June 02, 2007

Myth vs. Reality

First the myth part, via Kristol/Kagan: "This is no time to hedge or hesitate. Now is the time to put everything behind making the president's strategy--which looks to be a winning strategy--succeed."

Now, alas, grim reality:

The U.S. military, meanwhile, reported another soldier was killed in a roadside bombing Wednesday in Baghdad, raising to at least 127 the number U.S. troop deaths in May, the third-deadliest month for American forces since the war started in March 2003. It followed April 2004, when 135 Americans died and November 2004 with 137.

May also was the third-deadliest for Iraqis since The Associated Press began tracking civilian casualties in April 2005. At least 2,155 Iraqis were killed last month, according to the AP count. Interior Ministry officials said the Iraqi government put the number at 2,123.

The deadliest months in the past two years were December 2006, when at least 2,309 were killed, and November 2006, when at least 2,250 were killed.

The number of bodies found -- usually attributed to sectarian death squads -- dipped slightly in February 2007, immediately after the Baghdad security crackdown began Feb. 14, but has been steadily increasing in recent weeks. Since April 1, at least 1,974 bodies have been found across Iraq. At least 1,186 of these were found inside Baghdad, and 788 outside the capital.

Meantime, don't miss Greg Jaffe and Yochi Dreazen's article in this week's Wall Street Journal, "Can the Iraq Surge be Salvaged?" What, you protest? The 'surge' needs to be "salvaged"? But no less a Beltway notable than Bill Kristol avers we are witnessing a "winning strategy" unfurl. What gives?

Confused,

B.D.

P.S. More very soon, on related topics, I hope.

P.P.S. Non-utopic Brits who tend not to drag the pom-poms out every week in the yellow press say the surge is failing too.

No one is happy about this, mind you (save our enemies), but the first step towards a whole-scale, fundamental re-calibration of our policy is to grapple with the actual realities before us, rather than fanciful aspiration masquerading as judicious analysis. I thought we'd learned this the past 6 years, but evidently many among us still haven't. As I said, more soon (time permitting), including more detailed analysis of the state of the surge in Baghdad, as well as dynamics in Kurdistan, the Shi'a south, Diyala, and Anbar, etc.