B.D. reader DL, currently based in Germany, sends in the below report on the state of U.S.-German relations (and with apologies to my always generously 'on call' German website designer Thomas Eberle!). They're bad, of course, and DL sketches out some of the whys. Not suprisingly, he's not a big fan of Gerard Schroeder. Er, I'm not either.
The Chancellor will largely be remembered as a rank panderer and opportunist. As someone unable to address structural defects in the German economy. And, most pitiably perhaps, as someone who tried to forge, unconvincingly and ineffectively, a Franco-German union in a bid for hegemony over Euro-land emitting from Berlin/Paris via proxies in Brussels. Despite theatrical summitry of late with Zapatero, this policy has proven a sad (if predictable) failure (Iraq quite apart--the Poles, Brits, Italians would never have gone for some form of Gallic-Teuton tutelage).
Put simply, Gerhard Schroeder will go down in history as a deeply mediocre Chancellor. Now, over to DL!
Understanding German Anger
At no time in the history of U.S.–German post-war relations has there been as much German anger directed at the United States as there is today. A certain amount of turbulence is normal in any bilateral relationship, especially in one that served as the foundation of the Cold War order. But even during the deployment of Pershing II missiles, when our differences were strong enough to give birth to a political party, there were voices of reason, usually within government, that cautioned against anti-Americanism. Today those voices have disappeared. The German government is now the leading critic of the United States and it has liberated German society from an unspoken taboo. The result has been an unprecedented outpouring of anti-American sentiment in the media and among the populace.
Germans would like us to believe our President is the reason. Their litany of his supposed affronts to world order is long. But underlying the criticism of American policy is a foundation of anti-Americanism that has just as little to do with our President as it does with the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, it is the result of Germany’s inability to adjust to drastically changed circumstances and its loss of influence over domestic and international trends.
Anti-Americanism is not new. For anyone who has spent time in Germany listening to the talk on the streets it’s apparent that a long-term security alliance can never rid a society of its prejudices. It’s understandable that defeat and occupation culminating in an alliance of necessity does not breed admiration. But compounding post-war resentment were Cold War expectations. A constant theme of the German-American relationship during the Cold War was the German desire for a partnership of equals. That was an unrealistic goal. There can be no equality when one nation’s social and economic well-being depend on another nation’s security guarantee.
Germany’s troubles start with demographics. Germans are struggling to replenish their numbers and losing ground. If the childless trend continues, the population will reach a point where no number of children will be enough to sustain ethnic Germans as a group. Baring an upswing in the birth rate Germany is faced with two choices, neither of them acceptable. It must either encourage emigration and change the definition of German-ness, or face extinction.
Germany is also wrestling with waning economic influence, a declining military, and a collapsing welfare state. It is no mystery why Germany seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It must institutionalize influence that was formerly exercised by virtue of economic power before the rest of the world realizes what every German already knows. Germany is a shadow of the nation that created the entitlement state that became the envy of socialists and refugees worldwide. When the Berlin Wall fell and Chancellor Kohl promised East Germans a flowering landscape within ten years, the conventional wisdom was that western investors would flock to the east with jobs that would finance reunification. But after conducting history’s largest State-sponsored transfer of wealth from one geographic region to another, Germans have come to the conclusion that no amount of money will be able to fix what’s wrong with East Germany. International investors headed east but they didn’t stop until they reached Asia. The focus of economic competition in the 21st century will be between Asia and America. Germany’s BMWs and Mercedes come from North Carolina and Alabama and it’s only a matter of time before its Volkswagens come from China. German companies have voted with their factories.
Germany’s declining military should neither be a surprise nor cause for concern. As a member of the NATO alliance, the majority of German defense costs during the Cold War were borne by the United States, freeing up valuable GDP for social entitlements. And while Germany can continue to starve its military without consequence, it cannot influence strategic events any longer by virtue of its geography. For half a century Germany was at the center of American security policy. Germany had grown used to being consulted on every nuance of Cold War diplomacy. Then came 9-11 and a strategic shift took place that Germany has still not comprehended. It is neither the focus of American foreign policy nor America’s most important ally. Military events in Pakistan and economic developments in India are of far more importance to U.S. security and economic well-being. But Germany labors under the illusion that its interests should continue to be of vital importance to the United States as if it were the natural state of affairs and any deviation from the Cold War arrangement lacks legitimacy. Germany’s failure to influence U.S. actions subsequent to 9-11 is cited as evidence of American unilateralism rather than a changed strategic environment where it no longer enjoys a privileged position.
These are uncomfortable facts that demand change, something Germans do not willingly embrace. Unfortunately, its Chancellor won an election by pandering to latent anti-Americanism, increasing the probability it will be used to gain political advantage in the future. While that may be a safe response to the latest opinion polls, it is no substitute for national policy.
Indeed. (BTW, readers are more than welcome to send in such pieces for posting here. I hope to do it more frequently going forward. Particularly as it makes my life easier--mitigating somewhat the (largely self-inflicted) pressures to post daily).
Posted by Gregory Djerejian at October 20, 2004 09:51 AM