The Belgravia Dispatch: Strategically Adrift

April 16, 2007

Strategically Adrift

Zinni, on MTP today:

MR. RUSSERT: As you know, there’s a widely publicized search for a war czar. One of the people who turned the job down was retired General, General John Sheehan, and let me read this to you: “‘The very fundamental issues is, they don’t know where the hell they’re going,’ said retired” Gen—“Marine General John ‘Jack’ Sheehan, a former top NATO commander...
“Sheehan said he called around to get a better feel for the administration landscape. ‘There’s the” resitue—“residue of the Cheney view--‘We’re going to win, al-Qaeda’s there’—that justifies anything we did,’ he said. ‘And then there’s the pragmatist view—how the hell do we get out of Dodge and survive? Unfortunately, the people with the former view are still in the positions of most influence.’” What does that tell you?

GEN. ZINNI: Well, I know Jack Sheehan very well, and he’s a extremely competent and capable former commander of the Atlantic command. And I think he’s expressing a view that, that many of us feel. We are in a situation now where we have to rethink our strategy on how we handle this. We have caused in the center of the Middle East a place where the—we could have a sanctuary for extremist groups, where Shia and Sunni strife can spill over, where we could have an Iranian or Persian/Arab conflict, and we have to find a way to contain this now. We can’t walk away from it. We cannot continue on the same course.

What has disappointed me is there hasn’t been this debate on the strategy, on the policy, a regional strategy on policy, let alone an Iraq policy. We’re, we’re debating the tactics. The, the surge is a tactic. In what context is the surge? You can make an argument for a surge if you were going to withdraw, to cover the withdrawal, for example, or to contain, to reposition forces or to re-engage in a different way or a stronger way. And why we got caught up in the tactical debate, in my mind, is an indication that we don’t understand what we want to do. What should our Middle East policy be? What should our policy be in terms of Iraq and, and the war against the extremists out there or the conflict against extremists? We seem to be strategically adrift, in my view.

So true.

Posted by Gregory at April 16, 2007 03:04 AM

Comments

The tragedy of denying such people as Zinni an active Administrative role in the Middle Eastern debate has got to be one of the many sad indictments of where the pairing of Cheney/Rumsfeld went so awefully wrong.
With still over 640 days to go, it's tough to see a significant change to strategy vs tactics unfortunately, strategy involves thinking not gut instincts.

Posted by: Nigel at April 16, 2007 03:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

I'm sorry Gen. Zinni is disappointed. I had thought that, being disappointed, he might have more to offer than a lot of ineffectual handwringing.

But he doesn't. He sort of indicates what he thinks his own priorities are, namely the interests of the countries with whom he used to deal when he commanded Centcom. He is frightened by all the things they are frightened of; he is willing as they are for America to pay any price to avoid them. He is disappointed that Americans have not had a proper strategic debate, so that they may be convinced that the center of American interests in all the world must remain the Arab Middle East. But the only concrete policy change he has to recommend involves the somewhat irrelevant idea that the United States switch to the Mexican system of a single six-year term for its Presidents.

The idea that liquidating the American commitment in Iraq might in itself be of benefit to the United States appears to be beyond the pale of intellectual respectability for Gen. Zinni. After all, what would the Saudis think? At the risk of giving him and those who think as he does the vapors, let me suggest that liquidation of the commitment in Iraq is where consideration of American interests has to start. The concerns of the various Iraqi political factions and Arab royal houses will have to be accomodated as best they can be in that context.

Just as the administration felt it necessary to dwell only on the absolute worst possibilities in the period before the war, so some critics of the administration agree with it now that only the worst scenarios for a post-withdrawal Iraq and the Middle East can be considered. I've had just about enough of that kind of thinking. Let me suggest to Gen. Zinni that he himself start the "strategic debate" he is so anxious to see by assuming that the American army in Iraq must and will be withdrawn sooner rather than later, and that not accepting this premise, at this time, constitutes a rank betrayal of American national interests. Now, given this premise, how may the worst of the scenarios he fears in the Middle East be prevented from coming to pass?

Posted by: Zathras at April 16, 2007 04:19 AM | Permalink to this comment

Hey Zathras -- in light of your comment, I wonder what you think of the latest post on the excellent "History Unfolding" blog? It's a (slightly verbose) hypothetical 2009 inauguration speech. To my mind the most important suggestion is that we face reality and leave the cultures of Southwest Asia and the Islamic world to work out their own historical processes. But if you get a chance to look at it, I'd be interested in your take.

Posted by: sglover at April 16, 2007 06:46 AM | Permalink to this comment

Pedantic and ponderous, to be perfectly truthful. The author declines the convention of using historical anecdotes to illustrate a point, and chooses instead to graft his points to an historical account. This practice is more effective, or at least more traditional, for public figures addressing Russian or Arab audiences. American audiences would only be bored.

Americans would also expect an inaugural address to be directed at least in part at what is important to them. Kaiser's doesn't qualify. I, of all people, will never complain if any President takes office pledging to attend more conscientiously to foreign affairs than recent Presidents have. Kaiser's speech dwells on nothing else.

As to his comments on the Islamic countries, he says at once more and less than I would. I want to liquidate the American commitment in Iraq, not to call forth a new era in our relations with the Muslim countries but simply to end a drain on American lives and resources in a country of secondary importance to our interests. At the same time I would never use a phrase like "the Muslim countries" were I drafting an inaugural address, because I would take for granted that American policy toward Indonesia and Egypt will be very different. For people in such different countries to hold to similar views of the United States, and hold to those views because they see themselves first as Muslims, strikes me as profoundly undesirable, not inevitable at all and in fact easier to avoid than many people appear to think.

Posted by: Zathras at April 20, 2007 03:46 AM | Permalink to this comment

What should our Middle East policy be? What should our policy be in terms of Iraq and, and the war against the extremists out there or the conflict against extremists? We seem to be strategically adrift, in my view.

the problem is not that were adrift...the problem is that we're some firmly anchored and the tide is rising....

The fact is that if the goal is a stable Iraq with a minimum of sectarian/ethnic violence and no al Qaeda presence, the only way to achieve that is by working with Syria and Iran. But Bushco won't cede any power to Syria and Iran, so there is no way to achieve the desired solution.

Posted by: paul_lukasiak at April 22, 2007 03:53 AM | Permalink to this comment

Seeing that the same tribes align along Eastern Syria, as with the
Anbar province, I find that kind of doubtful. Syria while nominally
secular, has relationship with Hamas (MB), PIJ, Hezbollah, Shia;
and according to the Mehlis report; even their direct Brotherhood
offspring; Jund al Shams. They along with Jordan, provide the
most direct sanctuaries for Baathists. That is why I found the
NY Times Op Ed regarding Iraqi refugees, ironic in the way they
recommend funding UN refugee efforts in Syria. in so far as their
part in turning Iraq into a charnel house. So long as the Mullahs
and the IRGC rule Iran, the same is true with regards to Sadr,
and the Badr Brigades, which seek to bring the rule of 'vedek
el fagil" to Iraq, with Sadr as spokesman over Sistani.

Posted by: narciso at April 23, 2007 02:11 AM | Permalink to this comment

"according to Mehlis", well..., that just proved the point!

Posted by: ausamaa at April 24, 2007 11:50 PM | Permalink to this comment

There exists some problems beyond our ability and resources to solve. We are the least likely candidate for brokering peace and stability in the middle east from the perspective of the locals. Time to acknowledge our mistake and look for a way out of this disaster

Posted by: Mr. Closets at April 30, 2007 04:06 AM | Permalink to this comment

	« Ankara Watch \| Main \| Oh Fun, "Process for the Sake of Process" » April 16, 2007 Strategically Adrift Zinni, on MTP today: MR. RUSSERT: As you know, there’s a widely publicized search for a war czar. One of the people who turned the job down was retired General, General John Sheehan, and let me read this to you: “‘The very fundamental issues is, they don’t know where the hell they’re going,’ said retired” Gen—“Marine General John ‘Jack’ Sheehan, a former top NATO commander... “Sheehan said he called around to get a better feel for the administration landscape. ‘There’s the” resitue—“residue of the Cheney view--‘We’re going to win, al-Qaeda’s there’—that justifies anything we did,’ he said. ‘And then there’s the pragmatist view—how the hell do we get out of Dodge and survive? Unfortunately, the people with the former view are still in the positions of most influence.’” What does that tell you? GEN. ZINNI: Well, I know Jack Sheehan very well, and he’s a extremely competent and capable former commander of the Atlantic command. And I think he’s expressing a view that, that many of us feel. We are in a situation now where we have to rethink our strategy on how we handle this. We have caused in the center of the Middle East a place where the—we could have a sanctuary for extremist groups, where Shia and Sunni strife can spill over, where we could have an Iranian or Persian/Arab conflict, and we have to find a way to contain this now. We can’t walk away from it. We cannot continue on the same course. What has disappointed me is there hasn’t been this debate on the strategy, on the policy, a regional strategy on policy, let alone an Iraq policy. We’re, we’re debating the tactics. The, the surge is a tactic. In what context is the surge? You can make an argument for a surge if you were going to withdraw, to cover the withdrawal, for example, or to contain, to reposition forces or to re-engage in a different way or a stronger way. And why we got caught up in the tactical debate, in my mind, is an indication that we don’t understand what we want to do. What should our Middle East policy be? What should our policy be in terms of Iraq and, and the war against the extremists out there or the conflict against extremists? We seem to be strategically adrift, in my view. So true. Posted by Gregory at April 16, 2007 03:04 AM Comments The tragedy of denying such people as Zinni an active Administrative role in the Middle Eastern debate has got to be one of the many sad indictments of where the pairing of Cheney/Rumsfeld went so awefully wrong. With still over 640 days to go, it's tough to see a significant change to strategy vs tactics unfortunately, strategy involves thinking not gut instincts. Posted by: Nigel at April 16, 2007 03:54 AM \| Permalink to this comment I'm sorry Gen. Zinni is disappointed. I had thought that, being disappointed, he might have more to offer than a lot of ineffectual handwringing. But he doesn't. He sort of indicates what he thinks his own priorities are, namely the interests of the countries with whom he used to deal when he commanded Centcom. He is frightened by all the things they are frightened of; he is willing as they are for America to pay any price to avoid them. He is disappointed that Americans have not had a proper strategic debate, so that they may be convinced that the center of American interests in all the world must remain the Arab Middle East. But the only concrete policy change he has to recommend involves the somewhat irrelevant idea that the United States switch to the Mexican system of a single six-year term for its Presidents. The idea that liquidating the American commitment in Iraq might in itself be of benefit to the United States appears to be beyond the pale of intellectual respectability for Gen. Zinni. After all, what would the Saudis think? At the risk of giving him and those who think as he does the vapors, let me suggest that liquidation of the commitment in Iraq is where consideration of American interests has to start. The concerns of the various Iraqi political factions and Arab royal houses will have to be accomodated as best they can be in that context. Just as the administration felt it necessary to dwell only on the absolute worst possibilities in the period before the war, so some critics of the administration agree with it now that only the worst scenarios for a post-withdrawal Iraq and the Middle East can be considered. I've had just about enough of that kind of thinking. Let me suggest to Gen. Zinni that he himself start the "strategic debate" he is so anxious to see by assuming that the American army in Iraq must and will be withdrawn sooner rather than later, and that not accepting this premise, at this time, constitutes a rank betrayal of American national interests. Now, given this premise, how may the worst of the scenarios he fears in the Middle East be prevented from coming to pass? Posted by: Zathras at April 16, 2007 04:19 AM \| Permalink to this comment Hey Zathras -- in light of your comment, I wonder what you think of the latest post on the excellent "History Unfolding" blog? It's a (slightly verbose) hypothetical 2009 inauguration speech. To my mind the most important suggestion is that we face reality and leave the cultures of Southwest Asia and the Islamic world to work out their own historical processes. But if you get a chance to look at it, I'd be interested in your take. Posted by: sglover at April 16, 2007 06:46 AM \| Permalink to this comment Pedantic and ponderous, to be perfectly truthful. The author declines the convention of using historical anecdotes to illustrate a point, and chooses instead to graft his points to an historical account. This practice is more effective, or at least more traditional, for public figures addressing Russian or Arab audiences. American audiences would only be bored. Americans would also expect an inaugural address to be directed at least in part at what is important to them. Kaiser's doesn't qualify. I, of all people, will never complain if any President takes office pledging to attend more conscientiously to foreign affairs than recent Presidents have. Kaiser's speech dwells on nothing else. As to his comments on the Islamic countries, he says at once more and less than I would. I want to liquidate the American commitment in Iraq, not to call forth a new era in our relations with the Muslim countries but simply to end a drain on American lives and resources in a country of secondary importance to our interests. At the same time I would never use a phrase like "the Muslim countries" were I drafting an inaugural address, because I would take for granted that American policy toward Indonesia and Egypt will be very different. For people in such different countries to hold to similar views of the United States, and hold to those views because they see themselves first as Muslims, strikes me as profoundly undesirable, not inevitable at all and in fact easier to avoid than many people appear to think. Posted by: Zathras at April 20, 2007 03:46 AM \| Permalink to this comment What should our Middle East policy be? What should our policy be in terms of Iraq and, and the war against the extremists out there or the conflict against extremists? We seem to be strategically adrift, in my view. the problem is not that were adrift...the problem is that we're some firmly anchored and the tide is rising.... The fact is that if the goal is a stable Iraq with a minimum of sectarian/ethnic violence and no al Qaeda presence, the only way to achieve that is by working with Syria and Iran. But Bushco won't cede any power to Syria and Iran, so there is no way to achieve the desired solution. Posted by: paul_lukasiak at April 22, 2007 03:53 AM \| Permalink to this comment Seeing that the same tribes align along Eastern Syria, as with the Anbar province, I find that kind of doubtful. Syria while nominally secular, has relationship with Hamas (MB), PIJ, Hezbollah, Shia; and according to the Mehlis report; even their direct Brotherhood offspring; Jund al Shams. They along with Jordan, provide the most direct sanctuaries for Baathists. That is why I found the NY Times Op Ed regarding Iraqi refugees, ironic in the way they recommend funding UN refugee efforts in Syria. in so far as their part in turning Iraq into a charnel house. So long as the Mullahs and the IRGC rule Iran, the same is true with regards to Sadr, and the Badr Brigades, which seek to bring the rule of 'vedek el fagil" to Iraq, with Sadr as spokesman over Sistani. Posted by: narciso at April 23, 2007 02:11 AM \| Permalink to this comment "according to Mehlis", well..., that just proved the point! Posted by: ausamaa at April 24, 2007 11:50 PM \| Permalink to this comment There exists some problems beyond our ability and resources to solve. We are the least likely candidate for brokering peace and stability in the middle east from the perspective of the locals. Time to acknowledge our mistake and look for a way out of this disaster Posted by: Mr. Closets at April 30, 2007 04:06 AM \| Permalink to this comment		Reviews of Belgravia Dispatch "Awake" --New York Times "Always-Worth Reading" --Andrew Sullivan "Honorary Chair--American Appeasement Blogs" --Hugh Hewitt Recent Entries McCain: Let's Compound the Blunder! Georgia On My Mind Should We De-Emphasize The Terror Threat in U.S. Foreign Policy? (Very Belated) In-House News Straits of Hormuz Quotable More Predictions Predictions, Predictions! A 'Sick Man of Europe' Reprise? Addingtonism (Belatedly) Ripe For A Comeuppance? 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