't want to see the Guns of August play out again.

—A settlement among Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.

—A grand bargain with Iran, with Iran trading off support for terrorism and its nuclear ambitions for security guarantees and a path towards greater integration into the global economy. (A nicer way to say this can be arrived at, so we don't appear to be rewarding wrongdoing.)

The idea that this is beyond American leadership is absurd.

Posted by: Tulayev at January 29, 2007 08:16 AM | Permalink to this comment

In point of fact, I don't think anyone, except maybe Laura, Barney and the President, think this escalation is going to accomplish anything.

Laura, Barney, the President, and Joe Lieberman.

Posted by: Doug H. at January 29, 2007 08:40 AM | Permalink to this comment

mr. tulayev,

* the UN scampered from Iraq after they go their ass bombed off -- after being warned that their ass was exposed to being bombed off -- they won't be back.

* a settlement mong Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon will never happen -- especially while Iran is ascendant.

* if "security guarantees and a path towards greater integration into the global economy" for Iran hasn't worked for the past 30 years, why will it, especially of all times, now?

Posted by: neill at January 29, 2007 09:00 AM | Permalink to this comment

Oh, be serious.

—The UN is not in Iraq not because of security concerns but because this administration had made it crystal clear that they will not share authority or power. Give the UN political control over a multinational force based around the current occupation army and they'll be in, for good and bad, faster than you can snap your fingers, giving political cover to the American force and filling their pockets with graft money. It's about patronage, same as any other sort of politics.

—You're joking, surely; we can manage the Cold War and can't get four pissant countries of no strategic significance to make the obvious deals they have to make? Real statecraft would involve using the massive leverage we have over all the parties here.

—You must know something I don't about the standing American offer of security guarantees and support for eventual WTO membership after rigorous reform over the past 30 years...

Posted by: Tulayev at January 29, 2007 09:46 AM | Permalink to this comment

You're joking, surely; we can manage the Cold War . . .

I'm not sure the U.S. ever 'managed' the Cold War. It may have been more a matter of muddling through and in the end catching a lucky break in the form of the enemy imploding.

Posted by: David Tomlin at January 29, 2007 09:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

At this stage, is the Isreal-Palestine issue really germaine to the situation in Iraq? I am for the respolution of those issues, I think it will save a lot of head- and heartache in the future, and save many lives. However, is that what is fueling the situation in Iraq.

In other words, imagine Isreal goes back to the old borders, two states are created, refugees are returned, all that. What does this do in Iraq? Maybe Al Quaeda leaves? Maybe not? The Shiites are still going to be trying to get rid of the Sunni's, no? And the Sunni's are still going to be cornered racoons, right? What does Isrealli-Palestinian peace do for us IN IRAQ?

Similar sentiments on the Iraq-Iran border patrols. My sense was that the UK determinied that there was not a lot of arms going across the Iranian border. What does shoring this up do for us if the insurgents and/or factions can get a hold of this stuff domestically, including U.S. Army uniforms and equipment?

I am for Gregs aggressive diplomacy. I don't see how any of this helps the Iraqi people or (if we are still there) our troops in Iraq. The more I think about the various solutions people air, they all sound like pretty aweful options that won't help the situation in Iraq.

Of course, we still have to do SOMETHING (Even if something is withdrawal). I just think that the lessons in health class about withdrawal still hold: it is not an effective form of birth control (once your in, pulling out will not help). Of course, staying in won't help much either. Pretty much your screwed once you go in there. As for what to do once you've made that mistake . . . I have not seen any compelling answers. That is why I and most Americans want withdrawal: it seems the least costly of a number of utterly uncompelling alternatives.

Posted by: Doug at January 29, 2007 03:22 PM | Permalink to this comment

The idea that this is beyond American leadership is absurd.

No, Tulayev, not too absurd if you take it as a given that the desire for "regional hegemon[y]" you posit needs to be given up, is the entire raison d'etre of "neocon" foreign-policy aims for the US in the Middle East. Under the G W Bush Administration, that is.

And given the all-or-nothing, black-and-white, Us-vs-Them mentality that has fueled most American policy under this Administration, you can bet that the goal of "hegemony" (especially if the despised UN is involved) is going to be that absolute last thing which will be given up.

January 21, 2009 can;t come soon enough.

Posted by: Jay C at January 29, 2007 03:32 PM | Permalink to this comment

Did anyone see the article on yahoo about the english speaking soldiers dressed in US garb with US weapons and a US armoured suv that kidnapped 4 US soldiers and executed them? Sobering.

Posted by: centrist at January 29, 2007 05:04 PM | Permalink to this comment

Dave P:

I just googled a Gen. Odom piece where he was advocating immediate withdrawal.

Out of the box, you are full of it. He is not an advocate of "immediate" withdrawal -- this is a cheap trick to debate a strawman. The linked article does not advocate it.

Read his recent Congressional testimony here. There are plenty of specifics as to what is wrong with the surge policy and alternatives.

Posted by: dmbeaster at January 29, 2007 05:52 PM | Permalink to this comment

Doug, I agree with everything you say, including about why Israeli-Palestine conflict does not have much to do with the Iraq mess, and your reasons given. With this Administration's record of incompetency, withdrawl is the best way forward. Also if Bush is forced to withdrawl or at least begin to withdrawl from Iraq, it will lessen the spread of the inevitable "stab-in-the-Back" that will promoted by Conservatives in the future.

For a post about our latest "victory" in Iraq, the deaths of 200-250 gunmen of unlear orgin; see Zeyad's post, "U.S. Likely Duped in Najaf Clashes" at http://healingiraq.blogspot.com

Posted by: David All at January 29, 2007 05:53 PM | Permalink to this comment

meant to say "the deaths of 200-250 gunmen of UNCLEAR origin".
Got to be more careful with the proof reading!

Posted by: David All at January 29, 2007 06:12 PM | Permalink to this comment

The difference between "unclear" and "nuclear" is just one keystroke.

Maybe that's partly how we got into this mess. Somebody read a paper that was supposed to say "Saddam has unclear goals" and somehow they got "Saddam has nuclear goals".

Posted by: J Thomas at January 29, 2007 06:26 PM | Permalink to this comment

Gregory goes to the heart of the matter:
"what strategic goals such men's ultimate sacrifice is meant to achieve. Facilitating Shi'a hegemony in Baghdad? Or, alternately, repopulating increasingly empty Sunni neighborhoods with Sunni internally displaced persons who have fled to relative safe havens like Fallujah? Stoking Kurdish-Sunni Arab tensions when peshmerga get enlisted to clear predominately Sunni Arab neighborhoods? Expanding Iranian influence by helping Dawa and Sciri, many of whose party officials fall, to varying degrees, well within Teheran's orbit?"
These are the goals--they scarcely rate as strategic--for which soldiers like Sgt. Leija are in fact dying. It's absurd and outrageous that it should be so. And they are, it should be noted, remote from any rationale--WMD, democratization, whatever--that might be advanced in support of the initial invasion or the continued occupation.
I try to think of a principled basis on which determine what we should do next. I take it that the American interests in Iraq are the continued pumping and piping of its oil; obviating any incursion into Iraq by Saudi, Turkish, or Iranian troops; and preventing the training on Iraqi soil of terrorists intent on attacking non-Iraqi targets. I'm pleased to observe that any likely Iraqi government will certainly share our first two interests, and quite likely the third as well. I'm distressed to realize that life for many Iraqis today is wretchedly bad and that as an occupying power we have a responsibility if we can to better their lot, and possibly can better meet that responsibility with a large troop presence than with a smaller one, or none.
John Burns thinks a pullout of our forces would probably result in a greatly intensified civil war, and that's enough to show, I think, that that might very well be true, and we shouldn't suppose otherwise. But it may be that sooner or later we have to pull out, and whenever we do, civil war may intensify until it's resolved by the victory of one party or another.
In this situation, it's fortunate that we did succeed in running a reasonably free election that installed a government that is, by the standards of the region, more legitimate than most. If the government is legitimate, if its interests concide with our vital interests, and if the usual standards of respect for the sovereignty of other states apply, it follows that we should be listening hard to what Maliki has to say. If, then, as reported he's said he doesn't want to see American troops coming, he wants to see them leaving, there is little to be said for the National Security Advisor of the occupying power denigrating him and much to be said deferring to his requests.
Gregory is very much to be commended for getting to the core of it: the struggle in Iraq has been nearly reduced to one vengeful band of brother against others. We don't belong in the middle of that; one of these bands has about it a sufficient semblance of legitimacy we should follow their lead.

Posted by: Hardy at January 29, 2007 06:31 PM | Permalink to this comment

dmbeaster:

"Out of the box, you are full of it. He is not an advocate of "immediate" withdrawal"

Try thisessay by Gen. Odom in the L.A. Times. Read Odom's first sentence: "WITHDRAW immediately or stay the present course?" Now read the rest of his essay. Which of those two options is Gen. Odom advocating? He's clearly in favor of withdrawing immediately.

Now that we've disposed of your nasty comment and false accusation of a straw man argument, perhaps you will address the second part of my previous post: that Gen. Odom offers no specific, actionable plan to stabilize the region after an American withdrawal. In the pieces by him I have read, he only suggests forming a big coalition under UN auspices to do so.

Dave P.

Posted by: Dave P. at January 29, 2007 07:14 PM | Permalink to this comment

Dave P:

Read the LA Times link -- its clear that what you pretend is Odom's opinion is his hypothecation of the two extreme positions.

What he literally says is "Withdraw immediately or stay the present course? That is the key question about the war in Iraq today." He does not assert that the answer is 100% one or the other of these extreme choices, and its phony for you to argue for that inference.

He is an advocate for a more rapid withdrawal than some, but the whole point of his logic is to make it is clear that we are leaving very soon, start doing so, and make use of this change to engage other regional players with an interest in stability. His contention is that no one else will participate meaningfully so long as we are there because our presence is itself a reason for destabilization. On that point, he is clearly right.

And let's be clear that the position you advocate is not a "specific, actionable plan to stabilize the region." The surge is political window dressing so that war advocates can pretend that we are not continuing the same failed policies. It makes no tactical or strategic sense, except for the political cover it provides here in the US. It will not prevent any of the alleged horribles that will ensue with a withdrawal policy -- it will simply delay them while pointlessly chewing up more American lives and treasure.

Posted by: dmbeaster at January 29, 2007 09:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

J Thomas: You may well be right. I am always transposing couple of letters when I type. God only knows who else could be making similar mistakes!

Point out that not only between unclear & nuclear is is there one keystroke in difference. The same is true between Iraq & Iran. Maybe the report originally identified Iran as the power with a clandastine nuclear bomb project, but was misspelled as Iraq!
(Recall back before we invaded Iraq in 2003, a British comedian, perhaps it was Rowan Atkinson, had a routine based on the dangers of having two countries, in the same region, with just one letter difference in their names!)

Posted by: David All at January 29, 2007 10:13 PM | Permalink to this comment

so then you surrender and deliver victory into the hands of al quaeda, which instigated the current sectarian strife in Iraq with just this end in mind.

what a USEFUL gift!

Posted by: neill at January 30, 2007 01:00 AM | Permalink to this comment

Just curious if you voted for the idiots in charge of this war.

Now I know I didn't, so my concience is clear.

How's yours?

Posted by: Richard Bottoms at January 30, 2007 08:03 AM | Permalink to this comment

The Shiites have generally been ruled by Sunnis throughout the history of Islam. The Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979 has inspired Shiites in other countries, namely Iraq and Lebanon. During the 1980s, the United States quietly supported the Baathists in Iraq in their war against the Shiite radicals governing Iran. The Baathists survived the war, despite mass suicide attacks by Iranian armies; many of the dead Iranians were teenagers.

When Saddam Hussein's Baathists occupied Kuwait, however, we took the side of the Saudis and Kuwaitis, raised an international coalition (even the French signed up), and expelled the Iraqis forcefully and convincingly out of Kuwait. We called the First Gulf War a lot of things, including the beginning of a "new world order," but ultimately our campaign restored the balance of power to the Middle East. Iraq's power to expand was defeated. Iran's military power continued to decline due to the lack of modern weapons. The power of the Saudis grew because of U.S. support. Israelis could thank God that they didn't have to intervene, despite salvos of Scud missiles.

Maintaining a balance of power, however, is a job not for the scrupulous. To do so, we had to ignore the pleas of the Iraqi Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north as the Iraqi Baathists oppressed them and killed them. America is not a nation whose leaders can proclaim to the world that we are only concerned with national interests, especially when national interest might compel our changing sides or allies.

Moreover, economic sanctions such as those imposed against Iraq seldom work, especially as a long-term policy. Americans learned to love economic sanctions before our own revolution, when mass protests against the Stamp Act and the Intolerable Acts shocked and hurt British commerce. If the war had not broken out in 1775, the British would have likely found more reliable customers and suppliers of goods, and the success we enjoyed from our boycotts of British products would have been seen as short-lived. Throughout the 1990s, nonetheless, the U.S. enforced economic sanctions and no-fly zones over a sovereign nation. Of course, Saddam Hussein and his Baathists didn't starve to death. They tortured people and built more palaces while those out of power suffered and died.

9/11 changed American posture in the Middle East and created a national mood in which anything was possible. I sensed a desire that something had to be done, even if it were wrong. The Ox-Bow Incident is an excellent book and movie capturing such a mood. In it, a farmer is murdered and his cattle are stolen in the Old West. A posse goes out in anger, finds three innocent men with the cattle, and hangs them. There is considerable regret at the end of the day when they realize it was all a zealous mistake, as there should have been. The movie was not well received in 1943 because at that time we were so angry at our German and Japanese enemies that we were likely to do the same thing, and to some extent, we did.

We went to war in Iraq in 2003 for a variety of reasons, but I think Iraq was caught in the perfect storm:
1. Anger after 9/11 and a desire to fix the bad situation 9/11 revealed.
2. The anthrax mailings after 9/11 and the fear of weapons of mass destruction.
3. The petty and evil public persona of Saddam Hussein. There might be worse and more cruel dictators, but his personality cult, his arrogance, his cruelty to the Kurds and other enemies, his bombastic anti-U.S. statements, and the fact that he remained standing after 1991 made him a tempting target. I think it would have taken a president as stubborn as John Adams to avoid a war with Saddam Hussein; I don't buy the argument that Bush Jr. was only making up for Bush Sr.'s mistake.
4. The economic sanctions made Iraq an outlaw nation, and the Baathists' contacts with every smuggler and criminal in the Middle East made it easy to assume that al-Qaeda and the Baathists were supporting each other more than they actually were. The Baathists were a criminal regime, and it is still difficult to separate their criminal contacts from their terrorist contacts.
5. Overreliance on electronic intelligence. The British know how to operate covert agents and recruit foreign spies. We don't. We have almost always relied upon technology for intelligence (and been foolish at protecting our own information). Despite having allies all around Iraq and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis angry at Saddam Hussein, we really didn't know what was going on in Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Electronic intelligence needs to correlate to intelligence gathered on the ground.
5. The decisive election of 2002. After the Democrats claimed President Bush was illegitimate for two years, the Republicans won governing majorities in both houses of Congress. The Democratic Party imploded when we needed them the most. If the Democrats had learned to quit congratulating themselves for our defeat in Vietnam, then the Republicans in their hubris would have had some credible opposition before and during this war. Instead, Republicans refused (until recently) to question President Bush's assumptions, and Democrats in most cases looked like whiners and defeatists. It didn't help the Democrats that only a few had the courage to come out bluntly against the war and that most Democrats sat on the fence as best they could. When Americans at war must choose between warriors that are blockheads and weanies that are smart, they will choose the warriors.
6. Genuine fear among the public that a nuclear weapon in the Middle East would threaten everyone's security.
7. A shift among conservative intellectuals from the foreign policy realism of Henry Kissinger to the more Wilsonian views of the neo-conservatives. (It's not a conspiracy. Republicans going back to Henry Cabot Lodge do not trust international institutions, and Republican foreign policy is developed in a triangular struggle between realists such as James Baker, neo-conservatives such as Richard Perle, and traditional, isolationist conservatives now unfortunately and poorly represented by Pat Buchanan. From 2003 to 2006, the neo-conservatives had the upper hand, though never a monopoly.)
8. Overconfidence in the American military based upon our easy victories in Kuwait in 1991 and Bosnia in 1999.
9. A presumption that the Iraqi state would survive the destruction of Baathism and be able to govern the country after a U.S. victory.
10. The desire by the Bush administration to create another client state in the Middle East through which we could protect U.S. interests and project U.S. power. A secular Iraq liberated by the U.S. and grateful to us would be a source of oil, a means for stability in oil supplies and prices, an armed force against Iran and Syria, a model for future democratic developments in the region, and an alternative to al-Qaeda, reactionary monarchies, and Baathism.

What we have in Iraq, however, is a Shiite regime which threatens the balance of power in the Middle East as well as the lives and property of Sunnis who were not Baathists. The Sunni Arabs make up the largest portion of the middle class who will need to lead the new Iraq. We destroyed a fiend and overthrew a fascist regime, but unless we can establish a governing coalition for Iraq that can guarantee the lives and property of Sunni Arabs, we will need to intervene in Iraq or a neighboring country during the next decade.

America might have a politically unacceptable task, that is, to protect the Sunni Arabs whose power we just destroyed from the Shiite regime whose constitution we made possible. If I thought we could throw up our hands and walk away from Iraq without having to return to something worse in less than a decade, I would advocate our withdrawal. No decision is going to be without adverse consequences.

Posted by: Tertium Quid at January 30, 2007 11:18 PM | Permalink to this comment

A new rule:

Anybody who demands a specific and detailed alternate proposal for what to do about iraq --

has to deliver a specific and detailed explanation of the current plan first.

Posted by: J Thomas at January 31, 2007 08:42 PM | Permalink to this comment