The Belgravia Dispatch: A Case for Withdrawal

May 16, 2007

A Case for Withdrawal

What would I do in Iraq now? I am not an expert, but I believe that the time has come to withdraw, that our presence is infantilizing the Iraqi political system. That we're like an inadequate antibiotic. We are sufficiently strong to have turned what might have been a conventional civil war into a highly unconventional neighborhood conflict. But we're not strong enough to eliminate it entirely. At the same time I fear that, without intending to, we have discredited democracy in the eyes of many Iraqis. We have created a situation in which many Iraqis now feel that the only way to keep security is to bring back a strongman. They are extremely skeptical of our programs and suggestions for development.
I think that Iraqi politicians are considerably more competent, canny, and capable of compromise than we acknowledge. Iraqi nationalism, in my view, can trump the Shiite–Sunni divisions. Our continuing presence is encouraging Iraqi politicians to play hard-ball with each other. Were we to leave, they would be weaker and under more pressure to compromise. In our relations with the Iraqis we often blocked negotiations with Moqtada al-Sadr or Sunni insurgency leaders, or the offer of troop withdrawals and amnesties for former Baathists and insurgents, among others. Yet these will probably be elements in any kind of settlement.

And therefore, my belief—and I emphasize this is my belief, not a certainty—is that were we to withdraw, things would improve. I say belief because that may not be the case. I can't predict the future. Iraq and its neighbors and its internal forces are extremely difficult to understand. In a single province in Iraq fifty-four new political parties emerged after three months following the invasion. And even Iraqis struggle to distinguish between the parties called the Islamic Call Movement, the Islamic Call Tendency, and the Islamic Call Muslim Party. All the parties that call themselves Hezbollah or Hamas have nothing to do with their namesakes on the other side of Arabia.

So I cannot guarantee that the situation will improve following a withdrawal. In some countries, civil wars do indeed continue for a very long time. Whatever government emerges after our departure is likely to be Islamist and authoritarian. People talk sometimes too easily about choosing between lesser evils. In this case the choices may be genuinely evil. But I am certain that our presence is not improving things. Despite some claims to the contrary, there is not a single indicator of significant, overall improvement I know of over the last four years, neither in electricity, nor in education, nor in police training, nor in the military. You might be able to achieve a temporary blitz, a temporary numerical drop in the number of security incidents, through deploying 20,000 troops into Baghdad, but this is not sustainable. There is no evidence I have seen that either the Iraqi police or army is prepared to take over our role, so long as we stay. In this situation there is simply no point hanging around. It would seem to me that starting to leave tomorrow, as opposed to in two years' time or six years' time, would make no difference; the situation would be the same. And there cannot be a justification for continuing, day by day, to kill Iraqis and to have our own soldiers killed in this kind of war.

There are problems with Stewart's argument (though having just taken in the Republican Presidential debate, I'd point out that the terrorists will "follow us home" if we leave isn't one of them, at least not a serious non-demagoguing one). What do readers think of Stewart's analysis? Does he underestimate how much greater the chaos would be in the event of a U.S. withdrawal in the very near term? Is he right that if we start to leave tomorrow, it would be the same as if we left in 6 years? None of us can really know, of course, but it is increasingly clear that a phased redeployment will prove ever more critical if (when?) the surge fails.

In other words, the much derided Iraq Study Group will end up having proven rather prophetic, not only in terms of U.S. forces diminishing their combat roles in Iraq, but also given the increasing momentum to engage Syria (at the Foreign Minister level) and Iran (for now, at the Ambassadorial level), while in terms of the overall neighborhood stressing too the importance of a renewed push on the Arab-Israeli front. As usual, however, the Administration (much like an indignant child) must be dragged kicking and screaming towards broaching such a judicious course (one where a bipartisan consensus could likely have been struck, at least outside the McCain-Lieberman wing), while meantime--riven by halting half-measures and endemic internecine squabbles--the Administration has effectively scuttled the chances of any truly viable course correction. Woefully predictable, but still depressing as hell.

Posted by Gregory at May 16, 2007 03:54 AM

Comments

I think he is correct and wrong at the same time. I do not think that leaving in 6 years is likely to be dramatically different than if we leave today. The pressures building in the region are centuries old and a paltry 6 years is less than a rounding error. I believe that leaving is likely to lead to massive violence and civil war, but then that is what is inevitable where there are 2 radical religious factions and hundreds of billions of dollars of future oil revenue at stake.

Of course, it is that last point that leaves me to believe that we will be in Iraq for a long time to come. Whatever the cost and pain of occupying, it pales in comparison to the short term costs of withdrawing - even if it would be better in the long term. $100 oil and losing the reserves to the Russian and Chinese that would inevitably be willing and in good position to deal with whoever arises from the chaos is probably not tolerable by the rulying class. In addition, the same public which has lost its stomach for the war is likely to be even moe upset paying $5 or $6 per gallon at the pump.

Even if the democratic candidate wins in 2008, I would expect them to reverse any rhetorical campaign of withdrawal once the realities of governing impose their will. Going into Iraq was obviously a massive mistake but the question now is whether we take our medicine quickly or over a long period of time. I'm not aware of politicians EVER selecting the former over the latter.

Posted by: James Dailey at May 16, 2007 04:39 AM | Permalink to this comment

I think Stewart would be proved correct, given enough time. That is to say I think Iraqi political leaders will be able to to strike lasting bargains with one another, eventually, once a certain level of bloodshed has occurred.

What that level would be in Iraq we can only guess. It is likely to be considerable. I regret this, and would prevent it if we could. But we can at best only delay it, and that isn't worth the price the Iraq commitment is exacting from us now. And frankly it is that price that I'm concerned about -- what this commitment means to us, not what happens in Iraq.

The only thing we need to happen in Iraq is that it not become a terrorist base and haven as Afghanistan was until the fall of 2001. We'd best think about the most cost-effective way to achieve that objective, and not worry too much about the rest of it. This is not the spring of 2003 anymore; whatever opportunities we might have had then to avoid very bad outcomes for the Iraqi population have long since gone by the boards.

Posted by: Zathras at May 16, 2007 06:10 AM | Permalink to this comment

yankee, go home

Posted by: someotherdude at May 16, 2007 04:43 PM | Permalink to this comment

What do readers think of Stewart's analysis? Does he underestimate how much greater the chaos would be in the event of a U.S. withdrawal in the very near term? Is he right that if we start to leave tomorrow, it would be the same as if we left in 6 years? None of us can really know, of course, but it is increasingly clear that a phased redeployment will prove ever more critical if (when?) the surge fails.

While I'm not conviced that chaos would result, I think that one has to first compare the effects of (temporary) assumed much greater chaos in Iraq with the costs involved in our continued efforts in Iraq.

How many more Iraqis will die or be displaced over the next six years if we stay and how many would die as a result of the assumed chaos? My guess is that "chaos now" would compare favorably to the continuation of our continued occumpation, and the damage it will cause.

However, as indicated above, I really don't see that much in terms of chaos, because instability in Iraq is not in the interest of any of Iraq's neighbors, especially those which have considerable military resources at their disposal. Once the threat of a US invasion of Iran and Syria is gone, I expect that those two nations (with the help of Turkey, Saudia Arabia, etc) will work together to stabilize Iraq, and end the sectarian violence.

The biggest problem will be US resistance to an increased role in Iraq on the part of either Syria or Iran --- were the US to do the smart thing, and work on a transition with those nations, the likelihood of chaos is significantly reduced. Absent that cooperation, Syria and Iraq will have to wait to intervene while "chaos" takes over significant portions of Iraq.

Posted by: p.lukasiak at May 16, 2007 10:50 PM | Permalink to this comment

What do readers think of Stewart's analysis?

I think he's arguing exactly what I've been fruitlessly arguing on Q & O, and Michael Totten, and even sometimes with you - for years.

He's correct.

Posted by: glasnost at May 17, 2007 11:13 PM | Permalink to this comment

"I think that Iraqi politicians are considerably more competent, canny, and capable of compromise than we acknowledge. Iraqi nationalism, in my view, can trump the Shiite–Sunni divisions."

This is precisely the point that is too often overlooked in the public discourse on Iraq. It is generally assumed that 1) Iraq will descend worse into civil war without the "protection" from this of the US, and 2) that the result of this civil war will be an "al-Qaeda" takeover of Iraq, or an Iranian takeover of Iraq, and in some of the most imaginative scenarios, a joint takeover by "the terrorists" and Iran. Stewart mainly addresses the first issue, by arguing that the Iraqis are much more "compentant, canny and capable" than we give them credit for. In some ways, introducing the idea of the "Sunni-Shi'a conflict" into American political dialogue has been detrimental, because we have taken it from a real and serious phenomenon to a catch-phrase, something that is blanketly stated by those on either side arguing that either we must stay and fix it or give up because of it. In reality, this conflict, though it does date back to the beginning of Islam and it is manifested in different ways across the Islamic world, is much more subtle and complex than just "Sunnis and Shi'as hate each other." Political disagreement lies at the heart of the conflict, and it can and must be solved politically (whether this includes prolonged military conflict is yet unknown). Stewart correctly identifies the prohibitive role that the US military and political interventions are playing in Iraqi politics. Just about the only thing average Sunnis and Shi'as can agree on is that the occupying forces of the US should leave. We cannot allow fear-mongering, or as Bill Maher put it, pundits whose predictions have been wrong every single time since before this war started, to dictate the terms of the debate. There IS a very strong possibility that the withdrawal of US forces will allow for a "breathing space" in which the forces--and yes, all the forces, including Moqtada as-Sadr and Sunni insurgents as well--realize that they stand on a precipice and face a choice: should they become another Lebanon, or should they force negotiations that will create at least a tenable peace, and focus on rebuilding? Should they allow their country to be overtaken by neighbors and terrorists (a la Lebanon or Afghanistan), or should they draw on that strong sense of Iraqi nationalism and pride that has prevented EVEN THE U.S from successfully occupying their country? My guess is that, in both cases, they will opt for the latter. Perhaps the momentum of the civil war is already too strong...if so, it will be just another sad casualty of a misguided, mis-run war in which, as Barack Obama has summed up so succinctly, "there are no good choices." We can only chose to help politically foster the conditions that will hopefully bring about an Iraqi-initiated solution upon our withdrawal--and that holds true whether we leave now or in six years. Either way, both sides are waiting for us to leave before the real action happens.

Posted by: jfy at May 18, 2007 05:12 PM | Permalink to this comment

	« Enquiring Minds Wanna Know..... \| Main \| Torture Party » May 16, 2007 A Case for Withdrawal Rory Stewart: What would I do in Iraq now? I am not an expert, but I believe that the time has come to withdraw, that our presence is infantilizing the Iraqi political system. That we're like an inadequate antibiotic. We are sufficiently strong to have turned what might have been a conventional civil war into a highly unconventional neighborhood conflict. But we're not strong enough to eliminate it entirely. At the same time I fear that, without intending to, we have discredited democracy in the eyes of many Iraqis. We have created a situation in which many Iraqis now feel that the only way to keep security is to bring back a strongman. They are extremely skeptical of our programs and suggestions for development. I think that Iraqi politicians are considerably more competent, canny, and capable of compromise than we acknowledge. Iraqi nationalism, in my view, can trump the Shiite–Sunni divisions. Our continuing presence is encouraging Iraqi politicians to play hard-ball with each other. Were we to leave, they would be weaker and under more pressure to compromise. In our relations with the Iraqis we often blocked negotiations with Moqtada al-Sadr or Sunni insurgency leaders, or the offer of troop withdrawals and amnesties for former Baathists and insurgents, among others. Yet these will probably be elements in any kind of settlement. And therefore, my belief—and I emphasize this is my belief, not a certainty—is that were we to withdraw, things would improve. I say belief because that may not be the case. I can't predict the future. Iraq and its neighbors and its internal forces are extremely difficult to understand. In a single province in Iraq fifty-four new political parties emerged after three months following the invasion. And even Iraqis struggle to distinguish between the parties called the Islamic Call Movement, the Islamic Call Tendency, and the Islamic Call Muslim Party. All the parties that call themselves Hezbollah or Hamas have nothing to do with their namesakes on the other side of Arabia. So I cannot guarantee that the situation will improve following a withdrawal. In some countries, civil wars do indeed continue for a very long time. Whatever government emerges after our departure is likely to be Islamist and authoritarian. People talk sometimes too easily about choosing between lesser evils. In this case the choices may be genuinely evil. But I am certain that our presence is not improving things. Despite some claims to the contrary, there is not a single indicator of significant, overall improvement I know of over the last four years, neither in electricity, nor in education, nor in police training, nor in the military. You might be able to achieve a temporary blitz, a temporary numerical drop in the number of security incidents, through deploying 20,000 troops into Baghdad, but this is not sustainable. There is no evidence I have seen that either the Iraqi police or army is prepared to take over our role, so long as we stay. In this situation there is simply no point hanging around. It would seem to me that starting to leave tomorrow, as opposed to in two years' time or six years' time, would make no difference; the situation would be the same. And there cannot be a justification for continuing, day by day, to kill Iraqis and to have our own soldiers killed in this kind of war. There are problems with Stewart's argument (though having just taken in the Republican Presidential debate, I'd point out that the terrorists will "follow us home" if we leave isn't one of them, at least not a serious non-demagoguing one). What do readers think of Stewart's analysis? Does he underestimate how much greater the chaos would be in the event of a U.S. withdrawal in the very near term? Is he right that if we start to leave tomorrow, it would be the same as if we left in 6 years? None of us can really know, of course, but it is increasingly clear that a phased redeployment will prove ever more critical if (when?) the surge fails. In other words, the much derided Iraq Study Group will end up having proven rather prophetic, not only in terms of U.S. forces diminishing their combat roles in Iraq, but also given the increasing momentum to engage Syria (at the Foreign Minister level) and Iran (for now, at the Ambassadorial level), while in terms of the overall neighborhood stressing too the importance of a renewed push on the Arab-Israeli front. As usual, however, the Administration (much like an indignant child) must be dragged kicking and screaming towards broaching such a judicious course (one where a bipartisan consensus could likely have been struck, at least outside the McCain-Lieberman wing), while meantime--riven by halting half-measures and endemic internecine squabbles--the Administration has effectively scuttled the chances of any truly viable course correction. Woefully predictable, but still depressing as hell. Posted by Gregory at May 16, 2007 03:54 AM Comments I think he is correct and wrong at the same time. I do not think that leaving in 6 years is likely to be dramatically different than if we leave today. The pressures building in the region are centuries old and a paltry 6 years is less than a rounding error. I believe that leaving is likely to lead to massive violence and civil war, but then that is what is inevitable where there are 2 radical religious factions and hundreds of billions of dollars of future oil revenue at stake. Of course, it is that last point that leaves me to believe that we will be in Iraq for a long time to come. Whatever the cost and pain of occupying, it pales in comparison to the short term costs of withdrawing - even if it would be better in the long term. $100 oil and losing the reserves to the Russian and Chinese that would inevitably be willing and in good position to deal with whoever arises from the chaos is probably not tolerable by the rulying class. In addition, the same public which has lost its stomach for the war is likely to be even moe upset paying $5 or $6 per gallon at the pump. Even if the democratic candidate wins in 2008, I would expect them to reverse any rhetorical campaign of withdrawal once the realities of governing impose their will. Going into Iraq was obviously a massive mistake but the question now is whether we take our medicine quickly or over a long period of time. I'm not aware of politicians EVER selecting the former over the latter. Posted by: James Dailey at May 16, 2007 04:39 AM \| Permalink to this comment I think Stewart would be proved correct, given enough time. That is to say I think Iraqi political leaders will be able to to strike lasting bargains with one another, eventually, once a certain level of bloodshed has occurred. What that level would be in Iraq we can only guess. It is likely to be considerable. I regret this, and would prevent it if we could. But we can at best only delay it, and that isn't worth the price the Iraq commitment is exacting from us now. And frankly it is that price that I'm concerned about -- what this commitment means to us, not what happens in Iraq. The only thing we need to happen in Iraq is that it not become a terrorist base and haven as Afghanistan was until the fall of 2001. We'd best think about the most cost-effective way to achieve that objective, and not worry too much about the rest of it. This is not the spring of 2003 anymore; whatever opportunities we might have had then to avoid very bad outcomes for the Iraqi population have long since gone by the boards. Posted by: Zathras at May 16, 2007 06:10 AM \| Permalink to this comment yankee, go home Posted by: someotherdude at May 16, 2007 04:43 PM \| Permalink to this comment What do readers think of Stewart's analysis? Does he underestimate how much greater the chaos would be in the event of a U.S. withdrawal in the very near term? Is he right that if we start to leave tomorrow, it would be the same as if we left in 6 years? None of us can really know, of course, but it is increasingly clear that a phased redeployment will prove ever more critical if (when?) the surge fails. While I'm not conviced that chaos would result, I think that one has to first compare the effects of (temporary) assumed much greater chaos in Iraq with the costs involved in our continued efforts in Iraq. How many more Iraqis will die or be displaced over the next six years if we stay and how many would die as a result of the assumed chaos? My guess is that "chaos now" would compare favorably to the continuation of our continued occumpation, and the damage it will cause. However, as indicated above, I really don't see that much in terms of chaos, because instability in Iraq is not in the interest of any of Iraq's neighbors, especially those which have considerable military resources at their disposal. Once the threat of a US invasion of Iran and Syria is gone, I expect that those two nations (with the help of Turkey, Saudia Arabia, etc) will work together to stabilize Iraq, and end the sectarian violence. The biggest problem will be US resistance to an increased role in Iraq on the part of either Syria or Iran --- were the US to do the smart thing, and work on a transition with those nations, the likelihood of chaos is significantly reduced. Absent that cooperation, Syria and Iraq will have to wait to intervene while "chaos" takes over significant portions of Iraq. Posted by: p.lukasiak at May 16, 2007 10:50 PM \| Permalink to this comment What do readers think of Stewart's analysis? I think he's arguing exactly what I've been fruitlessly arguing on Q & O, and Michael Totten, and even sometimes with you - for years. He's correct. Posted by: glasnost at May 17, 2007 11:13 PM \| Permalink to this comment "I think that Iraqi politicians are considerably more competent, canny, and capable of compromise than we acknowledge. Iraqi nationalism, in my view, can trump the Shiite–Sunni divisions." This is precisely the point that is too often overlooked in the public discourse on Iraq. It is generally assumed that 1) Iraq will descend worse into civil war without the "protection" from this of the US, and 2) that the result of this civil war will be an "al-Qaeda" takeover of Iraq, or an Iranian takeover of Iraq, and in some of the most imaginative scenarios, a joint takeover by "the terrorists" and Iran. Stewart mainly addresses the first issue, by arguing that the Iraqis are much more "compentant, canny and capable" than we give them credit for. In some ways, introducing the idea of the "Sunni-Shi'a conflict" into American political dialogue has been detrimental, because we have taken it from a real and serious phenomenon to a catch-phrase, something that is blanketly stated by those on either side arguing that either we must stay and fix it or give up because of it. In reality, this conflict, though it does date back to the beginning of Islam and it is manifested in different ways across the Islamic world, is much more subtle and complex than just "Sunnis and Shi'as hate each other." Political disagreement lies at the heart of the conflict, and it can and must be solved politically (whether this includes prolonged military conflict is yet unknown). Stewart correctly identifies the prohibitive role that the US military and political interventions are playing in Iraqi politics. Just about the only thing average Sunnis and Shi'as can agree on is that the occupying forces of the US should leave. We cannot allow fear-mongering, or as Bill Maher put it, pundits whose predictions have been wrong every single time since before this war started, to dictate the terms of the debate. There IS a very strong possibility that the withdrawal of US forces will allow for a "breathing space" in which the forces--and yes, all the forces, including Moqtada as-Sadr and Sunni insurgents as well--realize that they stand on a precipice and face a choice: should they become another Lebanon, or should they force negotiations that will create at least a tenable peace, and focus on rebuilding? Should they allow their country to be overtaken by neighbors and terrorists (a la Lebanon or Afghanistan), or should they draw on that strong sense of Iraqi nationalism and pride that has prevented EVEN THE U.S from successfully occupying their country? My guess is that, in both cases, they will opt for the latter. Perhaps the momentum of the civil war is already too strong...if so, it will be just another sad casualty of a misguided, mis-run war in which, as Barack Obama has summed up so succinctly, "there are no good choices." We can only chose to help politically foster the conditions that will hopefully bring about an Iraqi-initiated solution upon our withdrawal--and that holds true whether we leave now or in six years. Either way, both sides are waiting for us to leave before the real action happens. Posted by: jfy at May 18, 2007 05:12 PM \| Permalink to this comment		About Belgravia Dispatch Gregory Djerejian, an international lawyer and business executive, comments intermittently on global politics, finance & diplomacy at this site. The views expressed herein are solely his own and do not represent those of any organization. More About the Author Email the Author Recent Entries Lunch w/ the FT... 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