But the key point is that the authors of the earlier report felt free to be candid about what the Butler Report chose to keep hidden -- namely, that most of the British judgment about 'uranium from Africa' was based on the phony documents the Butler Report claims had nothing to do with their judgment. [emphasis added]
No, the key point is that Josh Marshall finally conceded that not all the intelligence related to the Niger/uranium saga was 'fruit of the poisonous tree' ("FOPT") tainted.
He did it reluctantly, to be sure.
He had to be dragged; kicking and screaming.
But the force of the evidence, as embodied in the Butler and SSCI reports, all but forced his hand.
Predictably, TPM's continued spinnin' would make Paul Begala blush.
For instance, how can Josh say "most of the British judgement about uranium from Africa was based on the phony documents"?
Take the September '03 UK Parliamentary Report Marshall is so enthused about.
TPM likes it so because it ostensibly makes plainer, as compared to the Butler report, that one of the British intel sources (assorted documentary evidence) was based on the forgeries.
But that very same report states unequivocally:
The SIS stated that the documents did not affect its judgement of its second source and consequently the SIS continues to believe that the Iraqis were attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger. We have questioned the SIS about the basis of its judgement and conclude that it is reasonable.
So that's two sources; one ostensibly FOPT tainted and the other not.
From this, how does one divine that "most" of the British judgement was based on forgeries?
Depends on what the definition of "most" is, I guess.
But wait, there's more.
Josh neglects to remind us of the Congo finding in the Butler report:
Quoting, at section 499 :
There was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case, there was some evidence that by 2002 an agreement for a sale had been reached.
Recall, Bush's SOTU referenced Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa generally--not just Niger.
So that's three separate sources of intel the Brits had regarding Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa.
One would appear to be FOPT tainted. Two weren't.
But, in TPM-land, where the spin is served up fast and furious, the take-away for this Sunday is that the Butler report was just another Hutton-like whitewash and rank cover-up.
Of course, the real take-away (well, aside from the fact that much of the Iraq intel was group-think FUBAR-fare but, relatedly, that POTUS didn't purposefully lie) is that Josh was forced to concede his FOPT thesis hasn't carried the day.
It has, instead, reached a pretty inglorious end.
Not all the Niger/uranium (let alone Africa/uranium) intel was FOPT-tainted.
To quote Josh again, from just a few days back on July 13th:
In other words, the British claim that there was other evidence beside the documents is given further weight....This is at best a very sloppy reading of the report.
This "sloppy reading" sin was allegedly being committed by FT journalists.
But, all told, who is really doing the sloppy reading here folks?
I'm sure Josh isn't being purposefully disingenuous, doubtless.
So it must be sloppiness....
Now, would I have been happier if Bush and Blair had occasionally caveated the intel rather than using the often weak intel as if they were compiling a lawyer's brief to make a more robust case for intervention?
Yep, sure.
But have I seen anything to date (some statement by Bush or Blair) that convinces me they were baldly lying to their publics?
Nope.
The 'literary flair' in this affair came from Joe Wilson--not Dubya.
More soon.
Oh, don't miss the WaPo ombudsman reining in TPM too:
Marshall takes issue with The Post's reporting that "contrary to Wilson's assertions . . . the CIA did not tell the White House it had qualms about the reliability of the African intelligence that made its way into the 16 fateful words in President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address." Actually, the CIA fought hard, and successfully, to keep the material about Africa, aspects of which were a matter of dispute, out of a major speech Bush gave in October 2002. But the Senate study points out that in January 2003, the CIA, which still believed Iraq was probably seeking uranium from Africa, did not tell the White House to take out those 16 words from the State of the Union address and that then-CIA Director George Tenet had not even read the speech beforehand.
MORE: Bill Safire, writing about "16 Truthful Words"
Posted by Gregory Djerejian at July 18, 2004 07:48 PM