Kevin Drum's point about "silly rhetorical jousting" is fair enough.
So let's turn straight to the substance of his post.
Here's Kevin's synopsis of Bush's record (his language in italics):
"By dedicating too few troops to Afghanistan in 2002, he [Bush] allowed Osama bin Laden and much of al-Qaeda to escape. They are still on the run, and al-Qaeda is by all accounts larger and more dangerous now than they were on 9/11."
That's one way to look at it--but I fear it's not a judicious view.
Put differently, it is at least debatable whether al-Qaeda's operational capabilities are stronger today than they were on 9/11.
Here's one take from Jason Burke, author of Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror:
The military component of the war on terrorism has had some significant success. A high proportion of those who associated with bin Laden between 1996 and 2001 are now either dead or in prison. Bin Laden's own ability to commission and instigate terror attacks has been severely curtailed. Enhanced cooperation between intelligence organizations around the world and increased security budgets have made it much harder for terrorists to move their funds across borders or to successfully organize and execute attacks.
And, of course, al-Q has been denied their state-sanctioned home-base in Afghanistan.
Now, of course, there was the IISS report that indicated Iraq had contributed to al-Q potentially being able to recruit more easily.
Until American-backed forces toppled the government in Afghanistan, a few months after the September 11th attacks, the country’s Islamist regime, the Taliban, had played host to al-Qaeda and its terrorist training camps. The regime change in Afghanistan, and the capture or killing of around half of al-Qaeda’s 30 most senior figures, severely constrained the group’s operations. However, the IISS’s annual Strategic Survey reckons that al-Qaeda still has more than 18,000 “graduates” of the terror camps it can call on—and its recruitment has accelerated as a result of the invasion of Iraq. Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, has apparently continued to evade America’s attempts to catch him. He and his henchmen are currently believed to be hiding on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or in Pakistani cities.
But really, what empirical evidence do we have that legions of the previously uncommitted have joined the al-Qaeda network specifically as a result of our intervention in Iraq?
Little, finally.
Regardless, the number of such persons has probably already peaked. And, especially now with the sovereignty handover accomplished, is now likely diminishing.
And how can we be so sure, say, that a Gore administration would have nabbed and/or killed half of al-Qs senior figures by now?
Smart money, I'd wager, would have the Bush Adminstration likely more successful on this front (fewer limitations on military and other covert actions based on relative perceptions of the legal constraints and/or concerns of allies).
All told, here is probably one of the fairest appraisals I've seen to date re: whether al-Q is stronger or weaker of late:
Ultimately, the debate about Al Qaeda’s current status centers on the important question of whether it is growing or declining in strength. In the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq military campaigns, when the predicted terrorist attacks on the United States and its interests did not materialize, what is the current level of threat to the United States? Most believe that the denial of safe havens and arrests of senior leaders have seriously crippled the organization when judged by its earlier form. However, it may be evolving into something new.For terrorist groups, periods of evolution can be particularly dangerous. Organizations in transition can be especially vulnerable to disruption and destruction, but they can also be less predictable and prone to lash out in order to cause additional damage, rally flagging supporters, and/or prove their continuing viability. With respect to Al Qaeda, evidence of new sophisticated operations, a possible succession plan in action, central coordination of attacks, and growing international ties, all increasingly converging on a common international agenda hostile to the United States and its allies, may give U.S. officials new reason for concern. In the short term at least, even successes in counterterrorist operations against a more decentralized organization can lead to greater difficulty in collecting reliable intelligence, as the paths of communication are increasingly unfamiliar, the personalities are changing,and the locations of operatives are more diffuse. While the long term trajectory is very difficult to assess, for the time being it seems that Al Qaeda (or its successors) has emerged from a period of inactivity and remains a very serious threat, requiring concentrated attention and vigorous countermeasures on the part of its prospective targets.
So yes, with much of its senior leadership decapitated--al-Q is, much like a cornered animal--likelier to lash out in more unpredictable fashion.
And, of course, without their relatively safe homebase --al-Qaeda will become increasingly decentralized--so harder to detect sometimes.
New leaders, heretofore unknown, are emerging.
But can one fairly hold this against Bush?
It was, of course, a no-brainer to go into Afghanistan--despite the very real risk that some al-Qaeda fighters would escape and scatter. And that al-Qaeda would, post any Afghanistan campaign, begin to morph into something more decentralized and 'affiliate' like.
It should be noted too, Kevin exaggerates that "much of al-Qaeda" (I presume he means the leaders) have escaped.
As the passages quoted above showcase--UBL and his No. 2 notwithstanding--at least half of these high value al-Q terrorists are dead or in custody (including KSM, the mastermind of 9/11).
Drum and his readers will cry--Tora Bora! How did buffoonish Bush let him get away!
But, deep down, I wonder if they believe an Al Gore military operation in Afghanistan would have been more robust in terms of boots on the ground and chasing the enemy through the hinterlands of southeastern Afghanistan.
The answer, very probably, is no.
Bottom line: Bush's record on al-Q is significantly better than Kevin portrays.
Kevin: "In the past three years he has done nothing to reform an intelligence community that is widely agreed to be fatally broken."
Mostly true.
Realize too, amidst all the heated talk about "intelligence reform" (as if one just waves a wand and, voila, it's done)--that it's a pretty complicated affair to systematically reform the way we conduct our intelligence.
Here's more worth reading if you're curious.
All told however, given our dismal intel failures, some serious heavy lifting has to be accomplished in this area.
And soon.
But Kevin, what would Kerry, very specifically, do in this area that you are so excited about?
Appoint a 'czar' or such?
Kevin: "Postwar planning for Iraq was criminally negligent. The result has been chaos, troop overstretch, a violent and growing insurgency, and an increasingly safe haven for terrorist camps."
This is where I agree the most with Kevin--the postwar planning and assumptions were disgracefully poor and/or overly optimistic.
And it wasn't just a case of hindsight being 20-20.
Drawing down the entire Iraqi Army was real dumb. Jacobin style calls for total de-Baathification were too fervent. Too few troops. Abu Ghraib. And so on.
But we have made significant headway of late containing the Sadr insurgency and the insurgency in the Sunni Triangle.
So I'm not as sure as Kevin is that the insurgency is "growing".
And is Iraq really an "increasingly safe haven for terrorist camps"?
Ask Zarqawi his views....I bet he feels like he's under some pretty significant pressure right now. Certainly he doesn't feel like he dwells in a "safe haven", no?
Regardless, the jury is still out on that Q.
Kevin: "He has refused to negotiate with North Korea, despite their clear desire to do a deal. As a result, North Korea is close to being able to mass produce atomic weapons".
Their "clear desire to do a deal"!?!
Heh.
Pray tell more about all this 'let's make a deal' bonhomie emanating from Pyongyang?
This is a classic example of why I fear a Democratic foreign policy team in power.
Like Drum, they are often too generous about our adversaries real intentions.
And so are more likely to get bamboozled.
Remember, it's the Clinton administration that got snookered on the whole NoKo issue with the 1994 Agreed Framework deal.
There was much excitement, recall, about the Agreed Framework.
But there was a little problem with all the relief in the air--the North Koreans most likely never intended to honor the Agreement--as former Ambassador to South Korea James Laney argues here.
It was classically feckless Clintonian (Kerryesque?) foreign policy making.
Kick the problem down the road some.
Someone else will pick up the pieces.
Bonus: Poll numbers will go up because it looks like you solved a foreign policy crisis.
Note too that Washington's policy towards NoKo has often been more conciliatory than many like Drum claim...
Kevin: "Domestic security is a joke. Bush has shown little interest in funding serious port security, hardening of chemical and nuclear plants, or improving local police and fire response."
Hmmm. There is, to be sure, still much to do.
But if domestic security is such an out and out "joke"--why has there been not a single attack on the American homeland for almost three years now?
Just plain good luck? Of course not.
Many attacks have been averted due to this Administration's hard work.
Here's more.
More broadly, it is clear that America has become better at combating terror since September 11th. Intelligence agencies are communicating better with policymakers; new checks have been put in place at borders; and the country now has an almost single-minded focus on stopping attacks. So far it has worked: since September 11th, no large-scale terror attack has occurred on American soil. Many diplomatic dealings these days also revolve around terror. This week, America and Britain introduced a draft United Nations resolution that would compel member states to disrupt efforts by any group to transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. And on Thursday March 25th, Tony Blair, the British prime minister, flew to Tripoli for a brief meeting with Muammar Qaddafi, in recognition of the Libyan dictator’s apparent renunciation of banned weapons and terrorism.
To be sure, I'll be picking up (like everyone else) my copy of Steve Flynn's America the Vulnerable...
There is much to do yet. But calling domestic security an out and out "joke" is just not fair.
So Bush's record is a bit better, isn't it, than Drum portrays?
More on the specific shortcomings of a prospective Kerry foreign policy soon.
UPDATE: Drezner has two excellent posts up well worth reading that are each somewhat related to the above post.
Posted by Gregory Djerejian at July 19, 2004 06:55 PM