October 08, 2005

Summary of ICG report on the implications of Dar ul-Islam, Part 1

I missed this when it first came out, but ICG has a great report out on the threat posed by Dar ul-Islam, the movement that al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian arm Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) can be seen as the major outgrowth of. One issue that is only touched on peripherally here but is discussed in far greater detail in other ICG reports, is that Dar ul-Islam grew out of the Indonesian Hezbollah, an Islamist militia formed during World War 2 by the Japanese to assist them in their conquest of Indonesia alongside the "anti-colonialist" Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) puppet government under Sukarno. While the links between World War 2-era Islamists (notably the Mufti of Jerusalem) and the Nazis are reasonably well-known, I'm surprised the ties between the Japanese and the Indonesian Islamists hasn't come under more scrutiny given that while Islamist SS units like the 13th Hanjar division and Ostmusselmanische SS regiment were destroyed at the conclusion of the war, JI is a direct organizational descendant of the Indonesia Hezbollah.

This summary is my summary of the outstanding ICG report on the topic, with some minor spelling differences due to my own preferences (Dar ul-Islam instead of Darul Islam, Suharto instead of Soeharto, etc.) that I hope is useful to others wishing to know more on the topic.


* After the September 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, evidence soon emerged that JI leaders Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top were involved. But evidence also surfaced that they were working alongside a Dar ul-Islam offshoot termed the Banten Ring by Indonesian police that provided logistical support, field cooperation, and the actual suicide bomber. Questions soon emerged as to whether JI was stronger or weaker than it was before the Bali bombing and whether bin Husin and Top were still in control of the JI leadership or were acting on their own. These questions missed a key point, namely that even if JI was seriously weakened by the arrest of much its senior leadership post-Bali that it can still operate by forging ties to other offshoots of Dar ul-Islam like the Banten Ring, suggesting that it might be productive to look back at the splits and fissures of Dar ul-Islam since its conceptions.

* Dar ul-Islam is an extraordinarily resilient organization, having gone through cycles of decline and growth over the course of its existence. Every time the old leadership seems to have passed out of relevance, a new generation of even more militant followers have emerged to breath new life into the movement. As a result, the Dar ul-Islam strongholds of the 1950s are now strongholds of JI and al-Qaeda support, with the bases of the Banten Ring overlapping with some of the last pockets of resistance to the Indonesian military in West Java in 1962. Past and present incarnations of Dar ul-Islam continue to provide recruiting pools for jihadi groups and their support networks can provide logistical aid and shelter to terrorist groups as needed.

* Over the decades, many of the younger Dar ul-Islam members have formed many new groups, the largest of which is JI. This common Dar ul-Islam bond facilitates contacts and communication across the movement, JI, the Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahideen Council), Laskar Jundallah (Army of the Legion of Allah), the Banten Ring, and Angkatan Mujahideen Islam Nusantara (AMIN), not counting the innumerable Dar ul-Islam veterans who maintain their own popular followings outside any formal organizations, those who know one another from school, intermarry, and stay in contact across generational lines. These ties have also led to feuding, bickering, and informing on one another to the authority, but the movement itself has endured even as its constituent elements continue to change.

The Defeat of Dar ul-Islam

* Dar ul-Islam emerged in 1948 with a regional rebellion in West Java under Sukarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, followed by similar outbreaks in Central Java and later independent Dar ul-Islam rebellions in South Kalimantan in 1950, South Sulawesi in 1952 under Kahar Muzakkar, and Aceh in 1953 under Daud Bereueh. The rationales for these rebellions differed from place to place, but most were rooted in the discontent of the Indonesian Hezbollah at the concessions that the new government had made to the infidel Dutch or its failure to give them the respect they deserved in the new national army. In the beginning, religious factors were not paramount, but it became a common bond between the leaders and by 1953 they formed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) with Kartosuwirjo as the group's leader. Seven regional commands (komando wilayah) were formed in Priangan Timur (centered in Tasikmalaya but spreading out to Jakarta, Purwakarta, and Cirebon), Central Java, East Java, South Sulawesi, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Serang-Banten, Bogor, Garut, Sumedang, and Bandung. Later, in the mid-1970s, komando wilayah were set up in Lampung and the Jakarta metropolitan area.

* In August 1962 after Kartosuwirjo's capture, the Indonesian military persuaded 32 of his top subordinates to denounce their actions and pledge allegiance to the government in return for amnesty. In their Joint Proclamation (Ikrar Bersama), they said that Dar ul-Islam and the NII rebellion was both wrong and misguided and that they had sinned against the people of West Java and now affirmed their loyalty to the Indonesian government. The signatories included many individuals who would later be arrested in the late 1970s for involvement in Komando Jihad.

* The betrayal and defection of so many of Kartosuwirjo's senior lieutenants questioned the issue of succession following his October 1962 execution. He had no second-in-command and while he had added a Dar ul-Islam regulation that any successor be chosen from the komando wilayah leaders and other members of his high command, but no explanation was ever given at how this was supposed to occur. All 6 contenders had some shortcoming: the West Java leaders Djadja Sudjadi of Garut and Adah Djalani of Tasikmalaya as well as Agus Abdullah Sukunsari had all signed the Joint Declaration, Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati of Kuningan had been in prison since 1953 (though he was released in 1965 to help the government fight the Indonesian Communist Party), Sulawesi leader Kahar Muzakkar was unacceptable because of his efforts in 1962 to form a federation that rejected Kartosuwirjo's concept of an Islamic state, and Aceh leader Daud Beureueh had surrendered in May 1962. As a result, Dar ul-Islam remained leaderless for nearly a decade as many of its former leaders received cars, land, and business rights in return for their cooperation with the government.

* Ahmad Sobari, the bupati (district head) of Priangan Timur near the time of Tasikmalaya, refused to abandon the struggle and founded the Islamic State of Tejamaya (Negara Islam Tejamaya, NIT) in 1969. But the new organization never achieved any lasting success after Sobari's arrest in 1978 and only maintains a handful of members in the Tasikmalaya area.

* As Dar ul-Islam's leaders feuded, the 12-15,000 fighters who had joined Kartosuwirjo during the height of his rebellion in 1956-57 were left without guidance but able to be recruited by members of the movement again. Some Dar ul-Islam leaders achieved reproachment with the Indonesian military in 1965-66 when they offered weaponry in return for agreeing to use it to wipe out the communists in West Java, Aceh, and North Sumatra. Suharto's powerful intelligence chief, Ali Murtopo, intervened with the dictator to save Dar ul-Islam from annihilation in 1966 when he learned that Suharto was planning to use the mass killings of that year to exterminate the last remnants of Dar ul-Islam.

* The Dar ul-Islam leadership saw cooperation with the army against the communists as a means through which they could both exterminate infidels while avoiding further arrests. A former NII regiment commander, Opa Mustopa, tried to reform the rebellion in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya in 1967, but he was arrested in short order and spent the next 3 years in prison.

* By the late 1960s, NII Aceh leader Daud Beureueh became a strong candidate for leader of Dar ul-Islam with Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakkar both dead by virtue of his being both a former Indonesian Hezbollah commander and the only one of Kartosuwirjo's original lieutenants who had retained his authority over the movement in Aceh. In 1967, he sent envoys to the remaining Dar ul-Islam leadership to ask their opinion on reuniting the movement. Two delegates returned, requesting that Beureueh become their new leader, to which he replied that only the Ummah could choose a new leader but that he would instead serve as All-Indonesia Military Commander (Komandemen Perang Seluruh Indonesia, KPSI). A stream of Dar ul-Islam leaders traveled to Aceh afterwards, including Aceng Kurnia, Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran), and Kahar Muzzakar's former lieutenant Ale A.T.

* In the late 1960s, Dar ul-Islam began to emerge from the period of inactivity that had plagued the movement since the signing of the Joint Proclamation. Aceng Kurnia began to instruct the children of Dar ul-Islam adherents, including Kartosuwirjo's son Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, inspiring them to continue their mission to make Indonesia an Islamic state. One of Aceng's students was Abdullah Said, an admirer of Kahar Muzzakar who founded the Hidayatullah pesantren (madrassa) outside Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, which would in more recent times be used to support and shelter jihadis fighting Christians in Ambon and Sulawesi.

* In West Java, recruits to Dar ul-Islam saw the movement not just as a political philosophy but also as the fullfillment of the Wangsit Siliwangi prophecy. According to the prophecy, Pasundan (modern West Java) will only be great when it is ruled by the followers of Kian Santang, the son of the 15th century Sundanese king Prabu Siliwangi. According to Indonesian legend, the Prophet Mohammed's nephew Ali bin Thalib first brought Islam to Pasundan and Kian Santang was among the first of his converts. During their meeting, Ali thrust his staff down in front of Kian Santang (whose family claimed to possess supernatural powers) and asked him to move it. Kian could not, so Ali recited a verse from the Qu'ran and easily pulled the staff out, convincing Kian to convert to Islam and take the name Sunan Rahmat. Dar al-Islam leaders in the Tasikmalaya area exploited this prophecy by telling the local population that their movement were the true followers of Kian Santang and that power would be theirs if they joined them.

* 10 of Aceng's students in the Bandung area led by Tahmid formed the Penggerakan Rumah Tangga Islam (PRTI) in the failed hope of consolidating Dar ul-Islam under their control. When that failed, Aceng began working with PRTI to form a committee to reunite former NII commanders. Danu Mohammed Hassan, who was Aceng's contact in the Indonesian intelligence coordinating agency BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara), was then contacted by Aceng to use BAKIN to support a reunion of the old NII leadership. With the 1971 elections drawing near, BAKIN saw the possibility of drawing former rebels into Suharto's Golkar ruling party and gave Aceng's committee $600 (R.p. 250,000) to finance their activities.

* Starting on April 21, 1971, Hassan hosted an NII reunion at his mansion in Situaksan, Bandung. Over the next 3 days, nearly 3,000 former rebels took part in Hassan's "Ex-NII Social," with Colonel Pitut Suharto delivering a speech explaining to the Islamists why they should support Golkar. Behind all the normal electioneering, however, a quiet consolidation was taking place as Dar ul-Islam members who had not seen each other for years met together to discuss the future. One fault line that quickly emerged was the issue of accepting BAKIN support, with Djaja Sudjaji and Kadar Solihat being vehemently opposed but many others seeing nothing wrong with taking money from their former persecutors.

* Following the Situaksan social, a series of secret meetings sprung up hosted by Hassan or Aceng to complete the revival of Dar ul-Islam. Because of the controversial nature of working with BAKIN, not everyone in the movement was informed but BAKIN was kept fully aware of their activities. The idea of working with Islamists was the brainchild of Ali Murtopo, Suharto's intelligence adviser and the head of Opsus (Special Operations) for the Indonesian government. A former Indonesian Hezbollah member, Murtopo was able to convince the Dar ul-Islam leaders not only to trust him but also to believe that he was dedicated to their goal of an Islamic theocracy in Indonesia. At a 1973 meeting in Cibuntu, Hassan, Aceng, and Adah Djalani drafted a new command structure for her movement with Daud Beureueh as their new military commander.

* In 1974, the Dar ul-Islam leaders for Aceh, Java, and South Sulawesi met at a house on Jalan Mahoni in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta in what would later be known as the Mahoni meeting and marked the success of efforts over the last 5 years to revive and unify the movement. Daud Beureueh came from Aceh while Ale A.T. came from Makassar bearing an apology for the actions of the NII rebels who had declared an Islamic Republic of South Sulawesi in 1962 rather than an Islamic Republic of Indonesia. Out of the meeting, Beureueh was named leader and KPSI, Gaos Tawfiq was named military commander, Beureuh and Ale A.T. agreed to share their foreign affairs portfolios, Adah Djalani became Home Affairs Minister with the assistance of Aceng and Kartosuwirjo's other son Dodo Mohammed Darda (Abu Darda), and Hassan was made military commander for West Java. Collectively, these leaders became membership of the Imamate Council (Dewan Imamah) with Beureueh as the chairman. Dar ul-Islam was divided into three territorial distinctions: Java-Madura under Hassan, Sumatra under Gaos Tawfiq, and Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia under Ale A.T. An agreement was made to continue their work towards an Islamic state, but Beureueh cautioned that they needed to focus on diplomacy and consolidation before they began to move openly again.


* Kartosuwirjo, Kahar Muzakkar, and Daud Beureueh are all regarded as heroes by Indonesian Islamists. While some of their followers have lost credibility for deviant religious beliefs or selling out to the government, these three continue to inspire new generations of jihadis. Ale A.T. was a mentor to Agus Dwikarna, Gaos Tawfiq (now 74) retains the respect of the Dar ul-Islam movement despite his former status as an Indonesian intelligence asset, and many JI members retain contact with him and his associates.

* During their persecution, Dar ul-Islam leaders in West Java legitimized the doctrine of fa'i (criminal activity, usually robbery, to raise money for jihad) that is now practiced by all members of the movement including JI. This reliance on fa'i has led to the creation of a symbiotic relationship between the Indonesian criminal movement on one end and JI on the other. The latter badly needs the money, while the former receive religious sanction for their criminal activities. Fa'i has now become a standard part of the JI recruiting and fundraising pitch in Indonesian urban areas.

* In the 1950s, NII commanders divided Indonesia into regions where they had control and could begin setting up an Islamist theocracy in addition to serving as a refuge for supporters fleeing government-controlled areas, areas that were contested but could be brought under control through dawaa (preaching) in addition to military gains, areas where they were actively fighting the government. In late 2000, some Dar ul-Islam leaders were still talking of the need to set up an secure base (Qaeda Aminah) under their control where they could uphold sha'riah and maintain a refuge for the faithful. Until 2003, Poso served this role for JI leaders based in Indonesia.

* The West Java Dar ul-Islam continues to instill the three-part doctrine of iman (faith), jihad, and hijrah (flight). Iman remains the core of the movement, while hijra is an integral part of the belief that whenever the enemy is stronger the faithful should take flight and head to a place where they can build up their numbers to the point where jihad can be waged against the enemy. Malaysia served as the site of hijrah for JI founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir in the 1980s, Jakarta played that role for madrassa students in central Java, and today Mindanao in the southern Philippines serves that role. Understanding hijrah is an integral part of understanding contemporary JI strategy.

Komando Jihad

* In 1976, a violent phase of Dar ul-Islam began with the creation of Komando Jihad, whose creation was manipulated by Ali Murtopo and BAKIN, who used the organization to serve their own ends. Dar ul-Islam's leadership were not victims of Murtopo's plot, but rather saw Murtopo's schemes as their first opportunity to mount a guerrilla war against the government since their defeat in the early 1960s. Former BAKIN head Sutopo Yuwono warned Murtopo against getting too close to Dar ul-Islam's leadership, but Murtopo believed that by encouraging the Islamists to act prematurely they would be all that easier to crush and discredit.

* After the Mahoni meeting, Dar ul-Islam's military structure was further refined. Hassan brought 2 men, Ateng Djalani Setiawan and Zaenal Abidin, became members of the Imamate Council even though they had both surrendered to the military in 1961 and helped them to hunt down fellow NII rebels before the end of the insurrection. Hassan claimed that they both wanted to atone for their past actions for joining jihad. This view of atonement is one of the reasons why feuds within even the most extreme elements of Dar ul-Islam can splinter, regroup, and splinter again. As long as there is still a jihad to fight, atonement is always possible.

* Hassan's decision to bring 2 new prior collaborators into the Imamate Council prompted a schism within Dar ul-Islam between those who were willing to accept BAKIN funding and those opposed to it. In 1975, a number of Dar ul-Islam dissidents based in Limbangan, Garut announced that they would henceforth be known as the fillah (with God) wing of Dar ul-Islam, as opposed to the fisabilillah (those who followed God for the sake of jihad) Imamate Council. The fillah Dar ul-Islam would devote itself to education and social welfare, while the fisabilillah prepared itself for military action. By early 1976, Hassan convinced Gaos Tawfiq to form Komando Jihad with the intention of starting a revolution that would begin Sumatra and then sweep across western Java while leaving Gaos Tawfiq to plan the military campaign.

* Gaos Tawfiq was born in Garut in 1930 and joined first the Indonesian Hezbollah in 1947 and later the Pasukan Dar ul-Islam (PADI). In 1954, he was captured by the Indonesian military in Sukabumi, West Java and forcibly relocated to Rantau Perapat, North Sumatra with 1,500 Islamist POWs. Once there, he began to organize local ulema, fellow relocatees, and even some soldiers into the anti-Sukarno resistance. By 1958, he had organized the 350-man force Operasi Sabang-Merauke that succeeded for 4 days in taking control of the city of Medan. When defeat at the hands of the Indonesian military seemed certain, Gaos transferred his allegiance over to Daud Beureueh and his brief success in Medan gave him enormous prestige among Islamist radicals.

* Gaos's first step in forming Komando Jihad (Komji) was holding a meeting in Sukabumi in 1976 where a flag for the group and a special forces unit were created. Recruiting men he had known since the 1950s as well as those who had joined Dar ul-Islam in Medan in the 1970s. One of the second group of recruits was Abdullah Umar, a 24 year-old ustadz (religious teacher) from Larantuka. Killed by a firing squad in 1989, Umar was not only an important figure in Dar ul-Islam and Komji, he also inducted the head of JI's second mantiqi (regional command), Abdullah Anshori (Ibnu Thoyib, Abu Fatih), into JI and introduced Dar ul-Islam to his village, producing a number of followers in an unlikely corner of Indonesia who are still active today.

* Komji operations were launched simultaneously in North, South, and West Sumatra and Lampung, including bombing pro-government mosques they deemed to be masjid dhiror (mosques that divided the Ummah). After several bombings in Medan in late 1976, Gaos Tawfiq and his followers were arrested. During his 1978 trial, several witnesses testified to attending Komji bombmaking courses and had reached an agreement with the Libyan embassy in Kuala Lumpur for weaponry that never arrived. One of the accused Komji members, Timsar Zubil, was sentenced to death in 1979 but was later commuted to life and finally released in 1999. During an interview in 2001, he recanted his earlier actions and admitted that he had sinned and visited the 1982 Nur ul-Islam mosque in Padang and 2 churches in Medan to apologize for his actions.

* After Timsar Zubil's arrest, Abdullah Umar fled to the Islamic boarding school at Pondok Ngruki was taken in because he as well as future JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir had the same alma mater - the moderate pesantren Gontor in East Java.

* In Lampung and Palembang, the lead Komji operative was Asep Warman (Musa), a Garut native who had been involved in Dar ul-Islam in his early years, arrested, and moved to Lampung after his relase. He was active in the local Dar ul-Islam movement there under the leadership of Pak Ujeng and Abdul Qadir Baraja, who continues to be active in jihadi circles today. Baraja led the Komji operations in Palembang in 1977 and supervised raids on police stations in order to secure weapons. He was finally arrested and imprisoned, but later led a prison break that added to his reputation and that of his followers. Warman carried out 16 raids in southern Sumatra prior to Gaos Tawfiq's arrest, which prompted him to flee to Jakarta in 1978 with the other Lampung fighters. In Jakarta they were given shelter at the pesantren Misi Islam headed up by Abdullah Hanafi, whose son Hasyim Hanafi now serves as a key aide to JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir arranges visitations for him in prison. Another of Misi Islam's alumni was Abu Dzar, the father-in-law of al-Qaeda operative Omar Farouk.

* After Gaos Tawfiq's arrest, Asep Warman and his comrades joined forces with Abdullah Umar and took up the nom de guerre "Terror Warman," launching an assassination campaign against individuals suspected of informing on Komji and Dar ul-Islam adherents, killing a university rector who had informed on JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, a man they suspected of informing on Abdul Qadir Baraja, and special forces soldier Farid Ghozali. The income from their robberies was so great that the rest of the Komji leadership, who only learned of Warman's activities through media reports. Abdullah Umar and Warman were apprehended by Indonesian authorities in 1979, but Warman escaped from prison and increased his reputation as a pious bandit, becoming the main Dar ul-Islam fundraiser and even undertaking contract raids to secure consumer goods for the Dar ul-Islam leadership. He was finally hunted down and killed by the Indonesian military on July 23, 1981 in Soreang Kolot, Bandung.

* After Warman's death, JI founder Abdullah Sungkar sought to find a replacement so he began recruiting criminals in the Condet area of Jakarta. A question of succession for the broader Komji after the Indonesian military abducted Daud Bereueh in 1978 and held him in Jakarta in secret, rendering him unable to act as KPSI and throwing Dar ul-Islam into chaos. Open fighting broke out between the fillah-fisabilillah factions, culminating in a rash of murders of senior members of both groups in 1978.


* Abdullah Umar is dead, but his nephew Abu Bakar continues to preach at a Dar ul-Islam mosque in Jakarta. Some members of the congregation including Ahmad Said Maulana became new recruits to jihadi groups after the violence in Ambon erupted.

* Emeng Abdurahman, one of Warman's followers, remains active in Bandung as the imam of a Dar ul-Islam faction loyal to the late Abdul Fatah Wirananggapati.

* Former Komji leader and training instructor Abdul Qadir Baraja is now the head of the Salafist group Khilafat ul-Muslimin. Based in Lampung and Sumbawa, Baraja now lectures regularly in Bekasi and several JI members had joined his movement, attracted by its message of setting up an Islamic republic in Indonesia.

* The exploits of Komji have become legendary for many Dar ul-Islam followers, particularly the story of how Warman Shaheed escaped from prison. Warman's life has become a hero story passed down among Dar ul-Islam families, who have taught their children to follow in the footsteps of this unlikely hero. Warman is seen not as a thief and a gangster, but rather as a pious bandit who lived the life of a devout Muslim who died for his faith.

* The experience of Komji also shows that no matter how deeply Indonesian intelligence was able to infiltrate the group and exploit it for Murtopo's ends, the organization was also adept at using BAKIN and Opsus for its own ends. The fact that Indonesian intelligence had so many contacts in Dar ul-Islam would eventually lead it to believe that its contacts were actually working first and foremost for the government rather than for the movement. Komji also shows how, more than a decade after the end of the NII rebellion, a handful of men could still undertake considerable anti-government activity at the height of Suharto's oppression. This is a valuable lesson as far as understanding the need to root out JI, as even a handful of survivors could easily be serve as the next generation of militant Islam in Indonesia.

Power Struggle in Java

* From 1979-1987, Adah Djalani emerged as the new leader of the movement just as the Suharto crackdown intensified, resulting in the arrest of most of its Java leadership. JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and Ajengan Masduki both contended for leadership of the movement, with both drawing new recruits from increased dawaa programs in Jakarta from 1983-1987, which continued even after Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir fled to Malaysia in 1985, the same year the first Indonesian Islamists left for Afghanistan in large numbers to fight the Soviet Union.

* In July 1979, a meeting was held in Tangerang near Jakarta attended by 16 Dar ul-Islam leaders in which Adah Djalani was chosen as the new leader in a bloodless coup. He then eliminated a key rival, worsening the schism between the fillah and fisabilillah factions of the movement that existed since 1975. To fisabilillah adherents, the fillah faction had abandoned jihad and the legacy of the NII rebellion and were traitors to the Dar ul-Islam movement along with their leader, Djaja Sudjadi. In 1978, Adah and his supporters sought out a fatwa from Ajengan Masduki about the permissibility of having two leaders under Islamic law. Believing it to be a hypothetical question, Masduki replied that if there were two leaders then one had to be false and therefore worthy of death. Seizing upon this fatwa, Adah ordered Djaja shot and killed with several of his men, ending any chance of healing the schism through negotiation. From that point onwards, the Dar ul-Islam movement was irrevocably splintered between fillah and fisabilillah, with only the latter producing jihadis.

* During the Tangerang meeting, Adah claimed that both Daud Beureueh (still in Indonesian custody) and the imprisoned Gaos Tawfiq had chosen him as the new Dar ul-Islam leader and presented a copy of the letter that Beureueh had sent Gaos when he appointed him as military commander. After Adah's accession, the Dar ul-Islam old guard from West Java appeared to be back in control and several NII commanders who had served under Kartosuwirjo became members of the Imamate Council. Yet despite the power of the West Java leadership, Central and East Java had over time become far more prominent for Dar ul-Islam. After Kartosuwirjo's defeat in 1962, many of his commanders had returned to their old villages and begun recruiting new members of the movement. One of them, Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) would recruit the future Bali bombers Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Ali Irmon before his arrest in Blitar in January 1977. Adah retained Gaos Tawfiq and Ale A.T. as the Dar ul-Islam leaders in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and eastern Indonesia. Ules Sudjai was brought in to replace BAKIN official Danu Mohammed Hassan as the Dar ul-Islam leader in Java-Madura. Adah's reign was brief, however, as he had only been head of the Imamate Council for a short time when he and the rest of the Council were arrested for involvement in Komji.


* Several members of the Dar ul-Islam leadership in 1979 have direct links to JI. Haji Rais who attended the Tangerang meeting is the grandfather of Abdul Rauf (Sam), who took part in robbing a gold store immediately prior to the Bali bombing at the behest of JI leader Imam Samudra.

* Haji Faleh of Kudus who was the head of the second komando wilayah in Central Java during this period, is the father of Abu Rusdan, who succeeded Abu Bakar Bashir as the active leader of JI following his imprisonment and had been inducted into Dar ul-Islam at the age of 15 by Aceng Kurnia.

* Mohammed Zainuri, the father of the notorious JI operative Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi (who died in 2003 after having escaped from a Manila maximum security prison), was active in Komando Jihad during this period and later arrested as part of the government crackdown.

* In July 2003, Indonesian police raids unearthed a wealth of JI ammunition and documents led to the arrest of Tawfiq Ahmad (the son of Dar ul-Islam leader Hussein Ahmad) in December. Ahmad is accused of working with Abu Rusdan but there was insufficient evidence to hold him and he was released after a few days.

* Despite the deep rift between the fillah and fisabilillah factions of Dar ul-Islam, the movement did not collapse. Similarly, if JI schisms, both factions could easily survive and the more militant wing could easily serve as both the source of ongoing problems as well as the progenitors of equally militant offspring.

Posted by at October 8, 2005 03:56 AM | TrackBack (0)

Its typical of Darling to resort to a game of "six degrees of Hirohito" in order to exaggerate and distort the nature of the "threat" posed by Indonesian Islamist terrorist organizations. The simple fact is that you could say much the same thing about every contemporary movement in Indonesia --- the Japanese were seen (at least initially) as liberators of Indonesia from the clutches of Dutch colonialism. Its notable that Darling mocks the anti-colonialist aspirations of the Indonesia people in his little propaganda exercise here----Sukarno and his BPUKI were not "anti-colonialist" in quotes, they were genuinely anti-colonialism.

No doubt had Dan not been in diapers at the time, he would have regarded the apartheid regime of South Africa a bullwark against communism....

Posted by: p.lukasiak at October 8, 2005 07:35 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Its typical of Darling to resort to a game of "six degrees of Hirohito" in order to exaggerate and distort the nature of the "threat" posed by Indonesian Islamist terrorist organizations. The simple fact is that you could say much the same thing about every contemporary movement in Indonesia --- the Japanese were seen (at least initially) as liberators of Indonesia from the clutches of Dutch colonialism. Its notable that Darling mocks the anti-colonialist aspirations of the Indonesia people in his little propaganda exercise here----Sukarno and his BPUKI were not "anti-colonialist" in quotes, they were genuinely anti-colonialism.

No doubt had Dan not been in diapers at the time, he would have regarded the apartheid regime of South Africa a bullwark against communism....

Posted by: p.lukasiak at October 8, 2005 07:36 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink

Actually, Paul, it was for a time, although it was a rather inefficient
way to do so. The Nationalist party; very much in the model of our
own Bourbon Redeemers turned Dixie Crats on steroids, continued
to beat the moderate liberal parties and banned the Communist
elements. (not unlike what could have happened in a hypothethical
Byrnes/Thurmond regime of the kind; mused about by Senator Lott) The ANC up to that point, was a rough analogue of the NAACP
except with a stronger Dubois/Marxist contingent, Upon their
banning, a turn toward the likes of the Black Panthers and Robert
Williams was manifested in the strongly Xhosa "The Spear of the Nation" and AZAPO organizations. The Soviets provided support , through the form of Patrice Lumumba U, and other KGB/GRU intake site, not for their great love on the peoples of Azania; (ask the Chechens Ingush & Dagestanis, whether they were considered even 3rd class citizens) but for the key mineral resources; eg; gold, platinum, uranium, manganese,) plus their role as strategic chokepoint, between NATo allies and the Middle East, When
Mandela followed that pattern, after Sharpesville, which led to his
conviction, and because of his violent advocacy, denial of 'prisoner
of conscience, this led to more 'militancy' by Umkhonto, specially
the rising new generation, characterized by the likes of current PM
Thado Mbeki, It was the second wave of detente in the late 90s, that gave Deklerk the latitude to release Mandela. Ironically, the
current threat stemming from the region, lies with the likes of the
formerly apolitical middle class of the Capetown region, some of whose residents, have taken to jihadism, as a reaction to the crime
and other disorders that came with the liberation, and some legacies of apartheid, combined

Posted by: narciso at October 9, 2005 12:37 AM | Permalink to this comment Permalink
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