Andrew Sullivan writes, in post entitled "Going Backward in Iraq?":
That's part of the extremely depressing message from the latest CSIS report on the liberation. Reconstruction is pitiful; the Shi'a and Sunni insurgencies remain intact; there is growing restlessness in the north. I don't think CSIS has an ax to grind; and their report is chock-full of data and interviews and on-the-ground reporting. It seems to me that the question of how we turn things around should be the most important question of the campaign. And yet it's barely mentioned.[emphasis added]
He's absolutely right--the biggest question of the campaign isn't even close to being adequately addressed by either campaign. Let's take a closer look--starting with Kerry's plan:
John Kerry and John Edwards will make the creation of a stable and secure environment in Iraq our immediate priority in order to lay the foundations for sustainable democracy. They will:Persuade NATO to Make the Security of Iraq one of its Global Missions and to deploy a significant portion of the force needed to secure and win the peace in Iraq. NATO participation will in turn open the door to greater international involvement from non-NATO countries.
Internationalize the Non-Iraqi Reconstruction Personnel in Iraq, to share the costs and burdens, end the continuing perception of a U.S. occupation, and help coordinate reconstruction efforts, draft the constitution and organize elections.
Launch a Massive and Accelerated Training Effort to Build Iraqi Security Forces that can provide real security for the Iraqi people, including a major role for NATO. This is not a task for America alone; we must join as a partner with other nations.
Plan for Iraq’s Future by working with our allies to forgive Iraq’s multi-billion dollar debts and by supporting the development of a new Iraqi constitution and the political arrangements needed to protect minority rights. We will also convene a regional conference with Iraq's neighbors in order to secure a pledge of respect for Iraq's borders and non-interference in Iraq’s internal affairs.
All this sounds swell. But there are lots of problems with it. The biggest one, in my view, is that nearly all of this is already being done by Bush. Bush has already reached out to NATO most recently during the Istanbul summit this past summer. An initial NATO mission is already on the ground analyzing how best to assist the 'train and equip' effort. Yes, it's pretty de minimis fare. But why should we believe John Kerry will be able to secure massive German and, particularly, French participation in a NATO-led 'train and equip' effort (let alone providing large troop contingents)? Simply because he isn't Bush and Berlin and Paris will like the smell of him better? Or because he will dangle a few more reconstruction contracts there way? Sorry, but I'm not buying.
And regardless, how will a more significant NATO presence really help us in Iraq vis-a-vis quashing the insurgency? Will more largely Christian, European soldiers change the dynamics of the war underway? Would it allow us to withdraw troops? Probably not, as we are already thin so new contingents would be more by way of supplementing forces already on the ground. Kerry also suggests a bigger NATO role would, in turn, allow for greater international involvement for non-NATO countries. But Powell has already been working on getting Islamic nations to contribute. Again, what will Kerry do differently here? Will Joe Biden wave a magic wand so that Pakistan, Egypt, Morocco, Bangladesh and Malaysia will be rushing to line up to send in contingents?
Kerry also talks about internationalizing the reconstruction personnel (more Nepalese perhaps?), forgiving Iraqi debt (James Baker III is already working this issue), and calling for a regional conference to secure a plege of non-interference by neighboring countries (a Les Gelb idea, largely a good one, but would Iranian (the country of most concern on porous border issues, at least currently) pledges of non-interference really be worth the paper they were written on?).
Bottom line: Kerry offers little new--and is now, post-Clinton sick bed consultation, talking more about the squandered $200 billion (with Deanesque touches of how wrong it all was to go in and how we have to get out of there as quickly as possible).
So would you forgive me that I'm a skeptic on Kerry and Iraq? He's proposing ideas that are largely already being implemented by Bush and screaming on about getting out of Iraq within four years. It doesn't sound to me like a man who has the will, perseverance or desire to see Iraq through.
And yet, as Fareed Zakaria reminds us, perseverance (Bush's strong suit) has its limits:
Bush's attitude is partly responsible for the problems in Iraq. Perseverance is a good quality, but one can sometimes persevere in error. Months into the occupation, the administration stubbornly insisted that there was no insurgency, that no more troops were necessary, that the Governing Council had widespread support and that disbanding the Army was the right thing to do. It could not accept the inconvenient facts.
I've defended Bush from such criticisms in the past--most recently in the context of Andew Sullivan describing him as something of a stubborn, bull-headed "religious visionary". And yet, talk of seeing Iraq through--devoid of greater detail--is pretty empty talk. Still, make no mistake, it's better to talk in vague terms about seeing Iraq through (Bush)-- than increasingly engage in barely concealed talk of cutting and running (Kerry).
Yet Bush can and must do better. Right now, the January elections are in deep peril of being judged illegitimate because large swaths of Sunni Iraq are no-go areas. This may not concern many Shi'a or Kurds--but would render the electoral results highly problematic. If population centers like Samarra, Falluja and Ramadi simply can't vote--well, Sunnis will be forgiven for thinking that they have now been disenfranchised not only figuratively but literally too. Such an outcome will allow for even riper conditions for insurgency to develop in large swaths of the Sunni triangle.
And yet, the answer is not to flatten Fallujah so as to set up a heavily guarded polling station there. You can't destroy the village to save it. You can't kill hundreds and hundreds of Fallujans so that shattered, grieving families can then 'vote.' That's, of course, dumb policy.
So, what to do? The first step is to better understand just exactly who you are fighting. On that score, check out this primer:
The insurgency is now driven mainly by Islamists,” says Kenneth Katzman, senior Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service. “There are some foreign fighters, but the engine of this is Iraqi Islamists mirroring the tactics of al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.” The Islamists kidnap and behead Americans, Iraqis, and foreigners working with them; detonate suicide car bombs; and set off roadside explosives. They have instituted “Taliban-like rule” in Falluja, according to The New York Times. Also active in the insurgency are Baathists, who a year ago were believed to be leading the effort, but “are in a subordinate position right now,” Katzman says. Overall, the insurgency in Anbar is growing in strength and resourcefulness. “The enemy is becoming more sophisticated in his efforts to destabilize the country,” said General Richard Myers, commander of the joint chiefs of staff, at a press briefing September 7.
So this is no surprise. Islamists and Baathists are the enemy, right? It's like Rummy and Bush have been saying all along--we are merely fighting terrorists (read: beheading Islamists) and 'dead-enders' (unseated Baathists and their closest sympathizers).
Well, not quite (and here is where an opportunity exists for us to mount a more intelligent counter-insurgency operation). Also fighting us:
A broad mix of fighters who resent the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Pamela Hess, reporting for United Press International from Ramadi, wrote that among the insurgents were “smugglers whose economic lines are getting severed by coalition patrols; tribal sheiks angry over their loss of power with the ouster of their patron Saddam Hussein; jihadists of various nationalities who flock to Ramadi ’to get their war on’; nationalists who resent the occupation; citizens who lost friends or relatives in the war or post-war and are seeking revenge; and mercenaries—desperately poor Iraqis who have no hope of jobs in the shattered economy who get paid $50 or $100 to shoot at Americans.”
Check out the motley crew I've bolded. Aggrieved families, mercenaries, tribal sheiks, smugglers, Iraqi nationalists. These are the constituencies that we must have, if not out and out falling in love with us, at least not actively combatting us. As I've argued before, what we need to do when fighting terror and terror-enablers is foster conditions that leave all but the die-hards (in Iraq: Zarqawi's crowd, foreign jihadists, and ex-Baathists) to confront. We need to methodically and ruthlessly isolate our real existential enemy and then confront him head on.
So how to make these other constituencies like us more? Two things, in the main. Security Security Security. And Reconstruction Reconstruction Reconstruction.
Security means different things in different places. In Fallujah--it means not having your house mistaken for a Zarqawi safe-house and bombarded from the air. In Baghdad (outside of Sadr City) it means not being blown up by an errant car bomb. In Sadr City--it means not getting caught up in the cross-fire between U.S. forces and Mahdi Army types. In Mosul and Kirkuk--it means police stations not getting routinely blown up.
Regular readers of my blog know that I've complained a lot about us never having sufficient troops in theater to create secure conditions. This remains true, in my view. That said, that debate has, to large extent, become stale now. We have a pretty conservative force posture in country and are massively involved (did Kerry hear?) in training and equipping new Iraqi forces. There won't be a GI on every street corner now. So we must, at least, get smarter in terms of ensuring security in conjunction with our new Iraqi allies.
For instance, check out this part of a (even more Kurdophile than usual!) Peter Galbraith piece in the NYRB:
Allawi's tough-guy approach has won him admiration not just in official Washington but in Iraq as well. Many Iraqis are fed up with the insurgencies, and citizens of Baghdad appreciate his efforts to deal with that city's kidnappings and armed robberies, which have gone out of control. (Allawi rounded up more than five hundred known criminals, a move that apparently never occurred to the American occupation authorities, since crime was not a problem in the highly fortified Green Zone.)
Well, that's dumb. The fact that many Iraqis are fed up with insurgencies is a major opportunity. So, with the limited resources we have available, let's be smarter about providing security (you know, get off our duffs, before Allawi had to do it, and go and apprehend known criminals enjoying free rein in Baghdad).
The other major part to all of this is the flailing reconstruction effort:
U.S. authorities are planning to shift about $3 billion of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction funds granted by Congress last fall away from major reconstruction projects and to programs designed to build Iraqi security forces and create short-term jobs. As of September 1, $886 million of those funds had been spent. Iraqi unemployment currently stands at between 30 percent and 40 percent.
Unemployment was 25% at the height of the Great Depression in the U.S. Is it any surprise that a country with 40% unemployment will provide succor to myriad insurgents?
So, how likely it is that more short-term jobs (many of them military) will prove helpful in giving Iyad Alawi something to work with to get the tribal shieks, smugglers, nationalists, and so on to give up their arms (or at least stop helping those that won't give them up--the die-hard Baathists with nothing to lose and the fanatical Islamists).
It’s unclear. General William Nash, the director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, says that the United States and Iraq have to succeed in “the long, slow battle of economic and political reconstruction.” His long-term strategy for ending the insurgency includes giving more authority and resources to the Iraqi government so it’s clear that it is in charge, and waging an information campaign to convince the Iraqi public that the insurgents “are not fighting the Americans, they’re fighting Iraq.” The focus of Nash’s plan—and the “hearts and minds” strategy being pursued by U.S. military commanders—is to win over the majority of Iraqis by showing them they can have a future in the new Iraqi state. A September 2 International Crisis Group report also emphasizes the importance of reconstruction. “Iraq desperately needs an economic recovery strategy to escape its vicious circle of hardship, discontent, and violence,” it says.
It's time to stop the Rumsfeldian-Politburo style recitations about how many schools or hospitals are being built. Let's be plain Mr. Rumsfeld. Large parts of the country remain in dismal shape.
The ICG, as is typical, makes some very smart recommendations, including:
"Address immediate socio-economic needs by:
(a) designing projects with a visible, direct impact and significant employment potential, such as street cleaning, garbage collection, sewage systems repair and local byroads repair;
(b) retraining former members of the Iraqi armed forces and employing them in state-owned enterprises;
(c) offering credit facilities for housing construction and repair;
(d) providing farmers with subsidised agricultural inputs; and
(e) generally consulting with Iraqis, in particular associations, labour unions, and groups representing the unemployed, on the design and implementation of projects."
And also:
1. Produce, in cooperation with the donor community, a comprehensive plan for reconstruction, including:
(a) a strategy for economic diversification that gradually steers the country away from its dependence on oil revenues;
(b) active support for the industrial and agricultural sectors; and
(c) postponed privatisation of state companies until market conditions and institution-building show considerable improvement.
I've bolded this last portion of an ICG recommendation because it reminds us how utopic people like Ken 'Cakewalk' Adleman were before this war. Privatize large industry Polish 'shock therapy' style! Get the oil on tap to pay for all the reconstruction soonest! Free and fair elections under the aegis of Great Leader Ahmad!
Democracy! Whiskey! Sexy!
Look, there is a lot of blame to go around and hindsight is 20-20. But as someone who has worked for some of the neo-cons now working in or around the Pentagon (in the context of the morally justifiable and critical 'training and equipping' effort of the Bosnian Federation Army), I have to say (with genuine regret because I sometimes share their idealism and moral neo-Reaganite shadings) too many critical errors of judgment were made. Errors that, finally, showcase a dismal lack of understanding of the full complexities of both nation-building generally, and the region and Iraq specifically. For me to feel more comfortable supporting George Bush--I need to know that new policymakers are going to be in lead positions on Iraq policy in any Bush II (I'll be following that issue very closely here over the next couple of months). Early indications are that's the case--which makes it easier for me to support Dubya over what appears to increasingly be a 'cut and run' Kerry Iraq policy largely staffed with Clinton alums that I find underwhelming as foreign policy practitioners.
(Note: I've written this in great haste before a full day of meetings. Forgive me awkward sentences and typos!). More soon.