March 13, 2009

Surgin' Again

The word "surge" is getting tossed around with increasingly profligate abandon of late. Indeed, some in the habitual quarters seems to be developing something of an almost libidinously charged attachment to the term. This Friday we were treated in the opinion pages of the NYT to an op-ed titled, I kid you not, "How to Surge the Taliban". How one might "surge" Pashtun Afghans of the fervently Islamist variety I'm not quite sure (does one somehow billow forth to corral them, much like one might a herd of cattle?) but I nonetheless tried in good faith to decipher the "plan":

Two or three more [brigades] might be needed next year to provide security in western Afghanistan, which has almost no United States forces. That would result in 45,000 to 55,000 ground troops, plus support units, as compared to more than 160,000 (22 brigades) in Iraq at the height of the surge.

In addition to sending more soldiers, we must also increase our efforts to expand the Afghan security forces. It may be impossible to speed up the pace of building the Afghan National Army, but the current proposed end-strength of 134,000 troops is far too low. We should immediately commit to a goal of 250,000 troops for the army, and a substantial increase in the national police as well. Afghan troops also need lots of better equipment — everything from armored vehicles to night-vision goggles.

One glaring lacuna in the international effort is the lack of focus on developing a justice system. NATO forces are not authorized to detain enemy combatants for more than 96 hours, after which they must be turned over to Afghan authorities. Some American forces have more latitude, but they are holding only 621 detainees, compared to the 24,000 detained in Iraq at the height of the surge. Insurgents taken prisoner by Afghan forces are generally released by the ineffective judicial system.

The lack of a functioning legal system not only makes it harder to quell the violence but provides an opening to insurgents who run their own Shariah courts. So, while the long-term solution is to help Afghanistan build a court system (something that isn’t getting the attention it deserves), the American military should also expand its detention facilities and press for expanded detention authority.

I understand better now. The thinly veiled subtext of this surge-giddy trio (why op-eds need to be penned in threes someone cleverer than I will have to clue me in): send young American boys closer to the Iranian border (that's the business about the dearth of troops in "western" Afghanistan), turn the Afghan village courts into a judiciary teeming with young Brandeises and Frankfurters (as re-fashioning the Afghan legal system, we are admonished, "isn’t getting the attention it deserves"), increase the size of Bagram (thank God that one isn't being closed, you can almost hear this triumvirate of detention-center aficionados sigh in relief!), oh, and get some more "night-vision goggles" in theater (what is it about Max Boot and "night-vision goggles"?).

And why all these Herculean (and utopic) exertions? Because, we are told:

The key question for those who advocate pulling back is this: Where will we get the intelligence to direct the raids? If we have few troops on the ground, we will have to rely on intercepted communications. But seven years into the fight, the terrorists have learned a thing or two about keeping their communications secret. The only way to get the intelligence we need is from the residents, and they won’t provide it unless our troops stay in their villages to provide protection from Taliban retribution. [my emphasis]

Intelligence for what, one wonders? Mohamed Atta type movements in the suburbs of Hamburg? Flight school training logs of al-Qaeda terrorists studying the finer usages of cockpits in the U.S. state of Florida? This folly disguised as prudent retention of intelligence-gathering capability, that somehow in the remote villages of Afghanistan today we will unearth the next Big Plot over here, especially as the al-Qaeda leadership is mostly scattered in Pakistan regardless (though I have no doubt the Kaganites would have us "surge" there too, before or after Iran is the only question), well, it helps showcase vividly the imperial decay we increasingly face--massive economic cataclysms apart--each and every day such thinking gains even close to a respectful audience by anyone remotely within the Obama Administration's orbit. No, call me a Les Gelb man through and through on this one (and see here my earlier cautionary notes to an Obama Administration on Afghanistan policy).

Permit me to end this short screed on a conciliatory note, that is, a point we all agree on, if to differing degrees, namely that T&E efforts need to continue in Afghanistan, though as often, the Kaganite idea of committing to a goal of 250,000 seems overly aggressive. Remember, it's hard work training a professional and competent army, and takes much smarts, time and money. Then there is the little matter of ensuring it is a national force for cohesion, rather than being viewed by too many in large swaths of the country as a non-Pashtun, northern militia. Good luck with that, friends. But at least a reasonably sized T&E effort--aligned with more of an 'over the horizon' military presence, more focus on retrenching our forces to key population centers, use of 'drones' against so-called HVT's in border areas (but not willy-nilly, when we have real intel that's bankable about the intended targets), greater regional diplomatic coordination (hint: more U.S. troops near the Iranian border--unless a coordinated move--won't help), and economic (dis)-incentives, that is a plausible way forward to wind-down, ideally by the end of Obama's first term.

Yes, reasonably weigh the cost/benefits, tee up a decision tree analysis, and sentient beings armed with a decent head on their shoulders would be looking to de-escalate from Afghanistan, not double-down at the Kandahar Casino (we are advised by the op-ed authors that the "odds of success are much better than they were in Iraq", shockingly naive clap-trap, nor should anyone sane be adjudging Iraq a success, incidentally). Indeed, has it occurred to anyone that it is the U.S. now seven year and counting troop presence in and around 'Af-Pak' (the phrase much in vogue among the arrayed cognoscenti, one espies, though one might prefer Pashtunistan to less clumsily conflate two sovereign, or at least semi-sovereign, states) that is now helping render more resilient the Taliban, or neo-Taliban, or whatever you might like to call them, given like most humans the locals tend to resist the humiliations of occupation (nor can they be enamored by the increasing use of air strikes, of course, strikes that almost inevitably kill myriad innocents too, thus further embittering populations we are meant to be winning over)?

One can only hope Richard Holbrooke fundamentally gets this. His old friend Les Gelb sure does. Oh, and the surge pom-pom squad? One would typically be happier ignoring them, save alas, the decaying Gray Lady too often allows its opinion page to become rather a rag-sheet for the airing of such transparently crude agitprop, that of the post-Petraeus trip variety (remember those of Iraq vintage?), where the spirited 'handling' gets spirits in rah-rah jingo on the long flight home for more surgin', again. That pesky part, however (as the authors put it, in that best boiler-plate CYA-style: "make no mistake: there is hard, costly fighting ahead in Afghanistan"), continues well after the 8-day junket has run its course. It is then the grunts left on the ground--quixotically attempting to win Pashtun 'hearts and minds', in a mission that is profoundly flawed strategically--that bear that particular Sisyphean burden.

UPDATE: Gideon Rachman, whose reporting I always read with respect and interest, writes in the FT: "(p)erhaps the mini-surge in Afghanistan can surprise the sceptics once again." Yet Gideon can only really dance around the question of how to nation build when there really isn't a nation to build (as he puts it "(t)he west has belatedly discovered the virtues of nation-building in Afghanistan but there may be no real nation to build"). Related, he notes how the T&E effort faces mega-challenges: "The Afghan army, in particular, is being expanded rapidly. But, ominously, it is having huge trouble recruiting in the Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban is strongest." Meantime, nation-building also entails pursuit of a very protracted counter-insurgency, of course. To what ultimate end, I'm not sure, with any real success I am afraid continuing to stubbornly elude us. Much like Iraq, what is needed now in Afghanistan is more by way of a responsible disengagement strategy, to include heightened diplomacy and use of regional actors in helping bring about a sustainable solution, rather than continued focus on military counter-insurgency and hugely ambitious nation-building that will likely prove utopian.

Why is it important to the U.S. that Afghanistan be a nation? I mean, whatever one thinks of our efforts in Iraq, I've yet to hear anyone say that Persian Gulf real estate with significant oil reserves can somehow not be subject to conflict, conflict that we will be party to, as a customer to whomever best controls the real estate, if nothing else. The reason I supported the Iraq invasion is becausae I didn't think it tenable to have a long term relationship with the Baathists that didn't likely end in a worse disaster.

In contrast, other than preventing jihadis from using the real estate knowsn as Afghanistan as a staging area for attacks in western countries, what do we care what happens there? I don't think Afghanistan needs to be a normally functioning country to achieve that goal, and in any case there isn't much we can do about the real estate known as Pakistan, so any progress we make in the Afghan real estate is likely to be limited in scope. So just what the hell are we supposed to accomplish? Poppy eradication?

Jesus H. Christ, don't answer that, cuz' I fear what the answer may be!

Posted by: Will Allen at March 19, 2009 01:31 AM | Permalink to this comment

Hi Greg

I realize that this is a bit off topic but in view of the current financial situation and the role played by the major banks in bringing down the world economy, I thought you might enjoy this snippet from the past......

"Gentlemen, I have had men watching you for a long time and I am convinced that you have used the funds of the bank to speculate in the breadstuffs of the country. When you won, you divided the profits amongst you, and when you lost, you charged it to the bank. You tell me that if I take the deposits from the bank and annul its charter, I shall ruin ten thousand families. That may be true, gentlemen, but that is your sin! Should I let you go on, you will ruin fifty thousand families, and that would be my sin! You are a den of vipers and thieves. "

~ Andrew Jackson, 1767-1845, 7th US President, when forcing the closure of the Second Bank of the US in 1836 by revoking its charter.

Posted by: Manfred at March 24, 2009 09:58 PM | Permalink to this comment

it feels a bit odd posting an update re: the site here as it's basically in hibernation (per my note in the preceding post) but pls note my software engineer had to restore comments which had got caught up in some bug and i take it in midst of this (or as a result of the bug) a comment or two may have been lost. if so, my sincere apologies, and feel free to repost if if you have it handy and are so minded. all best, gd

Posted by: greg djerejian at March 25, 2009 06:41 PM | Permalink to this comment