30,ooo troops does not constitute a meaningful increase, it won't change the situation on the ground, but it will add additional humiliation to our defeat as this will be portrayed as our maximum possible effort and still fail.

The rule of thumb when fighting partisans is one soldier for every ten people... that equals 2.6 million soldiers. 30,000 troops is laughable. We are already at a point where we control very little actual territory, just that around the free fire zone of our military. Our troops are in fact besieged in disconnected redoubts.

We have lost. Staying only makes the loss larger. The government and leader are thoroughly incompetent, so the situation is hopeless.

Posted by: Tom at January 1, 2007 05:09 PM | Permalink to this comment

Greg

The problem with this is that putting in an additional 30k US forces will merely replicate the force level that obtained in the wake of the Fallujah and Sadrist uprisings of spring 2004.

Given that the deployment of 170k troops for the best part of 12 months in 2004-2005 failed to stem the insurgency, aid in reconstruction or deliver security, it is hard to see that a repetition of the policy over the next 18 months can do anything other than "hold the line" whilst accelerating the US military exhaustion factor. Irrespective of whether there are additional deployments, the relentless drip of casualties is eroding domestic political support for a continuation of the occupation.

Having failed to contain the violence in Baghdad with the "small surge" of the past 6 months, the best that a larger surge is likely to accomplish is the displacement of violence elsewhere - more troops isn't a political solution ( it really speaks to the absence of political "thinking" in Washington ), and going after the Sadrists, for example, is merely to repeat the 2004 experience, with the exception that the Sadrists are more numerous, better positioned, better armed, better trained, and likely to adopt a tactical profile centred around IED attacks on the logistics chain from Kuwait as opposed to their earlier tactical naivete.

Surge or not, the 2008 elections will inevitably become a referendum on withdrawal - and the candidate who has the guts to frame the issue this way will have a serious chance of winning.

Whilst going massive with an additional 80-100k troops might work to tamp down the violence, the reality is that the US can only accomplish this by going on a "war footing" that will involve either a raise in taxes or a raise in interest rates, a re-ordering of Pentagon spending priorities away from fancy toys to low-tech "boots-on-the-ground basics" ( not going to be a hit with the corporate donors ), a further squeeze on an already overburdened army and marines, the continued degradation of the NG, and some mechanism to recruit or draft more boots. In the short term, quite how the US could deploy this number and maintain all its other committments to Afghanistan, Korea, Japan, Djibouti, the Philippines, Kosovo, the enormous foreign basing infrastructure, domestic security etc, let alone maintain a "reserve" to deal with contingencies, is a mystery.

Given that the US military has already had to widen parameters and dilute standards to maintain its army recruiting, and is already employing "creative" measures to maintain re-enlistment ( ie re-up with a bonus or be stop-lossed for free, but either way you're going back to Iraq sooner or later ), this is going to be tough to accomplish by "voluntary" measures.

Posted by: dan at January 1, 2007 05:21 PM | Permalink to this comment

I share your view that there are some good things in Kagan's COIN work. However, on balance I am deeply sceptical and I don't think it will work.

First off, the concept of a "surge" is antithetical to the nature of counterinsurgency (although other parts of the Kagan plan are tight in this regard). Even allowing for the fact that Kagan and Keane have recently, commendably, come out for a timescale at the longest end of the spectrum that has been bandied about, there are no guarentees whatsoever (although of course there never are in war). Given the extreme complexity of the situation, the notion of achieving decisive impact in 18 months seems to me extremely unlikely, even if everything goes right (which it won't).

And this is where we run into problems because there still seems to be too much that is undefined. In his initial writings, Kagan's idea for the "surge" was to shore up the Coalition's position in Iraq in order to buy time for a substantial expansion to the Army and the USMC to come online. Increasingly, the "surge" operation appears to be taking on the life of an independent entity. So it seems to me that we have a certain lack of clarity. Is it meant to:

- Win the whole game by itself?
- Buy time for major infusions of fresh US troops?
- Buy time for the Iraqi security forces to come online in sufficient numbers to take over?
- Create a situation relatively favourable to the one we are in now, to try to buy the US some pre-pullout high ground a la Vietnam?

Now, each of these potential answers (which are of varying merit and credibility) brings about a slew of further questions, mostly unanswered, but it's hard to pin down because quite what the answer is seems to depend on who you're reading/speaking to and at what time you're doing it.

A final point to note is that although Kagan and Keane have noted - correctly - the importance of taking an holistic approach to the operations and integrating reconstruction work with clearing and holding, when it comes to the details of the resources required and how the effort will be integrated into the overall Big Push... well there aren't any. We need to see answers in that area.

Posted by: Anthony C at January 1, 2007 05:33 PM | Permalink to this comment

"Whilst going massive with an additional 80-100k troops might work to tamp down the violence, the reality is that the US can only accomplish this by going on a "war footing" that will involve either a raise in taxes or a raise in interest rates, a re-ordering of Pentagon spending priorities away from fancy toys to low-tech "boots-on-the-ground basics" ( not going to be a hit with the corporate donors ), a further squeeze on an already overburdened army and marines, the continued degradation of the NG, and some mechanism to recruit or draft more boots."

Dan,

I'm not in a position to judge whether this is correct myself, but I know a lot of smart people who'd say you're right.

In other words it's getting to the stage where we're talking about employing something close to total means in order to win (or have a chance of winning) a limited war.* Not going to happen.

*I have to note that a very smart chap made the case to me that the sheer hideousness of the consequences of losing now push Iraq into the sort of bracket where it's close to total. I see what he means but disagree. However, it just illustrates what a stew we're in.

Posted by: Anthony C at January 1, 2007 05:39 PM | Permalink to this comment

Whether we're talking about 30,000 or 80,000, it would be nice to know exactly what the objective is.

Can any argument be made that Iraq has not already split beyond efforts to keep it together? Even Saddam's execution was an occasion for sectarian taunts - and sectarian fears, since his executioners felt they had to be masked - and that had to be with the government's blessing. Which means that the recognized, official Iraqi government is an agent of de-confederation, not a helpless bystander.

What, exactly, are the additional US troops supposed to be there for?

When I say "exactly" I mean just that.

All I've heard so far are wishlist items.

Will the additional troops be enforcing Shia control? Will they be assisting in driving out Sunni? Will they be taking sides in the civil war? Will they be taking orders from US commanders who are, in turn, taking orders from the Iraqi government?

What are the specific objectives?

Posted by: CaseyL at January 1, 2007 06:14 PM | Permalink to this comment

The figures bandied about before the war (from historical studies) indicated that from 250K - 500K troops would be needed. The higher figure was for regions which had lots of ongoing violence at the start of the counterinsurgency campaign. Whatever Iraq was back in 2003, it's got to be that now, so 500K seems to be the figure at which success wouldn't depend on miracles. This surge of 30K troops won't even bring things close to 250K, and the current logistical system can't sustain pre-surge numbers.

Basically, if you screw it up from the beginning, you get to a point where you can't succeed.

Posted by: Barry at January 1, 2007 07:07 PM | Permalink to this comment

The whole "Kagen/Keane" proposal is based on "clear, reconstruct, and hold" areas of Baghdad.

Unfortunately, they never actually explain what "clear" means. Do they mean "fallujah" style "clearing".... basically destroy Baghdad section by section, rebuilding each section as a police state once it is "cleared" of insurgents?

Now, this could work, in theory -- and could probably be done with an extra 30,000 troops for 18 months or so...... plus another 100,000 or so aid workers to deal with the refugee crisis that would results, and another 50,000 security personnel to secure the aid workers, and 200 Billion in reconstruction aid (for starters). It would also, as Greg notes, include a serious and sustained "diplomatic offensive" that would incorporate policies that are anathema to every Bush appointed over the last six years.

Thus it could only work "in theory", because the Bush regime has shown itself to be entirely incompetent in carrying out the simplest of tasks (like getting Saddam Hussein convicted and executed for crimes against humanity in a fair trial, and doing so without turning him into a martyr...), let alone show the kind of flexibility it would need to achieve its goals.

Posted by: p.lukasiak at January 1, 2007 09:17 PM | Permalink to this comment

A year ago there were 183,000 coalition troops in iraq.

Now there are 158,000, or 25,000 less.

So if we are talking about a 20,000 to 30,000 surge all we are doing is taking the force level back to where it was a year ago.

If we could not win with 183,000 troops a year ago, why should anyone expect to realize different results in 2007?

Posted by: spencer at January 1, 2007 09:31 PM | Permalink to this comment

First, remind me again what the surge is supposed to accomplish.

Second, how many more trainers will it take to make roughly 100 more Iraqi army battalions, roughly 80% of the force, effective--and effective exactly when and effective against whom?

Third, what we are going to find out, over the next 23 months, is the limit of Presidential powers to dictate a foreign policy course, the desires of the people, the desires of their representatives, the desires of the President's own party be damned. (See the cited Robert Novak piece.)

Baker-Hamilton was conceived and staffed to be an intervention. It didn't work. The administration will carry on regardless, unless and until they are, somehow, stopped, just as a drunk will carry on drinking.

That is baseline reality, and we might as well gear our thinking accordingly.

We can spin up diplomatic initiatives, Iraq Study Group reports, International Crisis Group reports (that one might, just might actually work--IF...), assumptions (as here) of a reasoned policy debate all we want. But all of that is just pointless wanking.

The Decider has decided on nothing less than victory, and victory it shall be--and thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands more will die in the trying for it. The mere fact that the situation is already irretrievable will bother Bush - Cheney not in the slightest. Has anyone heard any operational plan for the surge that makes it anything other than Operation Together Forward II?

When Nixon was shown the door, a bi-partisan delegation of Hill leaders went to the White House, telling him it was all over. I don't see that happening with Iraq. Efforts to prevent spending on a surge will be met first with a veto, and then with Addington-drafted signing statements, finding those parts of the legislation an improper infringement on the Decider's Commander-in-Chief powers. Efforts to modify the AUMF will meet the same fate. By the time the Supreme Court would decide the matter (IF this Court would even take jurisdiction), it will be 09 anyway.

In sum, we will be searching for the outer limits of Presidential powers, and I think that, to our surprise, we will find that, if the President (and, in this case, the OVP) so decide, there are (in a second term) really no limits at all.

This isn't what the founding fathers conceived, but, with the Constitution being read as this administration does, it is, I fear, what they wrought.

Posted by: dell at January 1, 2007 10:31 PM | Permalink to this comment

1. Whether the "surge" is a half-measure depends on what they are allowed to do when they get there.
The original Rumsfeld plan as I understand it was that "good guy" neighborhoods get material aid and minimal US police presence because they do not shoot at us, turn in those who do and participate in the nation-building process. "Bad guy" neighborhoods would get zero in the way of aid or rebuilding and get a military rather than a police response to acts of violence.
This model did not require street corner police presence just a willingness and mobility to kill quickly when provoked. The harsh consequence of non-compliance was designed to obviate the need for physical occupation. Call it the deadly small footprint model or a carrot or bullet approach.
Because we apparently balked at the whole bad-guy neighborhood approach, we suddenly needed a huge force to support the illusion that all areas could be treated with the same rules of engagement. As a result, the consequences for Iraqis for aiding bad guys are often far less than the consequences of defying them.
So if we deploy 200,000 or 500,00 troops under the same rules of engagement as currently apply to the LA police dept, it will likely not impact the level of violence. The real issue is the rules of engagement.

2. I am continually baffled by the Frank Rich "we have already lost" style of commentary as if there were some magic time limit that has already passed. The appetite for defeatist rhetoric fills some psychological need I do not fully understand. The delay in finishing the Iraqi mission is not due to the number of "boots on the ground" or de-Baathification or Green Zone mismanagement or other alleged policy error du jour so much as a typically American faith in the carrot over the stick. Our lack of focused ruthlessness means that a 2 to five year operation becomes seven to ten. But isn't it still a victory even if it is really slow?
Britain took 30 years to pacify Northern Ireland since the troubles were renewed by Bloody Sunday. Was that a failure? If it is possible to achieve a completely stable, democratic and prosperous Iraq but only with a ten or 15 year plan, would it still be a defeat if we did that? Not that I advocate a ten year plan but if it wound up being ten years would that still be a failure? What is the time constraint? Don't we have more resources than the bad guys?

3. Why does anyone admire Chuck Hegel, whose need for attention is pathological even by U.S. Senate standards. The Hegel dig-me-I'm-a-Maverick shtick is tiresome and sophomoric. His stands on alleged principle tend to correlate with polling data. You can disagree with Lieberman, Feingold or Santorum but you have to conceded that they operate rather consistently on principle and ideological consistency rather than oppositional narcissism which appears to be Chuck Hegel's principal motivation.

Posted by: George T at January 1, 2007 11:19 PM | Permalink to this comment

George -- here, here.

let's hope the following potential political shift combined with whatever our shift turns out to be leads to more secure and stable environment for Iraqis and our troops.

from Omar at Iraq The Model:

The United Alliance at a Crossroads.

For some time now we're seeing renewed speculations about the state of unity of the Shia alliance that we can almost see a possible radical change in its structure on the horizon.

It looks like the crack that resulted from ousting Jafari and choosing a replacement after the last elections is still haunting the alliance and its future. The question now is, is this likely to happen again and will the crack deepen after the failure of the government-with the UIA being its bigger component-in providing services and containing the political crisis?

To understand the nature of this bloc we must not forget the underlying historical and ideological factors from which the idea of a unified Shia alliance had arisen.

Centuries of injustice and fear from extinction that reach the level of paranoia affect the thoughts and attitude of its poles; this combined with constant attacks from Salafi/Wahabi extremists and threats posed by statements from regional Sunni powers who are concerned about a rising Shia power in Iraq backed from Iran, all of this keeps pushing the UIA to adhere more to its unity. A unity that is of existential value to the leaders of the alliance; it means much more than a mere political asset.

Reaching the top of the political pyramid in Iraq was a significant achievement for the UIA but the aftermath of this brought with it the real challenge. The UIA seemed weaker than it was before elections and found itself facing a reality that exceeds the Shiasm of the bloc; the UIA had to lead a country of various components and to deal with regional and international situations that impose their own variety of terms and demands.

This has made sticking to the unity of the bloc an impractical idea that can't be salvaged by historical or ideological pretexts. In other words, the big mass of the bloc turned into a burden because it's near impossible for all of its factions to agree on a common policy that satisfies their various goals.

If we look at the political blocs we can say that the UIA now is not as strong as the Kurdish bloc but also not as fragile as the Sunni component. The latter being the most susceptible to disintegration.

Some inside the UIA discovered this early and predicted its impact on the political future of the Shia bloc but still, walking away isn't easy at all especially when the hierarchy in Najaf stresses that, in order to preserve the Shia identity, the unity of the alliance is a redline that politicians must not cross—the UIA became a divine entity and not just a political body and this combination is critical.

When signals came that there are ideas to reshape the political map by forming a 'front of moderates' the members of the alliance who needed the bloc to be in the offices they occupy today felt the danger. They all know that alone they wouldn't get as much votes as if within the UIA, especially the Sadrists and the Dawa; neither can get the same number of seats if enters elections alone. And here the Dawa has another weakness that it has no significant armed wing and they are also less politically powerful than the SCIRI, their traditional rival.
They (the Dawa) realize they won't be the winners from forming the new front and they also know an alliance with the Sadrists won't be fruitful either should the latter get sidelined or struck.

The Dawa is now hesitant between joining the new front which they won't gain much from, and staying away which will mean a loss. That's why it was mostly Dawa members who panicked and rushed to Sistani to explain the nature of the threat which was described to him as a recipe for breaking up the UIA rather than a new phase in political building…once again, the politician seeks shelter in the religious symbol at times of distress.

Sistani didn't hesitate and stood once more on the side of history and faith rather than the present and the state. This is a signal that will be in my opinion of negative impact on the reputation of the Ayatollah who has so far been considered relatively impartial but this time he was very far from being impartial and this will make those who used to trust him as a 'safety valve' for Iraq change their mind—the Ayatollah is now a figure in the Shia equation, not a national symbol. He has simply declared himself a safety valve for the UIA.
The parties afraid from a change did not only warn the Ayatollah about the serious situation but even put in his mouth the "best way" to solve the problem which is convincing the Sadrists to abandon their destructive stance that's been threatening the unity of the alliance.

Although the Sadrists said they would think about it and that they would rejoin the political process (on conditions) the facts on the ground and the constant irresponsible atrocities committed by their gangs makes it very difficult to trust any words they give.

I think the targeting of Aadil Abdul Mahdi in Karrada, the stronghold of the SCIRI shows the level of Shia infighting. This along with the constant challenging to the authorities, mass kidnappings and the attempts to take over Shia cities in the south; this bloody conflict that reached the doorsteps of the UIA leaders is making the moderates in the UIA less interested in preserving the alliance in its old form.

Others will try everything to keep the alliance united and so will Sistani but they will be facing the realism of the others. Even Sistani himself knows that the change is supported by other senior clerics in Najaf which means his word will be faced by opposition from other Ayatollahs who don’t agree with him and who also endorse members and parties within the same alliance.
Meanwhile Maliki and his party have not chosen their way yet and Maliki is torn between two choices; he and his party would like the situation to remain unchanged and at the same time hope the Sadrists come back to reason, but I think every day that passes is making him more willing to consider joining the moving train rather than missing it. Sadr's stiffness will fix Maliki on this track.
It will take some time and lots of talks for the new formation to emerge, and overriding Sistani's interference won't be an easy task at all because who used his influence to win in the first place can't just abandon him like that. a strong and good excuse will be needed to get over it.

In any case I can only see a change coming, the present suggests this, not the past. And perhaps the biggest event that I expect to come after the new front is formed would be calling for holding early general elections towards the end of 2007, and then the political map of Iraq will be different, in a good way I think.

Posted by: neill at January 1, 2007 11:50 PM | Permalink to this comment

I appreciate Neill's quote from Omar's political analysis, and don't blame Omar at all for proceeding from the assumption that what matters most here is the future of Iraq. I would think less of any Iraqi who did not believe that. This does not make it true.

A surge could work, or appear to. A substantial influx of American troops to the Baghdad area could combine with the effects of damage to the infrastructure of insurgent groups; the efforts of Shiite factional leaders to avoid general conflict within their own sect; the greater physical separation of Sunni and Shia created over the last ten months or so; and the onset of sheer physical exhaustion among the population of Baghdad to create increased security in the capital and therefore at least a breathing space for the Iraqi government and people.

It could do this. On the other hand it might not. The above is a rather long list of necessary conditions; given this, a surge would appear to amount to a bet that our luck in Iraq suddenly becomes very good in a number of ways. The odds favoring this bet do not appear to be good ones.

But bets are sometimes won against the odds, so suppose this one is. Say a surge works, or at least works in combination with the other favorable developments noted above. What then?

The proponents of an increase in force levels all, to my knowledge, advocate a temporary increase only. Assume the Iraqi government does get its breathing space: does it then apppeal to the Bush administration to maintain the increased force levels? If the extra troops are withdrawn and violence resumes at its current level, aren't we back where we started? If violence remains at lower levels for a time, will not moves toward further withdrawals of American troops incur criticism that they risk reducing the government's margin of safety? If the jockeying for position among Shiite factions cannot be resolved amicably and the insurgency outside Baghdad continues, could we not find our troops and those of the British stuck indefinitely in the middle of factional fighting as well as the Sunni-Shiite civil war?

The last thing we ought to be enthusiastic about is a "change of direction" with respect to Iraq that does no more than kick difficult decisions about our commitment in that country down the road for a mere three months or so -- if it succeeds!

I exclude right at the start the ISG's idea of a "diplomatic offensive" supplementing what we are able to do within Iraq, as I know nothing to suggest that a State Department led by Condoleezza Rice and without a Deputy Secretary, Counsellor or UN Ambassador is capable of any such undertaking. There isn't much point in urging an administration to do things it lacks the capacity to do. But even excluding that consideration, I object to bets against long odds, especially if the payoff is as limited as it appears to be in this case.

Posted by: Zathras at January 2, 2007 12:45 AM | Permalink to this comment

Just some idle questions for George T: Do you speak or read Arabic? Do you know any Iraqis? Do you have even a single credential that makes you more informed about contemporary social realities in Iraq than anyone else?

I strongly suspect the answer is "no". I think your hackneyed analogy to Ireland illustrates just how willfully ignorant you are. (Did the Brits ever come close to gutting their army in Belfast? Did the Brits have to deal with a language barrier anything like what our troops in Iraq face? Please...) It follows that your call for "focused ruthlessness" springs from the same kind of strategizing-via-adrenal-gland that got us into this mess in the first place.

At a minimum I'd love to hear how "focused ruthlessness" is going to stem the flow of educated and professional Iraqis from their homeland -- a development that bodes as ominously for the future of Iraq as the continuing anarchy and bloodshed. I expect that your answer will be nothing more than the usual bloody-minded hand-waving and wish-thinking.

For the last several years our homegrown Night and Fog advocates have got much more credence than they deserve. Look how well that's worked out. You should be ashamed. Probably you're incapable of it.

Posted by: sglover at January 2, 2007 12:59 AM | Permalink to this comment

Zathras: If State, as currently led/staffed, can't handle this job, then a special envoy needs to be appointed. It's that important. But yes, I realize this team likely doesn't have the confidence or intellectual/strategic depth to acknowledge this gaping need, so as to make the necessary staffing arrangements. And while I understand your view that there is little value in making the point given this (likely) reality, I view the regional situation as being at such a low ebb, one that so critically requires hands-on crisis management on various fronts, that I feel compelled to continue to make this point (that a massive diplomatic effort is required at the highest levels), however quixotic and plaintive the pleas must sound to many of you.

Posted by: greg djerejian at January 2, 2007 01:30 AM | Permalink to this comment

Few thoughts:

"The proponents of an increase in force levels all, to my knowledge, advocate a temporary increase only."

This is a real issue. As has been noted, in the early stages of his thinking, Kagan advocated a "surge" as a way of holding the line, pending a substantial recruiting drive and expansion of the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, his figures have come in for very substantial criticism. As far as I can tell, in order to make up the sort of figures Kagan was bandying about a couple of months ago, not only would voluntary recruitment have to rise to a level that wasn't even seen in the aftermath of 9/11, it would then have to be sustained consistently for several years. As far as I can tell, hardly anyone thinks that's a serious prospect.

If that doesn't happen, the alternative is a draft.

Anyone think that's going to be a viable option?

George, I think many of us are not doctrinally averse to a long term commitment IF it can be demonstrated that the thinking underpinning it has genuinely changed and that we won't simply be delaying the inevitable by spending the lives of more servicemen. Although there are good things in Kagan's argument, there are really serious gaps, as has been pointed out repeatedly. Key among these are squaring the circle of conducting a limited operation with ever escalating means.

As for the historical record, I have to say that I can't think of a close analogy where a COIN force has faced the sort of challenges we're now looking at in Iraq and really come through well. Certainly I can't think of a successful Western COIN op conducted with such a weak central state, horribly complicated (almost anarchic) political environment poor tactical and cultural intelligence, heavily infiltrated security forces (we generally see Cyprus as a case study for the nightmares of a heavily infiltrated police force and Iraq is many times worse), porous borders, unfavourable force ratio and declining support for the campaign, not only among the electorate but also within the corridors of power and the armed forces.

It's very obvious that Northern Ireland is not a suitable comparison study. It was a much lower intensity operation, it featured lower casualty ratings (particularly among civilians), the terrorists were striking targets in the British homeland, the territory involved was seen by the COIN forces as a legitimate part of the United Kingdom (as opposed to a far off country about which we know precious little), there existed a consistent popular mandate for British troop presence both on the British mainland and among the Northern Irish population (thanks to the Protestant majority), the opportunity costs of maintaining a troop presence in Northern Ireland were far lower than a long term commitment to Iraq, the political situation was far less fragmented, the goals were clearer, British intelligence was far better, we were ultimately able to secure the co-operation of the Irish Republic etc etc etc. To a substantial degree we're looking at apples and oranges. Virtually nothing that made the British effort in Ulster a) fairly successful and b) sustainable pertains to the current situation in Iraq.

Greg:

Indeed. Although I generally don't view the militarisation of US diplomacy as a positive factor, Zinni would probably be my prefered choice, if the administrations own people can't handle it - but obviously that's not going to happen.

Posted by: Anthony C at January 2, 2007 02:49 AM | Permalink to this comment

to SGlover: The comparison to Northern Ireland was solely on the issue of duration and the definition of success. I am familiar with with the strategic differences--I did analyses of Northern Ireland issues at the behest of then-Chairman Ben Gilman of the House Foreign Relations Committee.
No, I do no speak Arabic and it has been 30 years since I did my Islamic history and culture courses at Georgetown, though some aspects of Arab thinking are eternal.
The Iraqis of my acquaintance are divided on the wisdom of the war.
The departure of educated Iraqis is the result of an inadequate response to the violence. It is my opinion (and I am no more an expert than you, I admit) that a change in the rules of engagement that is more decisive is a more effective military strategy and one that Arabs will respect if there is a corresponding carrot program and clear resolve to persevere--and will be more likely to restore order.

to Anthony C: No question that the scope of the challenge in Iraq is daunting for the reasons you and articulated and more. Your focus on the intellectual "underpinning" is apt and important. My fear is that we will continue to move to fuzzy, middling politically acceptable positions (such as the Iraq Study Group mishmash). We rejected (righly or wrongly) the Rumsfeld "light and lethal" approach but did have a well-conceived "heavy but more friendly" alternative.
The troops already complain about political intrusions, muddle missions and complicated rules of engagement.

to Neill: Omar is always worthwhile reading. I am less optimistic than he about the quality of Iraqi politics. I think that a lot of time and some real leaders are needed. The former may be denied by American political changes and the latter is always in short supply in the Arab world.

Greg: I am not a Zinni fan. The needed diplomatic effort is not a function of personalities at State. It is about the policies and the consequences we are willing to effect when those those policies are opposed and the rewards we grant when they are respected. How far are we willing to go to make Syria and Iran abandon support for violence in Iraq (and elsewhere)? If the answer is 'not very far', then making former generals into diplomats to effect a diplomacy of weakness is a waste of time. "Aggressive diplomacy" is a load of crap if the options, alternatives and consequences are all anemic and the strategic goal is mere extrication.

Posted by: George T at January 2, 2007 05:10 AM | Permalink to this comment

As a general rule, a Secretary of State who is not up to the job should be replaced, not supplemented with special envoys.

Greg's conviction as to the importance of more expansive (and more demanding) American diplomacy evidently does not extend quite this far. But in fact the diplomatic effort we would need to approximate the ISG's preferred level of engagement with Iran, Syria and the Israeli-Palestinian issue would require institutional support over an extended period of time from the Department of State and the intelligence agencies, effective liaison with the Pentagon and frequent consultation with allied governments and Congress. That is not a job for a special envoy, or even several of them.

If one is going to advocate quixotic ideas they ought at least to be ideas that might work if the political stars changed and they could be implemented. The United States cannot conduct "diplomatic offensives" with any hope of success as long as its principle diplomatic agency is ineffectually led. And that is the case right now with the Department of State. Condoleezza Rice, to an even greater degree than her vastly overpraised predecessor, has been given the benefit of many doubts: on account of her race, the good personal relations she maintains with many in the community of foreign policy types now out of government and -- perhaps most important with respect to mainstream media reporters and commentators whose own professional success depends on access -- her close, almost familial relationship with the Bushes.

The problem is that as Secretary of State, Rice is just no damned good. She is no leader, has not taken care to replace talented senior officials in her department when they leave, has accepted historically unprecedented meddling in policy and personnel matters from the Office of the Vice President, and conceptually is well out of her depth on issues unrelated to her academic specialty. Unfortunately that specialty was a nation that no longer exists.

Of course President Bush would never fire Sec. Rice, not even to return her to her previous position as National Security Adviser. She is not Rumsfeld, who was merely indispensable for running things beyond the President's interest or ken; she is all but family to the Bushes. Besides, if Bush had ever wanted a strong Secretary of State he would have appointed one long before now. All I'm saying is that expansive diplomacy in our current situation requires a strong Secretary of State and a Department fully staffed and functional at least at senior levels.

Posted by: Zathras at January 2, 2007 06:14 AM | Permalink to this comment

The delay in finishing the Iraqi mission is not due to the number of "boots on the ground" or de-Baathification or Green Zone mismanagement or other alleged policy error du jour so much as a typically American faith in the carrot over the stick.

What's typical of the American military is excessive faith in firepower.

Posted by: David Tomlin at January 2, 2007 06:47 AM | Permalink to this comment

"This model did not require street corner police presence just a willingness and mobility to kill quickly when provoked."

The solution to lawless violence: Lawless violence!

Posted by: Nick Danger at January 2, 2007 07:30 AM | Permalink to this comment

from Omar at Iraq The Model:
The United Alliance at a Crossroads.

A truly silly bit of analysis -- while Omar (or his DIA handlers) correctly identifies the difficulties involved in governing when a "supermajority" is required to form a government, he then goes on to suggest that fissures in the Shia movement could be exploited to form a more "moderate" coalition. The problem, of course, is that even assuming Omar's rather optimistic projection of the potential to marginalize figures like Sistani is realistic, one is still left with an even more unwieldy "supermajority" of moderates trying to govern Iraq.

In other words, his "solution" is even less likely to result in a successful government than the current situation is -- and this is so transparently obvious that it comes off as part of a US government disinformation campaign designed to create disarray among the Shia than an actual attempt at a solution to Iraq's porblems.

***************************

Oh, and that rustling sound you hear.... its the buck being passed for responsibility of the Iraq debacle from Bush to General Casey...

From our friendly White House Stenographers over at the New York Times....

Over the past 12 months, as optimism collided with reality, Mr. Bush increasingly found himself uneasy with General Casey’s strategy. And now, as the image of Saddam Hussein at the gallows recedes, Mr. Bush seems all but certain not only to reverse the strategy that General Casey championed, but also to accelerate the general’s departure from Iraq, according to senior military officials.

Posted by: p.lukasiak at January 2, 2007 10:15 AM | Permalink to this comment

Z & greg & p luka:

OK guys. The State Depatment is led by an incompetent who will not be replaced. Special envoys will not be supported by the bureaucracy. The President and Vice President will not be impeached, or if things do come to such a pass, it will be a year and a half before the deed is done. And the war would continue as always during the political wrangle

So. What can be done?

I take the position of "out now", and taking the political risk of defunding the war, as the only possible alternative. It's the measure where inept execution likely hurts us the least. I don't think entrusting he discussion with Syria and Iran with the reigning dumb people or the powerless smart people is going to help.

We have two more years of this. Other suggestions would be useful.

Posted by: Appalled Moderate at January 2, 2007 02:49 PM | Permalink to this comment

1.) Hill support is irrelevant for this apparent plan. He's the commander in chief, and he can tell the military to do what it wants. The Congress gave him carte blanche, and we will live with that until 2008.

2.) The diplomatic offensive is not as important as a political settlement among the different sects in Iraq. In fact, the political settlement among these factions is the only thing that really matters. Without it, we can't succeed. The military says this explicitly.

3.) The plans as they appear are all security and zero infrastructure. We don't have a large enough military to secure Iraq at this point.

Posted by: Chris at January 2, 2007 04:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

2.) The diplomatic offensive is not as important as a political settlement among the different sects in Iraq. In fact, the political settlement among these factions is the only thing that really matters. Without it, we can't succeed. The military says this explicitly.

the "political settlement" will only occur once the US withdraws from Iraq -- as long as the US remains in Iraq, Syria and Iran will guarantee that there is no political settlement. Thus, the only "solution" is a phased withdrawal in which two "international peacekeeping forces" (one controlled by Syria overseeing Sunni areas, the other controlled by Iran overseeing Shiite areas) take over security responsibilities from the US.

We can rely on Syria and Iran to utilize the kind of harsh measures endorsed by George T. above to deal with any insurgents within their "protectorates".

Posted by: p.lukasiak at January 2, 2007 04:35 PM | Permalink to this comment

Greg,

Answer this one question please:

In August 2006, the military and the Iraqi government began a new operation called "Together Forward" (or whatever silly name they gave it). It was meant to increase American presence in Baghdad and quell the nasty violence. Was this surge successful?

If the answer to this question is yes, then all future surges will be successful.

If the answer to this question is no, then why should we think any influx of soldiers in the future will somehow stem the violence? Especially now with the debacle that was Saddam's execution at the hands of tribal thugs?

You want to fix Iraq?

Let me say again what needs to happen.

1. At MINIMUM you need 500,000 troops in the country. Why that many? Because at this point, insurgents and tribal militias have too many places to hide. We don't know their country as well as they do, so flood the country with troops. Place troops on every corner. Let there be no hiding place. How much violence do you think they can do to each other with Americans around everywhere? How much violence can they do with Americans everywhere? Not as much as you would think.

2. Ask Americans to make a sacrifice. It is time to stop putting our wars on credit cards for our children to pay. If we wish to war, we must pay for our wars ourselves. It is absolutely reprehensible that we send the bill to our children!

3. Remove from power Bush, Cheney, Rice, and Hadley. They are all failures, and will never, I REPEAT NEVER, do the right thing in Iraq.

Do these things, and, heck, we might salvage Iraq. Do them not, and weep for our future and Iraq's future, and the future of the Middle East.

Posted by: Dan at January 2, 2007 04:36 PM | Permalink to this comment

Let's see. Bewfore the US elections we had 30,000 troops pulled out of iraq with the claim that it was a partial troop reduction. The implication was that things were going swell and we wouldn't need to vote against republicans to get out of the war. No telling whether they thought conditions on the ground allowed that, or whether it was entirely politically motivated.

They talked about making bigger cuts but then the news out of iraq turnsd so bad they obviously couldn't so they stopped talking that way.

Now they're talking like bringing those 30,000 troops back is a big change in strategy.

it's just talk After they do that they'll come up with something else to call a new strategy. When the public wants to hear about new strategies, they'll talk about new strategies. Just marketing.

As for the idea of killing people at random in neighborhoods where there are terrorists -- that's one of the war crimes we tried germans for after WWII. It would not get us support, not from anybody. Not from anybody except a few US right-wingers who haven't thought out the implications.

What might work better is to make a whole lot of iron collars with a few grams of explosive in them, plus a transponder. We require every iraqi to wear one, and each one sends out its own unique signal. Any time you see somebody not wearing one, you shoot him on sight. And any place somebody does violence against US forces, you just push a button and all the people wearing collars have their heads blown off instantly, and then you quick kill anybody who's left. And if somebody places an IED, you go back over the records and trace the suspects. When you find somebody who might have done 3 or 4 of them, you just send out the signal and remotely blow his head off. No dither, no bother, just get him.

That would teach them! And it wouldn't take a lot of extra troops.

Posted by: J Thomas at January 2, 2007 05:00 PM | Permalink to this comment

To all those who say we need 300,000 troops or 500,000 troops. IT. IS. NOT. GOING. TO. HAPPEN.

Let us deal with the players we are stuck with until '09. OK? We have one Decider, who is responsible for our mess, and one Congress, which has, realitically, only the blunt tools of investigation and the defense budget, and the bully pulpit of CSPAN.

These are the tools we have in hand. Now. What to do? And realistically, what's Congress to do, because our Great and Powerful Decider has decided, and we know how often he changes that little mind of his.

Now, P Luka's approach is essentially this. We withdraw is a responsible fashion. Then we let Syria and Iran figure it out between themselves. Since this method means the Decider does not have too much to decide, it sounds workable. The fly -- what about the Kurds? Will they lose their republic? Does it matter to us? Should it?

Luka is reasonable. Dan wants a draft. J Thomas has been watching the SciFi network.

Posted by: Appalled Moderate at January 2, 2007 05:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

In Tuesday's Financial Times, Gideon Rachman says that Fred Kagan "as recently as November was arguing that while 'the high end of estimates' suggested the need for another 80,000 USs troops to stage an effective counter-insurgency operation in Iraq, 'it is very likely that a surge of 50,000 troops would be sufficient to stabilise the capital.'"

Posted by: Historian at January 2, 2007 05:34 PM | Permalink to this comment

Even the President now realizes he will never produce anything ressembling a victory in the classical sense over the next two years. So, in true Rovian fashion, the remaining time will be spent constructing a Potemkin Iraq to shield himself and his "legacy" while the inevitable failure of the enterprise will be left for the next poor bastard. Apparently no price is too high for the nation to pay to preserve his personal infallibility...

Posted by: jim in austin at January 2, 2007 06:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

Appalled Moderate,

I know it is not going to happen. I'm telling you what needs to happen if you actually want to win in Iraq. That's how bad the situation is. I really believe that anything short of that will not work (Operation Together Forward last August proved that).

It obviously won't happen because no American will approve that many troops going into Iraq. It won't happen because our Dear Leader is too incompetent to actually do something that will work.

What do I want to see that can happen?

I want to see us out of Iraq. We've failed.

Posted by: Dan at January 2, 2007 06:59 PM | Permalink to this comment

Even the President now realizes he will never produce anything ressembling a victory in the classical sense over the next two years. So, in true Rovian fashion, the remaining time will be spent constructing a Potemkin Iraq to shield himself and his "legacy" while the inevitable failure of the enterprise will be left for the next poor bastard. Apparently no price is too high for the nation to pay to preserve his personal infallibility...

Yep, this is the heart of the "strategy" that we're pursuing. You'd think our hard-charging media bulldogs might want to play this up -- Should more troops die for George W. Bush's vanity and lifelong stunted emotions?

Posted by: sglover at January 3, 2007 01:13 AM | Permalink to this comment

Armed Moderate, no, I haven't been watching the Sci Fi channel. I've been reading George T's comments.

I suppose in some ways it isn't all that much different.

Posted by: J Thomas at January 3, 2007 01:31 AM | Permalink to this comment