The Belgravia Dispatch: Two Views of the Basra Precedent

July 12, 2007

Two Views of the Basra Precedent

The minute we start to withdraw, all hell will break loose in the areas we leave, and there will be a no-holds-barred contest for power among Iraqi factions. Our staying there with, say, half as many troops, will not be sustainable.
Look at the British in Basra. The British forces there have slowly receded into a single base at Basra airport. And what has happened? The void has been filled by a vicious contest for power among Shiite warlords, gangs and clans, and British troops are still being killed whenever they venture out.

As the International Crisis Group recently reported from Basra: “Basra’s political arena is in the hands of actors engaged in bloody competition for resources, undermining what is left of governorate institutions and coercively enforcing their rule. Far from being a model to replicate, Basra is an example of what to avoid. With renewed violence and instability, Basra illustrates the pitfalls of a transitional process that has led to the collapse of the state apparatus.”

Well, perhaps. But I find Robert Malley & Peter Harling writing here rather more convincing:

TO IMAGINE what Baghdad will look like after the surge, there is no need to project far into the future. Instead, just turn to the recent past. Between September 2006 and March 2007, British forces conducted Operation Sinbad in Basra, Iraq's second largest city. At first, there were signs of progress: diminished violence, criminality, and overall chaos. But these turned out to be superficial and depressingly fleeting. Only a few months after the operation came to an end, old habits resurfaced. Today, political tensions once again are destabilizing the city; relentless attacks against British forces have driven them off the streets; and the southern city is under the control of militias, more powerful and less inhibited than before.
Operation Sinbad, like the surge, was premised on belief that heightened British military power would help rout out militias, provide space for local leaders to rebuild the city, and ultimately hand security over to newly vetted and more professional Iraqi security forces. It did nothing of the sort. A military strategy that failed to challenge the dominant power structure and political makeup, no matter how muscular it was, simply could not alter the underlying dynamic: A political arena dominated by parties -- those the British embraced, no less than those they fought -- engaged in a bloody competition over power and resources.

So, what happened? While British forces were struggling to suppress the violence, the parties and organizations operating on the public scene never felt the need to modify their behavior. Militias were not defeated; they went underground or, more often, were absorbed into existing security forces. One resident after another told us they witnessed murders committed by individuals dressed in security force uniform. This, of course, with total impunity since the parties that infiltrate the security services also ensure that their own don't get punished.

For militia members, it's an easy call: By joining the security forces, they get a salary, government-paid weapons, and political cover to boot. Security services are divided along partisan lines. Fadhila -- the governor's party -- controls the Oil Protection Force, responsible for safeguarding oil wells, refineries, and pipelines; the small Hizbollah party has a strong presence in the Customs Police Force; the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council dominates the intelligence service; and the Sadrists have penetrated the local police force.

Likewise, little was done to rebuild the city. Instead, the leading parties maintained their predatory practices, scrambling to take advantage of available public resources, contracts, or jobs. Oil contraband is an open secret, acknowledged even by a fighter in Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army, who told us that "when Moqtada al-Sadr met with representatives . . . in Basra, he scratched his nose and said, ' I smell the smell of gasoline' -- his way of accusing his own representatives of smuggling oil." Fadhila siphons diesel off at the source; others drill holes into pipelines. The public sector as a whole is rife with corruption -- instance of mammoth-sized projects that have delivered virtually nothing are legion -- malfeasance and partisan hiring.

In short, Operation Sinbad, at best, froze in place the existing situation and balance of power, creating an illusory stability that concealed a brutal and collective tug-of-war-in-waiting. Once the British version of the surge ebbed, the struggle reignited.

For Baghdad, the implications are as clear as they are ominous. Basra is a microcosm of the country as a whole, in its multiple and multiplying forms of violence. In the southern city, strife generally has little to do with sectarianism or anti-occupation resistance, both of which are far more prominent in the capital or Iraq's center. Instead, it involves the systematic misuse of official institutions, political assassinations, tribal vendettas, neighborhood vigilantism, together with the rise of criminal mafias that increasingly are indistinguishable from political actors. This means that even should the armed opposition weaken, even should sectarian tensions abate, and even should the surge momentarily succeed, Basra's fate is likely to be replicated throughout the country on a larger, more chaotic, and more dangerous scale. [my emphasis throughout]

On a related topic, some of the more asture commenters here have been chiding me that I seem to be cheerleading the ISG as some panacea without being critical enough. In that vein, please note I plan to react to the criticisms from Korb/Podesta and Stephen Biddle shortly (thanks to Matt Yglesias for the links, as well as commenter David Tomlin). Last, I note yet another resurgence among some elite opinion-makers to 'pull all the troops to Kurdistan' as a solution to our Iraq woes, and plan to again explain why this too isn't likely to be of particular help ultimately.

Posted by Gregory at July 12, 2007 01:25 PM

Comments

Of course your comment on Basra-- is there such a thing in this environment as a well-managed withdrawal? If nothing really works (which is the subtext I see here), why not just do the thing as quickly as possible?

Also, what's your thought on the Lamar Alexander proposal to adopt the ISG now?

Posted by: Appalled Moderate at July 12, 2007 02:37 PM | Permalink to this comment

Gosh, it's as if everything I've been saying for years was true.

Posted by: Jim Henley at July 12, 2007 03:06 PM | Permalink to this comment

A well-managed withdrawal could be done quickly, but a withdrawal done quickly might not be well managed.

Any withdrawal of American forces from Iraq would have to be done under fire, as insurgents seek to make a record that withdrawal is a response to their attacks on American forces. That means even the best-planned, best-executed withdrawal would involve substantial dangers for American forces as long as it lasted. The dangers would be much greater, though, if combat and logistical planning for a pullout were delayed in response to pressure from Washington not to look as if a withdrawal were being contemplated.

I don't know the state of military planning for a full or partial withdrawal from Iraq. Frankly, the less about that subject that were public knowledge the better. You don't have to be Montgomery Meigs, though, to understand that improvising something like the movement of 160,000+ American servicemen, plus their equipment, plus associated contractors, Iraqi employees at risk and other personnel on short notice would be a perilous undertaking. It would be like strapping oneself to the largest rocket one could find, igniting it, and expecting to work out how to walk on the moon on the way there.

There must be American military leaders who are aware of this. One can only hope they have not been deterred from doing the contingency planning for this eventuality by an administration determined to kick the Iraqi can as far down the road as possible.

Is the above meant to suggest that the post-withdrawal contest for power among Iraqi factions ought to be far down on our list of concerns? People will have to make up their own minds whether they care enough to lose sleep over it. But if the only way to prevent or delay it is to maintain the American commitment in Iraq indefintely, then we had best look after our own interests, liquidate the commitment in Iraq, and accept that the Iraqis willing to kill each other for whatever reason are going to kill each other. That's not a great option, but it's the one we have now.

Posted by: Zathras at July 12, 2007 03:41 PM | Permalink to this comment

Is it oversimplifying to suggest our choices are:

- stick it out with the corrupt incompetent Administration & management we have, and hope for an improvement at the next election

- pull out with the corrupt incompetent Administration & management we have

Both choices involve subjecting the guys in harms way to more danger under the incompetent and uncaring guys in the White House, so that is therefore unavoidable then?

Posted by: CaseyJoe at July 12, 2007 04:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

CaseyJoe:

The third way, of course, is take it out of the hands of the corrupt and incompetent and uncaring guys we have. You think 2/3 of the sentate is going to vote to remove Bush and Cheney? Really? Unless impeachment is successful, then we have the two choices on the table. And I see no movement towards impeachment by the Democrats (who can, no doubt, count to 34, and are not going to risk one of the last levers they have against the administration with a demonstration of impotence.)

The situation is not simple, but the choices are pretty stark because we have an administration incapable of subtlty. (I imagine a withdrawal would be done comepetently, becasue the current SecDef is competent, the the crrent commander in Iraq appears to be competent. The problem with the occupation is not an incompetent military but an undermanned one)

Posted by: Appalled Moderate at July 12, 2007 04:50 PM | Permalink to this comment

Frankly, the Basra precedent doesn't look that bad (compared to the situation now in the rest of the country - in absolute terms, it's awful). Once Gordon Brown pulls all British troops out of Iraq, it doesn't sound like Basra will be much worse than it is now. So why would things play out much differently in the country writ large following a rapid US withdrawal? Sure it'll be corrupt, chaotic, dangerous and in general a failed state. But predictions of mass genocide seem questionable given the Basra precedent. Admittedly, it's almost all Shiite so you don't have the ethnic tensions of Baghdad. But let's be realistic, the ethnic cleansing is inevitable as Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds relocate to safety in numbers. The only question is does it happen in bursts of continuous incremental violence (i.e. now) or a bigger burst following withdrawal.

Posted by: ramster at July 12, 2007 05:51 PM | Permalink to this comment

It is too seldom noted that there are at least two contradictory predictions of the exact nature of the post-withdrawal disaster. It seems to be the administration's position that 'al Qaeda' will 'take over'. But many others predict a 'genocide' in which the Shi'ites exterminate the Sunnis. Al Qaeda is a Sunni group, so it's hard to see how they 'take over' even as they are being exterminated.

Posted by: David Tomlin at July 13, 2007 05:07 AM | Permalink to this comment

Yes indeed, David. What IS true, unfortunately, is that the native Sunni insurgents -- who appear not to be very fond of the al-Qaeda intruders -- will be forced into an emergency alliance with them in order to resist the Shiites; but the Iraq branch of al-Qaeda will not be in much shape to plot against the US while they're busy fighting for their lives.

In any case, that new NIE has rather swept the ground out from under the feet of the Bushites' insistence that if we pull out of Iraq "al-Qaeda will follow us here" -- they can follow us here perfectly well, thank you, from that huge slice of Afghanistan and Pakistan we dropped into their custody by shorting out the Afghan campaign prematurely in order to start the Iraq War.

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 13, 2007 07:50 AM | Permalink to this comment

Basra does illustrate nicely why the underlying dynamic in Iraq renders the surge idiotic and short sighted idiocy at that - although the true believers remain immune to doubts: Max Boot the other day went with the gem that tribal leaders in Anbar are cooperating with us in hunting down AQ elements so that must mean we're wining, a claim that not only proves nothing but, in trumpeting tribalism, seems to want to rejoice in its stupidity - but is not so good at illustrating how the rest of country will devolve since its essentially Shia contra Shia down there. In Basra you don't have to choose sides once you choose to step aside; up Baghdad way the US is going to have to choose a side, it cannot simply get the hell out. Once the surge looses steam and starts to roll back down the hill the US, in order to preserve the hope of staving off a dangerous anarchy, will have to back a side so that a future balance, stalemate might be brought to bear. Given regional tensions and other factors the Sunnis are the logical choice [So I guess that means Boot is right? Sort of, but he doesn't know why]. Even if Bush manages to spin this surge out til he leaves office and America is stupid enough to elect Obama as President and he is stupid enough to take his 'peace in our time' speeches seriously and try to get the hell out - facts on the ground will conspire to make such a thing impossible. We're staying, it's just a question of what team we'll be on.

Posted by: saintsimon at July 13, 2007 01:45 PM | Permalink to this comment

What could one expect of the British troops?

In 2003 Basra's population was 2,600,000. The Brits have roughly 5,500 troops in all of Iraq.

Now, perhaps Basra's population has dropped. But still....

Posted by: Davebo at July 13, 2007 10:38 PM | Permalink to this comment

Krauthammer has just joined Boot in that absurd tune:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/12/AR2007071201619.html . For a more unformative look at the real situation, see http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2007/07/infiltrated.html

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 13, 2007 11:09 PM | Permalink to this comment

That's "informative", not "unformative"...

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 13, 2007 11:10 PM | Permalink to this comment

Antonia Snow from the Friday, July 13 presser at the White House about sums up the Cheney Administration's attitude towards the U.S. military.

Q Is the Iraqi government and the Iraqi parliament taking the month of August off?

MR. SNOW: Probably, yes. Just not --

Q They're taking the entire month of August off, before the September deadline?

MR. SNOW: It looks like they may, yes. Just like the U.S. Congress is.

Q Have you tried to talk them out of that?

MR. SNOW: You know, it's 130 degrees in Baghdad in August, I'll pass on your recommendation.

Q Well, Tony, Tony, I'm sorry, that's -- you know -- I mean, there are a lot of things that happen by September and it's 130 degrees for the U.S. military also on the ground --

MR. SNOW: You know, that's a good point. And it's 130 degrees for the Iraqi military. The Iraqis, you know, I'll let them -- my understanding is that at this juncture they're going to take August off, but, you know, they may change their minds.

Posted by: John P. Normanson at July 14, 2007 10:06 PM | Permalink to this comment

JPN-

"Antonia Snow from the Friday, July 13 presser at the White House about sums up the Cheney Administration's attitude towards the U.S. military."

Yea. Right. Clearly 'twas dispositive of the administration's attitude toward our military.

Just ask the military....

I'll bet they're counting the minutes for the Pelosi junta.

Posted by: reshufflex at July 15, 2007 12:10 AM | Permalink to this comment

1) I don't see why withdrawal will be especially dangerous for US troops. We redeploy men and material all the time in Iraq, and the assumption that the people who want us gone would increase their attacks as we leave is, to say the least, unsubstantiated. We could just stop sending in new troops today, accellerate "redeployment" schedules for those those coming home, and get out of Iraq in 8-12 months without much of a serious problem.

2) I find few news reports that suggest that Basra is "chaotic" in the violent sense. While there is certainly violence in Basra, its not near the level of pre-surge Baghdad ... indeed it does not seem as high as Baghdad today. As worst, Basra is "anarchaic" rather than "chaotic"

3) According to Malley and Harling, the British withdrawal to the airport was completed in March 2007. Given the pre-withdrawal situation, its not terribly surprising that three months later "little was done to rebuild the city...". Basra may not be making much progress, but it hasn't fallen into chaos.

4) The withdrawal of the Brit left a power vacuum -- and the most likely source to fill that vacuum and create stability is Iran, and cannot do so overtly while US troops remain in Iraq. To me, the most likely scenario is that once the US leaves, the situation will deteriorate, and the Iranians will show up to restore order, and will be greeted as liberators. (The syrians will perform the same function in western Iraq).

A "failed state" in Iraq is not in the interests of its neighbors, and they will take the necessary steps to prevent a long term chaotic situation in post US Iraq. Everyone with any sense pretty much recognizes this, and while they won't say it out loud, realizes that the objective of talks with Syria and Iran is the orderly transfer of security responsibilities.

Posted by: p_lukasiak at July 15, 2007 01:19 AM | Permalink to this comment

Actually, if you want a much less ambiguous indicator of the Administration's attitude toward our troops, take a look at http://proctoringcongress.blogspot.com/2007/07/there-is-travesty-occurring-in-our.html .

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 15, 2007 04:47 AM | Permalink to this comment

Also http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/015386.php . The evidence on this point, I think, is quite conclusive.

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 15, 2007 04:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

p_lukasiak:

A "failed state" in Iraq is not in the interests of its neighbors . . .

Perhaps not, but that doesn't mean they have the resources to make it otherwise.

Iraq is like a fire that no one has enough water to extinguish. The sensible thing to do is to put up firebreaks and let it burn itself out.

Posted by: David Tomlin at July 15, 2007 11:46 AM | Permalink to this comment

re:
> http://proctoringcongress.blogspot.com/2007/07/there-is-travesty-occurring-in-our.html

I have to say, this is like Bush's earlier trying to cut combat pay illegally, and then more recently trying to keep it below the legally mandated limit. The similarity is that -- I have no idea why it is in his (or his minders') interest to try to screw the US troops?

What do they have to gain by punishing and screwing the US military troops? I don't see how oil companies, or Haliburton, or Carlyle Equity, make money out of these ways of abusing US troops?

These amounts of money are obviously far too small to benefit the skyrocketing US deficits* (besides which, Bush is very obviously not a person who cares at all about preventing a skyrocketing deficits).

* deficits (pl) - to include the budget deficit and the trade deficit

Posted by: Smedly Jones at July 15, 2007 05:09 PM | Permalink to this comment

re:

http://www.rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fobserver.guardian.co.uk%2Fworld%2Fstory%2F0%2C%2C2126817%2C00.html%3Fgusrc%3Drss%26feed%3D12

I wouldn't mind seeing a discussion of whether these British guys are right, that Afghanistan is sliding towards disaster, and what the negative consequences there might be.

Posted by: Little John Minor at July 16, 2007 12:45 AM | Permalink to this comment

The British "softly, softly" approach to Basrah proved one thing: If you spend a lot of time kissing ass, be prepared to eat a lot of shit.

I think all you loons here missed the crucial point about the "flipping" of the Anbar tribes, etc. It was summed up well by Soldier's Dad, when he said, paraphrasing, that the more strongly a Sunni tribe had been dominated by AQ, the more quickly and completely they "flipped" to opposing and hating it. You can only take so much of being forbidden, on pain of death or dismemberment, to smoke, kiss, or mix (f.)tomatoes and (m.)cucumbers in one bag, before you conclude there are better ways to live.

Posted by: Brian H at July 16, 2007 02:54 AM | Permalink to this comment

OK, Brian; so you think the Brits should have started confronting the Shiites openly? Without nearly enough troops to back it up -- especially since the destiny of the whole country unquestionably lies in the hands of the Shiites?

As for the Sunnis learning to detest al-Qaida: wonderful. That's the only way we're going to persuade the Moslem world as a whole to reject theocracy -- let them actually have a taste of it and learn that it's every bit as rotten as secular tyranny. But to do that, they've actually got to HAVE a taste of it -- they sure as hell are not going to believe this just because us Infidels say it. The problem, and the main task for us, will be trying to keep nukes out of the hands of such theocratic tyrannies during the decades before they too get the boot -- after all, Iran hasn't even undergone its liberalizing revolution yet after three decades, despite the indications that the people are fed up with it.

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 16, 2007 03:42 AM | Permalink to this comment

Flipping and opposing the US seems to be the trend as well, across Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and even Afghanistan now, which is quite sad -- losing Iraq was an obvious consequence of a thoughtless, incompetent attempt by a corrupt Administration, but it is sad that they seem to be destined to simultaneously lose Afghanistan as well.

Posted by: Ali Mughar at July 16, 2007 03:54 PM | Permalink to this comment

Robert Malley & Peter Harling hint at what Christopher Parker and Pete W. Moore discuss in more depth: htttp://www.merip.org/mer/mer243/parker_moore.html

Viewing the conflict as tribalism is too simplistic. Analysis needs to include organized, local business networks seeking monopoly control over activities such as oil. The US simply represents another competitor but is different in that it requires Iraqi state blessing to make its control over Iraq's economic assets and distribution legitimate internationally. The other business operations are able to work without state sanction but are limited in potential.

Posted by: JohnH at July 16, 2007 09:22 PM | Permalink to this comment

Iran hasn't even undergone its liberalizing revolution yet after three decades . . .

Nor has Saudi Arabia after three quarters of a century.

Saudi Arabia isn't a 'theocracy' in the dictionary meaning of the word. Iran is the only country that is AFAIK. But Saudi Arabia's 'virtue police' are worse than Iran's and almost as bad as the Taliban's.

Of course the Saudis are geopolitically pro-U.S., which complicates the propaganda cartoon of noble freedom-lovers versus repressive Islamo-fascists.

Posted by: David Tomlin at July 17, 2007 02:57 AM | Permalink to this comment

Not for me, it doesn't. While you've provided good reason to be even more pessimistic, I don't think you've regarded any argument against my overall picture -- namely, that trying to democratize an undemocratic culture by brute force is a fool's errand, and that we are going to be more than adequately occupied militarily just trying to keep nukes out of the hands of theocratic dictatorships during their lifetimes.

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 17, 2007 03:53 AM | Permalink to this comment

Iran hasn't even undergone its liberalizing revolution yet after three decades . .

Iran was in the process of undergoing a liberalizing "soft" revolution prior to Bush's agressive anti-Iranian stance (specifically, the "axis of evil" speech). As with any nation that feels threatened, the immediate reaction is to submit to authority in exchange for a sense of security --- and that is what happened in Iran.

Posted by: p_lukasiak at July 17, 2007 12:52 PM | Permalink to this comment

Jonathan Kay, National Post, Tuesday, today. Whose Mojo worked this Magick? I'll not say his name.

Hint: Evil conjuror that he is, it is not Joe Wilson.
===============================

Posted by: kim at July 17, 2007 03:17 PM | Permalink to this comment

Bruce-

"trying to democratize an undemocratic culture by brute force is a fool's errand, "

I admit to sleeping way too often during history class, but didn't Japan become democratic via brute force? For that matter, Germany and half of East Europe are now eating at McDonald's, courtesy of democratic interventionism, instead of sucking down cold sausages from the dictator du jour.

Neoconism aint a bad idea per se; it's the goddamn execution of it that induces indigestion.

Posted by: reshufflex at July 17, 2007 08:42 PM | Permalink to this comment

Um, Germany and "half of East Europe" became democratic in the same process the US did -- by rebelling and self-establishing democracy.

I think you got confused midway through, because you started off talking about imposing democracy by force, as in Japan after WWII/Great Patriotic War.

Posted by: avoid_code at July 17, 2007 11:11 PM | Permalink to this comment

Actually, Reshufflex, my wording was sloppy. I should have specified that democratizing a WORLDWIDE undemocratic culture by brute force is a fool's errand, especially if that culture has a religious basis separate from any specific government -- all of which of course is the case with Islam, and was not the case with post-WW II Japan or Germany. (Even there, visualize the additional problems we would have had if Hirohito had not ordered the Japanese to cooperate with us.)

Posted by: Bruce Moomaw at July 18, 2007 12:26 AM | Permalink to this comment

A/C-

"Um, Germany and "half of East Europe" became democratic in the same process the US did -- by rebelling and self-establishing democracy. "

So youre saying the Germans and E.Euro's would today be celebrating democratic freedoms and rights sans US interventionism, ceteris paribis? Shame on me. I was long under the impression that our kicking Hitler's ass and then using passive-aggressiveness, cold-war style, to debilitate the Kremlin accounted principally for their latent self-destiny, ditto the satellites.

Posted by: reshufflex at July 18, 2007 04:08 AM | Permalink to this comment

edit paribus

Posted by: reshufflex at July 18, 2007 04:10 AM | Permalink to this comment

Bruce-

"...should have specified that democratizing a WORLDWIDE undemocratic culture by brute force is a fool's errand,"

Got it. I think the crusades establish your general point. Nonetheless, the state of militant Islam did not arise from foolish, martial interventionism, notwithstanding bin Laden's cris de coeur.

It arises from a psychological deficiency, and concomitant fears, which is to say that Islam's retrograde worldview is unable to reconcile modernity-at least amongst the extremist nutcases. As a parallel, we could use the southern racist who just couldnt handle integration and black equality, the meme of racism was too deep-rooted.

So, too, the jihadist warrior. It isnt his inability to coexist with our presence that feeds his toxic zeal as much as it's his inability to coexist with the present that drives him mad. Saying goodbye to one's past, mythical or not, is never an easy thing.

Posted by: reshufflex at July 18, 2007 04:40 AM | Permalink to this comment

> So youre saying the Germans and E.Euro's would today be celebrating democratic freedoms and rights sans US interventionism

By this logic the French are responsible for US independence, because French intervention in Europe was necessary for the US to win independence -- but, this is only because you want to argue this slightly odd line that everyone who contributed to damaging the colonial power gets credit for the indepence. By this line, Saudi Arabia will get major credit when Iraq drives the US out, because Saudi Arabia is the major foreign funder of terrorists/freedom fighters in Iraq striving to gain independence from US colonial rule.

Your line makes sense, and is interesting, but is certainly an unusual line of reasoning. In a way, I like it, and not only for its breaking the common patterns.

Posted by: avoid_code at July 18, 2007 04:57 PM | Permalink to this comment

Our bringing democracy to Japan is not a good example for doing it with other countries. Japan, more than any other country, has always taken what they find to be the best of other cultures and incorporating them. Their armies were modeled on the Prussians for example.

Posted by: Russ at July 20, 2007 03:10 PM | Permalink to this comment