Amidst all the histrionics and mega-maelstrom surrounding the quality of the intelligence related to Iraq's WMD programs many tough questions remain unanswered (indeed, scarcely discussed).
Increasingly, you will doubtless instead hear a lot of chest-beating about who, as between Bush and Kerry, would appoint an intelligence czar more quickly.
Doubtless said Czar-in-Waiting will often be depicted as an individual who would bestride the Beltway like some omniscient behemoth--a panacea who will valiantly save the day and cure all the limitations related to our intel gathering/analysis capabilities and processes.
Don't believe all the hype. Bureaucratic reorgs and such can accomplish a lot--but there are other fundamental issues that need to be addressed too. Here are some of them.
Where should the burden of proof lie when confronting possible but uncertain proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- should the suspect state be required to prove its innocence, or should the outside world be required to prove its guilt? Should a state obstructing inspections -- something that can be easily observed -- be assumed to be harboring banned materials -- a much more uncertain conclusion? Should that distinction even matter for purposes of policymaking? Should we regard dual-use materials -- ones whose ultimate purpose is inherently uncertain -- as illicit until proven innocuous, or the reverse? The flagship example here is the now-notorious aluminum tubes delivered to Iraq that some once argued could be used in a nuclear weapons program, but which turned out to be part of a rocket program instead. Should the standards of proof and suspicion under uncertainty be applied evenly, or should they vary with the nature of the state under investigation?
This post isn't meant to rehash the Iraq intel but, rather, to flag going forward issues. That said, Levi's questions all but beg such a discussion.
So a few very quick points.
His last Q, to me at least, is a no-brainer.
Standards of proof, particularly post 9/11, must vary with the "nature of the state under investigation."
And, at the end of the day, I have to say that I viewed Saddam's Iraq as a more unstable and unpredictable state actor than Iran and even North Korea. We can debate NoKo--it's admitedly a close call. But for all Kim Jong Il's eccentricities--he hasn't started two land wars with his neighbors (Iran, Kuwait) and/or fired missiles at other neighbors besides (Saudi Arabia, Israel).
P.S. A final point on the old aluminum tubes debacle. Lest we forget--the ballistic missiles program that the aluminum tubes were being used for (rather than a nuclear program) was also violative of Resolution 1441.