It would be interesting to hear Aznar talk now about the conversation El Pais reports as having happened five years ago.

Aznar comes across as someone inclined to be sympathetic to what an American President wants to do about something the American President thinks is vitally important, but also as someone trying very hard to figure out where this American President is going. In other words, Aznar appears to expect one thing from a President of the United States even as he is somewhat vaguely aware that he may be getting something else.

From a European point of view, Iraq was hardly the first time an American administration gave short shrift to someone's views in taking a dramatic decision on some foreign policy issue. Grenada, Panama, German unification, Bosnia, and Kosovo were all cases in which an American administration decided to support a substantial change in the geopolitical status quo while giving key allies no more than a courteous hearing. This is not advisable as a routine practice, for any country, so it mattered a great deal that each American administration deciding these cases knew more or less what it wanted, and what it was and was not prepared to do to get what it wanted. Governments are more apt to forgive high-handedness than unreliability.

What President Bush wanted in Iraq bore little resemblance to what was achievable there, nor had he any conception of what kind of American (and allied) commitment would be necessary to secure an acceptable outcome, nor had he any very firm ideas about the limits to American military action in the Middle East. All this is well known now, but five years ago most people were disposed to give the American President the benefit of the doubt. This wasn't just because 9/11 spooked people in Europe as well as people here, but also because the administration's first moves after 9/11 had included a relatively painless overthrow of the noxious Taliban government in Afghanistan. Off that precedent it certainly appeared from the outside as if the Bush administration knew what it was after and how to get it. But the precedent was of limited utility, because Afghanistan engaged the full attention of only a small part of the administration's upper echelons.

Aznar, as I said, appears in this transcript to be aware that something is not quite right here. He is being given a lot of talk about dreams and ambitions, and of course freedom; his own concerns are answered in a manner that might well leave him in doubt as to whether they had registered with Bush in any meaningful way. In retrospect it is obvious that the way Aznar handles Bush is all wrong -- he's dealing with a man who never hears more than the first word in the expression "yes, but..." -- the standard diplomat's approach has to be reversed to get anywhere with Bush at all. Again, though, while Americans may have only poor excuses for not sizing Bush up properly by that time, the luckless Aznar is placed in the position of either accepting a somewhat unusual approach from the American President or assuming that the head of the country he wants to support has judgment so untrustworthy as to require Spain's support be conditional.

Posted by: Zathras at October 28, 2007 04:17 PM | Permalink to this comment

I thought Danner captured the spirit of the times, the strange and grotesque, spirit of the times, in his first paragraph:

>>.Surely one of the agonizing attributes of our post–September 11 age is the unending need to reaffirm realities that have been proved, and proved again, but just as doggedly denied by those in power, forcing us to live trapped between two narratives of present history, the one gaining life and color and vigor as more facts become known, the other growing ever paler, brittler, more desiccated, barely sustained by the life support of official power

Posted by: jonst at October 29, 2007 05:16 PM | Permalink to this comment

It's no wonder that Bush was as popular as he was for so long, as he embodies three "virtues" that many Americans (most? then, anyway) hold dear: decisive action, impatience and faith.

Nothing wrong with decisive action if it comes after some deliberation, but the other two made that impossible. Many Americans still seem to believe that they are entitled to whatever they desire RIGHT NOW. No work, no thinking, just "gimme." It's been brainwashed into several generations of Americans now: no compromise. To settle for less than 100% of what you want is to lose your manhood, honor, whatever. I'm impatient when I'm driving in traffic or waiting for a web page to load, but if I were contemplating a major military operation, I'd like to think I'd give it more thought and careful planning than Bushco seems to have done.

And faith: I know what that word is supposed to mean, but people have perverted its meaning (or just applied it to inappropriate contexts, like planning for the full-scale invasion of another country). They think "faith" can be applied to any situation, and if you want something bad enough, it'll happen, just because you want it. Bush still seems to think this (or his public statements would indicate that). "Faith" has no place in military planning or diplomacy. I've never worked in the military or government, but I know that much. The more I learn about Bush et al behind the scenes, the more frightening they become to me. Maybe they are stupid enough to invade Iran. I honestly will not be surprised if they actually go through with it.

Posted by: LL at November 1, 2007 06:42 PM | Permalink to this comment